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16 May 1984

# Latin America Report

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16 May 1984

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## PETROLEUM PICTURE BRIGHTENS AS DRILLING PROGRESSES

## Canefield Oil Finds

Bridgetown THE NATION in English 3 Apr 84 p 1

[Text] Preliminary tests on the new oil well drilled at Canefield, St Thomas, a month ago have indicated that there "are some dsposits of oil" there.

Making this disclosure to The Nation yesterday, general manager of the Barbados National Oil Company (BNOC), Mr Mal McElroy, said that servicing equipment would soon be moved to the site for further indepth studies.

Mr McElroy said: "We have done only preliminary tests so far and these have shown that some deposits of oil and natural gas are down there. We cannot say exactly what quantities there are because we have to do the tests taking in the various zones one-by-one."

He disclosed that the servicing rig should be on the site by the middle of this month and testing should begin immediately after.

The well was drilled to a depth of 2 576 feet by the Canadian oil drilling company, Bowbally, under contract from Petro Canada Limited, the Canadian Government corporation with which the Barbados Government has an agreement.

Mr McElroy said that if the tests proved there are commercial quantities of oil at Canefield, exploitation would begin immediately. If the tests showed large deposits of natural gas, this might not be tapped for some years as the country now produces more than it consumes.

Since completing the drilling exploration at Canefield, Bowbally has moved equipment to Lower Parks (near Dark Hole), St Joseph. Other sites prepared for drilling include Saddle Back, St Thomas, Bissex Hill, St Joseph and Greenland, St Andrew.

Meanwhile, reliable sources said that it would cost Petro Canada between \$750 000 and Bds \$1.5 million to drill each of the wells. However, the long term savings which the company receives from each of these successful wells outweigh drilling costs.

## Woodbourne Prospects

Bridgetown BARBADOS ADVOCATE in English 3 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Jewel Brathwaite]

[Text]

Barbados which has a thriving oilfield at Woodbourne, St. Philip, has a good chance of producing another commercial field, a top Canadian Petroleum Engineer said yesterday.

The Engineer, Mr. Jack Goldburn, who is also Project Manager of Bow Valley Resource Limited which is carrying out drilling operations here, said that based on the fact that Woodbourne already exists, the chances of having another field were good.

Bow Valley Services Limited which is Canadian owned, has been contracted by the Petro-Canada International Corporation to carry out a drilling programme in the Scotland District as the search for oil intensifies. The drilling is mainly an assessment exercise.

Last year Government and Petro-Canada International signed the second part of a Can \$4 million deal under which the Canadian owned Corporation will finance the exploration in the Scotland District.

Some 10 wells are to be sunk.

Drilling has already taken place at Canefield, St. Thomas and at Lower Parks, St. Joseph. A third will be drilled this week at Bissex, also in St. Joseph.

Mr. Goldburn who has 40 years experience in the petroleum field, stated the company was conducting shallow drilling at a depth of about 2 500 feet, and on completion, information is being passed on to Petro Canada and the Barbados National Oil Company (BNOB).

He could not comment on results of drilling to date only saying that there were productive formations at Canefield but that will have to be confirmed by the BNOC."

He added it was still too early to talk about Lower Parks.

Other wells are to be sunk at Gregg Farm, Rock Hall and Coots Pond.

Since drilling was increased in 1973 in the aftermath of the oil crisis the main producing field has been at Woodbourne. The country is producing more than 1200 barrels per day.

Bow Valley Resources Limited will be in Barbados for about three to four months.

CSO: 3298/730

BRIEFS

GAS PRICE INCREASE--A spokesman of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has announced that with effect 31st March the pump prices of premium and regular gasoline and kerosene have been increased by three cents per U.S. gallon. And at the same time the pump price of diesel has been decreased by two cents per U.S. gallons. [Text] [Belize City DISWEEK in English 6 Apr 84 p 2]

CSO: 3298/732

## FRG ASSISTANCE IN SEARCH FOR ANTARCTIC PETROLEUM DISCUSSED

Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 12 Apr 84 p C-1

[Article by Gabriel Gonzalez Segovia]

[Text] Chilean Antarctica, Lt Rodolfo Marsh Air Force Base. "Chile should join forces with countries with advanced technology and more capital in order to prospect for oil in Antarctica. There is already some interest in the Federal Republic of Germany in beginning a program of this type."

"Petroleum extraction in Antarctica will not show a profit before the year 2000. Research programs to determine the existence and extent of oilfields must be increased, and remote sensors should be used in these programs."

These are the fundamental points of the report submitted to the president of Chile, Gen Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, during the visit he made on Monday and Tuesday of this week [9-10 April] to this air force outpost, located on King George Island in the South Shetland Islands.

The study, which also contains some suggestions, was released by the adviser on Antarctic affairs of the commander in chief of the FACH [Chilean Air Force], Air Force Gen (R) Javier Lopetegui Torres, and by the director of operations of the air force, Air Force Gen Mario Lopez.

The report also covers topics related to tourism and air transport.

In one section the report spoke of the need to increase the Chilean presence in these latitudes, "but this should not be focussed solely on actions related to sovereignty. There should be other reasons of a practical nature involved, so that what is done will be an investment and not simply an expense."

General Lopetegui said that they are moving rapidly toward establishing some type of agreement among the countries which signed the Antarctic Treaty, in order to regulate the extraction of non-renewable resources, including petroleum.

"In this activity, which is extremely expensive and difficult, we can not act alone. We will have to join together, in full confidence, and work with countries with advanced technology and large capital resources in order to undertake successfully a job of such magnitude," he reported.

He revealed that there seems to be no possibility of any profitable extraction of this "black gold" from Antarctica before the year 2000.

Still, he added, during the 16 years remaining in this century, work should be done in the areas of prospecting, exploratory drilling, the establishment of logistic support bases, human settlements, the establishment of communications, and everything else that will be necessary for this major project to function.

#### West Germany

The speaker explained that while there is an Antarctica Policy Council which meets sporadically and which deals with major policy issues, there is still a need for a working group or technical advisory group that would be responsible for maintaining continuity of actions so that policies related to this area could be easily implemented.

During the presentation given to President Augusto Pinochet, Gen (R) Lopetegui announced that West Germany has expressed interest in conducting some type of joint activity with Chile in the Ellsworth mountains. This would greatly cut the costs of prospecting studies and programs, as well as the costs of any future extraction of petroleum.

Lopetegui, who chose voluntary retirement from the FACH after serving as chief of staff for a number of years, said that Chile "has a great opportunity to act as a trustworthy partner. Chile has a good grasp of the Antarctic situation, an adequate network of bases, good air and maritime communications, personnel trained in the area, and in essence, a scientific knowledge of the region."

In his opinion, the use of remote sensing equipment and earth science studies should be added to the present prospecting programs now being conducted in the area.



General Lopetegui explained that it is important to persuade other countries that any action they want to conduct will be much easier if they work in cooperation with Chile.

To do this, he pointed out, the scientific research conducted by the INACH [Chilean Antarctic Institute] should be expanded, by using a ship (the "Capitan Alcazar") and by making use of the infrastructure created south of the Polar Circle and the air communications established during the past 3 years, in order to conduct scientific investigations in those areas which until the present time have not been visited by our scientists working under the Chilean flag, although they have been invited by other governments.

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CSO: 3348/398



## BRIEFS

PEMEX PROFITS REPORTED--Nuevo Pemex, Tabasco--Due to improved management systems and efficient use of resources, PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] has reported savings of 1 billion pesos in operations costs. PEMEX Director Mario Ramon Beteta yesterday presented 1983 financial and progress reports to President Miguel de la Madrid. Beteta said that the firm made 800 billion pesos in profits in 1983, the largest profit it has even made. He also said that oil reserves increased from 70 trillion to 72.5 trillion barrels. PEMEX's gross income for 1983 added up to 3 trillion pesos. Dollar income for the year was \$16.517 billion. [Summary] [PA141935 Mexico City THE NEWS in English 19 Mar 84 pp 1, 30]

CSO: 3200/23

## CARIBBEAN LEFT-WING PARTIES MEET, ISSUE COMMUNIQUE

## Report on Guyana Meeting

Georgetown MIRROR in English 11 Mar 84 p 1

[Text] Twelve left-wing parties and organisations from eleven countries in the Caribbean, including Guyana and Cuba, held a three-day Consultative Meeting in Georgetown during March 2-4 last.

The Freedom House gathering of top Caribbean communists and revolutionaries was the first since the Grenada invasion and was convened by Dr Cheddi Jagan, General Secretary of the People's Progressive Party.

Dr Jagan, who briefed the media and information personnel of foreign missions on the outcome of the Georgetown Meeting on Tuesday (March 6) last at Freedom House explained that the Caribbean parties have been holding consultations from time to time since 1972. Apart from assessing developments in the region and analysing mistakes, the parties also map out broad guidelines for action against imperialism, for a Caribbean peace zone, for national and social liberation, he said.

Pressed repeatedly by Guyana government mediemen to say why the PNC had not been invited, Dr Jagan stated that it was felt that the PNC did not qualify for membership when the consultation got underway in 1972. The PNC, he added, has been taking different positions from time to time.

He stated further that there was no representation from Grenada because of restriction and detention of revolutionary leaders and pressures on others not to attack US imperialism.

However, the Grenada situation was gone into with the focus being on the internal division, identification of mistakes, and lessons to be drawn.

The Meeting reviewed the loss of the Grenada Revolution as a great setback for the progressive developments in the region and for socialism. It recognised that the slain Maurice Bishop was almost synonymous with the Revolution as he was a people's hero and leader in the popular sense. "Bishop was definitely a revolutionary. We would honour him as that and preserve his memory," the convenor of the Georgetown Meeting told the press conference.

He went on to explain that though the Communique did not mention Suriname, the meeting nevertheless recognised the ongoing problems being created in that country by imperialism and reactionary forces. He said that it was very difficult for the government to cope with this situation and at the same time carry on in the interest of the people.

Dr Jagan stressed that the Suriname situation has no similarities to problems which face Guyana. Suriname is being isolated and is surrounded by a sea of reaction but in Guyana the country's largest political force and its major political party, the PPP is always urging the PNC regime to go forward, to have a democratic solution. The regime has never responded positively.

The PPP which is the majority party has taken a consistently revolutionary position and is willing to find a political solution, but the government has not responded so far. A similar situation does not exist in Suriname.

Some government journalists insisted on questioning the size of parties at the Consultative Meeting. A delegate, Michael Als of the People's Popular Movement of Trinidad explained that the parties could by no means be considered "small." In Cuba, the Communist Party holds state power in a country of ten million; in Martinique and Guadeloupe the Communist Parties have considerable political control at the local and legislative levels; in Guyana the PPP is both large and influential.

Als who is Chairman of the party, explained that the Caribbean revolutionary parties are like the Biblical "mustard seed"--so tiny, yet growing into a magnificent tree. "We do not despair. Life belongs to the future and to the progressive forces," he said, and he concluded:

The region possesses dynamic leaders of the calibre of Fidel Castro and Cheddi Jagan. We still have Cuba, Nicaragua; soon we shall have El Salvador and Guatemala, and by the end of this century we might be discussing whether capitalism could survive in only one country in the region--the United States of America."

#### Text of Communique

Georgetown MIRROR in English 11 Mar 84 p 4

[Text] 1. A Consultative meeting of communist and revolutionary parties and organisations was held in Georgetown from 2-4 March, 1984.

2. The meeting was attended by representatives from the Movement For National Liberation (MONALI) of Barbados; The Communist Party of Cuba; Action Committee For a Socialist Movement (ACSAM) of Curacao; The Dominican Liberation Movement Alliance; The People's Progressive Party of Guyana; the Communist Party of Guadeloupe; The Worker's Party of Jamaica; The Martinique Communist Party; The United People's Movement of St Vincent and the Grenadines; The Worker's Revolutionary Movement of St Lucia; The February 18th Movement and The People's Popular Movement of Trinidad and Tobago.

3. Meeting for the first time since the illegal and unjustified US led invasion of Grenada which was condemned internationally and by the U.N., the delegations made a profound assessment of developments in Central America and the Caribbean and concluded that the Grenada tragedy introduced a renewed emphasis on the use of force by U.S. imperialism as a solution to the Region's problems.
4. Participants unanimously agreed that the deteriorating economic situation and the declining living standards of the Caribbean people are endangering peace and security in the Region. Delegates emphasised that the Reagan-sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is basically an instrument aimed at creating a military/political bloc linked to imperialism and against the interests of the peoples of the Region.
5. Speakers emphasised the need to counter U.S. imperialist military offensive in the Region. Attention was paid to the increasing dangers facing the Nicaraguan Revolution as well as to the heroic struggles being waged by the revolutionary forces of El Salvador. All participants reiterated their whole-hearted support and solidarity with the people and government of Nicaragua and with the revolutionary forces of El Salvador, led by the F.M.L.N./F.D.R. Firm support and solidarity was also reaffirmed with the people and government of Cuba in their endeavour to build a socialist society. Emphasis was laid on the necessity to step up the fight for world peace and to make the Caribbean A Zone of Peace.
6. All delegates expressed their firm repudiation of U.S. military bases in the Region, all aggressive military manoeuvres, Washington's increased militarisation of the Region and in particular the proposed Washington-sponsored and controlled Eastern Caribbean Sub-Regional Interventionist Army, being established against the dignity, sovereignty and wish of the Caribbean peoples for the peaceful and independent development of their respective countries.
7. Participants in the meeting highly appreciated the positive stand taken by the Governments of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas and Belize for the dignified and sovereign stand in their rejection of the criminal invasion of Grenada by U.S. imperialism.
8. Delegates expressed deep regret at the death of Maurice Bishop and his colleagues and agreed to take appropriate actions in their respective countries to sustain the memory of the Grenada Revolution. Delegates also recognised the heroic resistance put up by patriotic Grenadians and Cuban internationalist workers to the U.S. aggression against tiny Grenada; lamented the loss of civilian life and agreed to protest vigorously against the illegal occupation of Grenada and insist on the recognition of the Human Rights of all Grenadian citizens.
9. Representatives exchanged information and experiences pertaining to the work of the parties and organisations in their respective countries.

10. Participants agreed that meetings of this kind are very useful to the fight for peace, the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Caribbean countries--and the well-being of the Caribbean peoples.

11. There was a coincidence of views among delegates that the parties and organisations should continue working in a spirit of equality and co-operation in the interests of peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism.

12. The discussions took place in a frank, constructive and comradely atmosphere.

Georgetown--Guyana

4 March 1984

CSO: 3298/729

## OECS PLANS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE AUTHORITY

Port-of-Spain EXPRESS in English 5 Apr 84 p 10

[Text]

CASTRIES, (CANA) — THE seven-nation Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) has embarked on several development programmes which it hopes will place the authority on a "firm footing" in the years ahead.

OECS Director General, St Lucian Dr Vaughn Lewis says the plans were to have been made public as early as last November, but this was superseded by the political crisis in member state Grenada.

"The authority's fourth meeting in February had approved a number of proposals, including the establishment of a legal unit, the streamlining of the operations of the East Caribbean Tourism Association (ECTA), developments in civil aviation and foreign representation," Lewis said.

He said that the OECS Secretariat is to review ECTA's (formed in the 1960s) operations, since its member states have become independent and wish to undertake some national tourism promotion overseas.

"There needs now to be a balance between this national promotion and the sub-regional promotion which ECTA undertakes," Dr Lewis said.

In addition, Lewis said, OECS governments have been operating under extreme financial stringency and are seeking to get as much as possible out of what funds are being spent.

On the question of the creation of a legal unit, Lewis said since most of the OECS states became independent — only Montserrat remains a British colony — the governments have been concerned with the necessity for legal reform.

This has to do with a review of all international treaties to which the OECS states are signatories, consequent upon their ties with Britain, the former colonial power.

Lewis said the secretariat will employ a specialist in international law, whose main responsibility will be to review those treaties. The specialist will also be required to consult with member governments on matters related to the revision of civil law.

"He will identify for each government, laws which are in need of reform and prepare a revised draft for their consideration."

The authority will also deal with maritime delimitation, following the establishment of new regulations under the Law of the Sea convention.

"During the past year, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation assisted the OECS with a review of all legislation on this subject, including the drawing up of sea boundaries and proposals for new legislation," he added.

Lewis said that civil aviation arrangements also need revision, and the OECS has been trying to get technical assistance to further the reorganisation of the Antigua-based Directorate of Civil Aviation.

Payment for aviation services in respect of airports is also being looked at, he said, and a formula which meets the concerns of governments and the regional system as a whole will be developed.

One of the key aviation questions is the acceptance by states of the designation of the Trinidad and Tobago national airline, BWIA in the negotiation of air services agreements with third countries.

"Many of the member states, especially those heavily involved in tourism, are attempting to establish air services in various countries of the world where the tourism markets are strong," Lewis said. "The idea is to have a regular flight servicing the industry, and in order to achieve this, we need to make reciprocal arrangements."

Approaches will also be made to Port of Spain to set up machinery to improve communications with the OECS and resolve existing trade difficulties.

Late last year, in the face of OECS complaints about the inaccessibility of the Trinidad market, a decision was taken to send St. Lucia's Trade Minister George Mallet to Port of Spain in an effort to resolve some of the differences.

Lewis said the governments have decided to list their specific problems to the Economic Affairs Secretariat which will arrange them in a systematic form for presentation to an OECS Trade Ministers conference next May that will also prepare for a proposed Caricom council meeting to deal with trade matters.

On the question of foreign representation, Lewis said the present situation in which five of the seven nations have joint representation in London and Ottawa, was being reviewed.

Member states are considering in which countries or institutions they either collectively or individually really need to have representation.

"They have been asking (for instance) whether there is a basis for upgrading the relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) and therefore establish representation in Brussels," Lewis said.

In addition, some, like St. Lucia's Prime Minister John Compton, have been pressing for representation in the Far East to take advantage of the possibility of investment and financial assistance.

"Government", he said, "have indicated their wish to exercise more national initiative than they did when they were simply British associated states and had minimal activity in the area of external relations".

Other questions, Lewis said, include whether the present structure of a single envoy representing all of the islands, the structure of the mission, in terms of personnel employed, and the divisions of functions are adequate.

A report out of a review of these arrangements, that will be submitted to the May meeting, will look at the feasibility of setting up new relationships in a period of financial stringency, the focus of these relationships, and how the island can serve the large number of their nationals in the metropolitan capitals.

Lewis said the Authority will finalise an agreement with the British Virgin Islands (BVI) on associate membership and may offer similar status to Anguilla.

The relationship with the BVI, he said, will bring into the area of functional cooperation, a country which is already sharing certain OECS institutions.

In sport, Lewis said the secretariat will soon announce the appointment of a sports coordinator, through the assistance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

According to him, the OECS states believe that given their small size, collectivity was extremely important to the future of the grouping.



## BRIEFS

**PARAGUAY WANTS BRAZILIAN ARMS**--The Armed Forces of Paraguay are interested in purchasing weaponry from Brazil. Yesterday Gen Francisco Ruiz Diaz, deputy commander of the Army General Staff in that country, attended a demonstration of the Cascavel and Urutu combat vehicles put on in Lago Paranoa by the Third Mechanized Cavalry Squadron, which uses 12 of these units in the Federal District. The Paraguayan military leader arrived in Brasilia Sunday at the invitation of the Brazilian Armed Forces General Staff. Accompanied by a group of officers from the Paraguayan land forces war equipment sector, General Ruiz Diaz will travel to Sao Paulo today to tour the Brazilian war equipment facilities, including ENGESA [Specialized Engineers, Inc], the manufacturers of the Cascavel and Urutu vehicles, TECNASA, which manufactures radars and other equipment in the electronics field, and the EMBRAER [Brazilian Aeronautics Company]. According to military sources at the IMBEL [Ordnance Industry], General Ruiz will sign a letter of intent for the purchase of combat vehicles, probably the Urutu, as well as operational vehicles to equip the Paraguayan army during his visit to the ENGESA. At the EMBRAER, the Paraguayan military leader will attend a demonstration of the Tucano military training airplane, the most modern of its sort produced in Brazil. This model has already been sold to Egypt, and a bid has currently been offered for the sale of 151 units to the British Air Force. The Paraguayan Navy recently purchased its first warship from Brazil. [Text] [Brasilia CORREIO BRAZILIENSE in Portuguese 3 Apr 84 p 8] 5157

**SOCIALIST PARTIES PLAN MEETING**--Representatives of seven Latin American socialist parties will arrange to meet in the middle of this month in Lima to analyze the democratic process and socialism in Latin America. According to the events' organizers, leaders will attend from the Popular Socialist Party (Argentina), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Bolivia), the Democratic Worker's Party (Brazil), the Firmes Movement (Colombia), the Socialist Party of Chile (Chile) and the Socialist Party of Uruguay (Uruguay). In Peru the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) is organizing the meeting, as reported yesterday by its secretary general, Senator Enrique Bernales. The meeting will be convened from the 16th to the 18th of this month. At the socialist meeting new ways to interpret the Latin American reality will be discussed, as well as the possibilities and limits on the continent for the democratic process, among other topics. [Text] [Lima LA PRENSA in Spanish 7 Apr 84 p 2]



CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH CANADA--The governments of Canada and Mexico have signed a cultural agreement in Mexico City during the course of meetings between the representatives of the two nations which took place from 26-30 March 1984. The agreement, effective until 1986, encompasses the fields of education, arts, anthropology, history, radio, television, and cinema. It includes scholarships, exchanges of professors, writers, orchestra directors and exhibits as well as the realization of joint projects, consultation, and dissemination of the other nation's language and literature. [Summary] [PA111724 Mexico City EL NACIONAL in Spanish 31 Mar 84 p 2]

CSO: 3248/575

## MERCHANT FLEET FUND PROPOSAL AWAITING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 31 Mar 84 p 7

[Text] The executive branch will send a bill to Congress in the next few days proposing that taxes be levied once again on foreign trade to support the merchant marine fund.

The bill, it was revealed, was drafted by Secretary of Industry Carlos Lacerca and national Radical Deputy Hugo Socchi, chairman of the Industry Committee of the lower house.

The proposal would levy a 20 percent tax on imports and a 5 percent tax on exports initially, in order to finance the construction of vessels. At present, those vessels could include fishing boats, and the possibility of including sand barges is being studied.

It is hoped that the measure will provide a quick boost for shipyards. There will also be reimbursements under the bill; an additional one for opening up new markets, although in this case an effort will be made to include a clause designed to ensure that the exports are sold to countries that are able to pay.

This is based primarily on the experience of selling goods to Poland in the past; that country has not met its obligations.

The reimbursements under study could be between 15 and 25 percent of the value of the national inputs included in the shipments.

All inputs that do not entail a greater national value added are ineligible for this benefit.

In addition, the law provides for the implementation of mortgages on vessels, and will set forth guidelines to encourage shipping insurance.

It was learned that the measure is supported by the national shipping industry.

The tax for the merchant marine fund was eliminated in 1980 when the value added tax was generalized. This considerably eroded the financial capacity of private shipowners to order ship construction.

The money from the fund is used to make subsidized loans to shipowners so that they can pay shipbuilders for the vessels they have commissioned. These loans would now be expanded to include direct government credit to shipbuilders who sell their product abroad.

## PRESIDENTIAL LABOR MEDIATOR ON RELATIONS WITH UNION LEADERS

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 6 Apr 84 p 41

[Interview with Hugo Barrionuevo, presidential labor representative, by Tabare Areas: "Not All Union Leaders Are Part of Union Clique"; date and place not given; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] [Question] Are you the extra card Alfonsin played after Minister Mucci's dialogue with the unions failed?

[Answer] I am not extra or a replacement for anyone. I am a delegate from the president to act in a field in which I have knowledge, contacts and a clear idea of how union unity can be achieved.

[Question] But your duties can be superimposed on Minister Mucci's....

[Answer] No, that will not happen. The minister of labor has specific functions under the law on ministries and he has the necessary structure to fulfill them. I am a delegate from the president and I don't have any structure, only an administrative employee and an office on the fourth floor of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor].

[Question] The UCR [Radical Civic Union] members say they want to get rid of the union clique. Who is in that clique?

[Answer] Look, I don't know if that union clique exists or not. I think it is necessary to recognize that there were excesses in unionism and there were attitudes among some men that must be changed. This does not mean that the whole labor movement is a clique. We are always using adjectives for union leaders that change with the times. Now clique is used while before union bureaucracy or things like that were mentioned.

[Question] When the union military pact was mentioned, it was said that it involved men like Miguel, Ibanez, Papagno....What do you think of them?

[Answer] I am not going to talk now about individuals, speaking for or against anyone. About the pact, many things were considered certain or understood but the evidence did not appear. That is why there were so many lawsuits.

[Question] Do you say, then, that the union military pact never existed?

[Answer] I don't dismiss anything. I only recall that unionism always suffered from persecution by the different military governments and all the military coups ended by intervening in the union organizations. I think one of the major problems to solve, normalize, is to end the partisan function of the union so that past confrontations are not repeated.

[Question] Is the Argentine union still essentially Peronist?

[Answer] I cannot say precisely. I do know there is a vast sector of workers who are and, therefore, that way of thinking must be respected. I don't believe that all the workers are Peronists but a large part are.

[Question] Are you a Peronist?

[Answer] No, I am not a Peronist, I am not in the UCR, I am not a socialist. I don't have a political or party card....

[Question] Who did you vote for?

[Answer] Since I am a citizen, I have always voted for the options I considered most valid. I voted for solutions and not for men or parties. That has been a constant in my life.

[Question] Did you vote for Alfonsin in October?

[Answer] I have no reason to tell you. You think what you want but that does not authorize you to write it.

[Question] Aren't you afraid that your own union comrades will begin to call you /gorilla/ or /traitor/, using only two of the most common adjectives in union jargon?

[Answer] I can tell you one thing: I have already been called all the direct or indirect adjectives that men who participated in unionism were called. Accusations no longer frighten me.

[Question] What did they accuse you of before?

[Answer] Look, when they accused us of tying ourselves to the positions, they called us /union bureaucrats/. Then the military called us /corrupt and subversive/ and others talked about union power.

[Question] Did they ever call you a traitor?

[Answer] Yes, in my own union many years ago because of a partisan question. It was shown later that I was right.

[Question] Does union power exist or is it a journalistic invention?

[Answer] In the last stage of the last Peronist government, I think union power existed as a concrete reality. I don't know if it reached the scope mentioned but it had political weight and influenced the decisive events then. Later they still talked about union power but I think more as a figure than as a sizable reality. Unionism is an unquestionable factor of power in any modern society but things should not be exaggerated.

[Question] Are you opposed to Lorenzo Miguel?

[Answer] I don't get along well or poorly with Miguel. When we have had to talk, we have talked....

[Question] Concretely, why would you get along poorly?

[Answer] Look, there was one thing that bothered me a lot and I will always remember it. In 1974 I was CGT press secretary for the second consecutive time. They took the position away from me because they said that anyone who was not a Peronist had to be excluded from union leadership. They told me that Lorenzo Miguel made that decision.

[Question] Are you going to reproach him when you see him?

[Answer] We have already met once after that episode and we talked about what concerned us. Neither of us mentioned the subject.

[Question] What did Triaca and Ubaldini say after Alfonsín named you his personal delegate?

[Answer] I talked on the telephone with them and noted a certain willingness to dialogue. I think there can be a meeting right away to begin work on the great project of unity. It will not be easy but I know them well and the points they support. They obviously know who Hugo Barrionuevo is. I think we will understand each other although we will argue.

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CSO: 3348/378

## TRACTOR SALES REGISTER SHARP INCREASE

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 12 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] "Statistics reveal that tractor sales in 1983 rose by more than 100 percent over 1982 figures. But that figure could be deceptive, unless one considers that the market had been in a slump. Therefore, it can be safely said that we are still quite far from attaining normalcy in the Argentine tractor market," stated one of the high officials of FIATAGRI. He added that "despite this good recovery, the potential market could be up to 15,000 to 20,000 units per year, which would substantially expand the current fleet of tractors, estimated at approximately 140,000 units."

He also said that "the promising prospects for this year also indicate that in 1984 the market could accommodate around 10,000 units, and if this happens, then we could indeed talk of a good recovery in the sector."

"Agriculture," he went on, "the driving force of the Argentine economy, is the source of progress in the country's economic activity, and if new technology is put to use to develop mechanization, once again this sector will provide all the support needed for the long-awaited reactivation. In this context, FIATAGRI's line of tractors, harvesters and specialized tools will contribute to increased productivity in Argentine agriculture. In the past 3 years it has changed its entire line of tractors, implementing concepts that fit within the firm's business philosophy. The present line consists of 14 basic tractor models, covering the whole range of possibilities and requirements in national agriculture. It should be pointed out, however, that the higher-power units are taking on special importance, considering the topographical and dimensional characteristics of Argentine farmland."

He added that the tractor line ranges from 25 HP to 350 HP models, available with two-wheel and four-wheel drive, but all are specially designed to ensure maximum comfort, as most are equipped with power steering, sound-proof cabs and air conditioning. "In addition," he stressed, "particular emphasis should be placed on the four-wheel drive tractor, which yields a greater working capacity at the same level of power, with lower fuel and tire consumption, without forgetting the longer life of the vehicle even under difficult conditions. That is why our firm is a world leader in four-wheel drive tractors, and in Argentina as well, after 3 years our DT models represent 60 percent of our sales."

Finally, he pointed out that in 30 years of manufacturing tractors in Argentina, his firm has sold more than 136,000 units, "which made history in the mechanization of agriculture and made us one of the most prestigious companies in this sector."

## LABOR UNION POLL SHOWS MAJORITY UNCONCERNED, APATHETIC

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 13 Apr 84 pp 24-26

[Article by Pablo Martinez: "What Unions the Workers Like"]

[Text] Not even the cold arithmetic of votes can approve or reject the current union leaders. Only a small proportion of the union organizations have been normalized. In the majority of the unions, especially the more important ones, interventions continue or the terms have been extended. In spite of the enormous amount of journalistic space accumulated on the union situation in recent times, it continues to be a big question. This is particularly valid when measuring the degree of participation in union organizations. SOMOS asked the A & C Business Analysts and Management Consultants Agency--which it has already used for opinion polls--to do a public opinion poll on the degree of union participation.

For this new study, a special sample was used of 400 white-collar workers, skilled laborers and unskilled laborers in the federal capital and Greater Buenos Aires, based on the population parameters from the latest census. The opinion of the people surveyed was obtained through an administered, standardized questionnaire. The field work was done by trained researchers who concentrated on points selected at random.

The resulting material was processed electronically with 100 percent supervision and the margin of error in this sample is plus or minus 5 percent.

#### Basic Question

The surveyors went out into the street with a basic objective: /to find out from skilled workers, unskilled workers and white-collar workers their degree of involvement in the leadership of their unions/ [in italics].

According to Esther Kaplan, public opinion director of the A & C Agency responsible for the conclusions drawn based on the quantitative data collected in the survey, "to elect a representative implies a degree of social participation and awareness of belonging. Asking white-collar workers, skilled and unskilled laborers what union leader merits the most confidence meant finding out their degree of participation in their own leadership. Apathy responds to a lack of identification by those surveyed with the union and the lack of hope that their individual vote can change the course of things."



Last February a poll showed that 66 percent of those surveyed said they were affiliated with a social benefit but only 31 percent formally belonged to a union. According to Kaplan, "this would indicate greater participation by the population in social benefits than unions."

Since deductions for social benefits are officially taken by employers and the laborers and employees are automatically incorporated in social benefits, the A & C survey was proposed to establish the degree of real participation by the members in unions and in the social benefits of those organizations. Therefore, it is important to point out that the white-collar workers--about 77 percent--and skilled workers--72 percent--mainly stated they were affiliated with a social benefit. However, it is noteworthy that the unskilled workers, without question the neediest of that type of assistance, show less affiliation in the social benefits. Only 62 percent of them answered affirmatively.

Field research in recent months revealed, in Kaplan's opinion, that "on the lowest social scales there was a growing complaint against what they called privileged sectors of the unions. The former have difficulty obtaining access to all the social benefits, partly monopolized by some groups, especially the tourism services." The low degree of affiliation in the unions has enormous political and social implications, especially since the survey only included white-collar workers and laborers. About 62 percent of those polled answered negatively when asked if they were affiliated with some union organization. Only 38 percent was consciously incorporated in a union. This is very interesting, especially considering that laborers and white-collar workers are the real protagonists of union life.

#### Necessity Obliges

The union members are mainly concentrated in the lowest socio-occupational sectors. This number decreases going up the scale. Among the unskilled laborers, only 51 percent admitted not being incorporated in any union organization, a proportion that rose slightly among skilled laborers (52 percent) and much more in the case of white-collar workers. In that segment of those surveyed, 71 percent is not affiliated with unions. This latest survey confirms the situation described in the February 1984 survey but "doubling the number surveyed by reducing the people consulted to white-collar workers, skilled and unskilled laborers and interviewing the same total number of people (400) showed that the more white-collar workers interviewed, the lower percentage of affiliates was found. The same is not true among the skilled and unskilled laborers since the more surveyed from that sector, the higher the proportion of affiliates," according to Esther Kaplan.

/Higher education meant less participation in the union organizations/ [in italics]. The distribution of those interviewed, according to their level of education, confirmed that the majority of the members of the unions are people without education. Inversely, the highest percentage of nonaffiliates is people with a university education. Among workers without complete primary education, 85 percent belong to the unions. This proportion goes down to 44 percent among those surveyed with primary education. Among those with incomplete secondary education, the proportion of members decreased to 31.5 percent and



32 percent of those surveyed who finished their secondary studies. University graduates are the least affiliated with a union organization. Only 8 percent is enrolled in union organizations. However, it must be explained that only 12 university graduates were interviewed. By occupation, they belonged to the segments of population that had significance for this sample. There were 194 with secondary education, 181 with primary education and 13 without education.

#### Who Knows the Leaders

Perhaps the greatest surprise in the A & C survey is the tiny, almost insignificant, recollection of union leaders among those who are, theoretically at least, represented by them. About 83 percent of the people included in the survey did not know what leader merited the most confidence from them. This percentage included those who, *prima facie*, have greater interest in their leaders like white-collar workers and skilled and unskilled laborers.

Other occupational components of the social spectrum like professionals and businessmen were not included in this percentage.

Kaplan emphasized in her conclusions: "It is understandable that professionals would not know about good or bad union leaders, but it is more difficult to accept that the white-collar workers and laborers, main protagonists in union life, do not know."

That high degree of "don't know" in the survey shows disinterest, helplessness and, therefore, ignorance. The low percentage of those surveyed who could indicate a union leader who merits confidence was inadequate to draw conclusions due to its small size.

Since it is a matter of establishing which leader has greater prestige and generates greater confidence, the survey shows that there is greater relative knowledge among those who were affiliated to some union compared to those who do not even have formal membership in union structures.

Among the latter, the proportion of those who do not know what union leaders merit the most respect wavers between 96 and 98 percent of those surveyed. This goes down to 57 percent among workers affiliated with a union.

The list of union leaders, although irrelevant due to the size, again includes Saul Ubaldini, leader of the unified CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and secretary general of the Brewers Union, at the top followed by: the plastics leader, Jorge Triaca; trade leader Armando Cavalieri at the same level as the leader of the UTA [Motor Transport Workers Union], Rene Azar, and mechanics leader Jose Rodriguez. Lorenzo Miguel, the leader of 62 organizations and a decisive figure in the Metalworkers Union was in sixth place with railway leader Lorenzo Pepe, taxi leader Roberto Garcia and ship electrician leader Enrique Venturini. A full squad of leaders follows with only one vote of confidence for each.

The survey verified that the role of social benefits continues to be irreplaceable for the workers. In many cases, they dispense with affiliation with a

union but, to a much lower degree, withdraw from the organization that offers them assistance, health care and recreational opportunities under very different conditions than those that the state offers. It could also be verified that the low affiliation is closely related to disinterest and ignorance. The main challenge seems to be to generate greater participation.

#### Union Leaders

<u>Leader</u>	<u>Votes of Confidence</u>
Ubal dini	6
Triaca	3
Cavalleri	3
Azar	3
J. Rodriguez	3
Lorenzo Pepe	2
R. Garcia	2
Lorenzo Miguel	2
Venturini	2
Murgulondo	1
Gonzalez	1
Marchese	1
J. Amar	1
Britos	1
Lista Gris (Food Service)	1
Trimarco	1
Papagno	1
Escobar	1
Marchesi	1
Canola	1
Piastro	1
Galupe	1
Bravo	1
Ambato	1

Only 17 percent of those surveyed showed a concrete preference for any union leader. This 17 percent represents 68 of the 400 people surveyed. Saul Ubal dini headed the list of union leaders from 25 unions. Not just the large unions--like the metalworkers, mechanics, railway, textile workers or bank workers--had leaders on this list but very unimportant unions had union members in their ranks who were indicated by those surveyed as the leader of their choice.

In the 68 responses, 13 felt that no union leader was viable while another 14 considered them all good.

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CSO: 3348/378

## FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY BUDGET, REDUCTIONS DISCUSSED

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 20 Apr 84 pp 20-21

[Article by Luis F. Torres; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in bold-face]

[Text] /Argentina spent \$20 billion on defense between 1976 and 1983,/ according to the Institute of Research for Peace in Stockholm. Is that a lot? Is it normal? What is the point of reference for assessing that figure? To determine its relative position, political, strategic, and structural motives must be taken into consideration. During that period, Argentina fought a war and was on the brink of another; it had a military government and a structural concept of the Armed Forces much different from what it might have had if it were governed by a democracy. In addition to all of this, one must consider the phenomenon of subversion, which necessitated a profound change in one's perception of the goals and objectives of the Armed Forces.

At this time the executive branch is trying to work out the controversial budget for this year, caught between the International Monetary Fund and the beginning of the Congressional session. It must make all the numbers add up so that it can write its letter of intent with the Fund, which will be used as a basis for the renegotiation of the foreign debt and to send to Congress the Draft Budget. It has already been announced that the this bill will spark a great controversy. In this /tug-of-war/ game, with each sector out for itself, /military spending has a predominant place./

## Keys

Military spending has three /keys/ that must be taken into account in any calculation or speculation:

- /Wages
- Food and clothing of soldiers
- Payments due on previous purchases of weapons/

/"Look, if there is not a profound and genuine reordering of the functions and structure of the Armed Forces, there can be no talk of reducing military spending,"/ confessed a high-ranking officer.

The fact is, to balance the books for military spending, any accountant will run into a tangle of complexities that range from operational estimates to enterprises, security forces, military institutes, liabilities and even hospitals.

Thus, the reflection of a retired military officer takes on particular relevance: /"Are the 11 military high schools in operation still viable?"/ And in the case of military enterprises, /"Wouldn't it be better to turn them over to the private sector, or to make them mixed entities?"/ Another point in question is firing ranges. For example, in Azul and Olavarria large tracts of land are used for instruction and tank maneuvers, operations that have practically become obsolete because of technological advances in weapons. So why not get rid of that land and buy new land in Patagonia, where prices are much lower than in the rich area of downtown Buenos Aires? Obviously many examples like this can be cited, but they can be responded to whenever the structure and functioning of the Armed Forces is reviewed. Until this happens, the military budget will continue to be /rigid,/ and /no less than 4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product/ will be taken up by it. Otherwise, ships, planes and tanks will be idled.

The salaries of military personnel take up 3 percent of the GDP. Of that total, 20 percent goes to retired personnel.

If the executive branch finally sets the percentage of the GDP earmarked for military spending at 3.94, the Armed Forces will have just 0.94 percent to use for operational spending. In other words, they will barely have enough for minimal maintenance.

### Salaries

While the technicians sharpen their pencils--/those who hang around the Ministry of Defense claim that the briefcases have been coming and going in the last few hours from the building on Paseo Colon to the Casa Rosada/-- trying to figure out where to get the \$3 billion that the military needs as a minimum this year, economic realities hammer away at regiments and units day after day.

On the one hand, the salaries of lower-ranking personnel have fallen far behind, an issue into which Minister Borras wants to breathe some life. On the other hand, there is the matter of suppliers; there are those who comment that the delays in payments have already led to more than one refusal to continue supplying certain goods, including a crucial one: food.

Do salaries take up that much money? Are they too high, or are there too many soldiers? The fact is that the Armed Forces have the same design they had 10 years ago, and that is why the calculations have taken on the nature described above. At present, in the Army, for example, there are 6,081 officers, 15,400 non-commissioned officers, 9,430 cadets and candidates, 13,736 civilian employees and 63,941 enlisted men (half will be mustered out in July of this year).

During the campaign, the Radicals promised to cut military spending to 2 percent of the GDP, which has been estimated at \$80 billion this year. Once in office, however, reality changed their tune, and the Ministry of Economics proposed 3 percent. After the /tug-of-war,/ Borrás is finally on the verge of obtaining 3.94 percent, as opposed to the military request for 5.48 percent.

Unofficial figures for this year indicate that Brazil will spend approximately 7 percent of its GDP on this sector, while Chile will keep it under 9 percent.

As for manpower, once half the draftees have been discharged, Argentina will have about 120,000 troops, while Brazil now has 300,000 and Chile 100,000.

One final idea of the growth of military requirements over the past few years can be obtained by looking at the percentages of the annual GDPs that were allocated to the Armed Forces.

Between 1968 and 1974, military spending averaged 2.5 percent of the GDP, but in 1975 and 1976 the amount rose to 3.5 percent. The subsequent increase resulted in 4.5 percent in 1982 and 6 percent in 1983.

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CSO: 3348/386

## PREBISCH ON IMF DEBT RENEGOTIATION DISCUSSIONS

Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish 20 Apr 84 pp 42, 44

[Interview with economic adviser Raul Prebisch by Enriqueta Sugasti in Washington D.C. on 16 April 1984]

[Text] The first contact that was made to request an interview with Raul Prebisch (a phone call from New York to Washington) took place on Monday the 16th, early in the morning. In Buenos Aires speculation was still raging about his press conference (in the absence of Grinspun) at which the specific details of the agreement with the Fund had been explained.

In that phone conversation, Prebisch expressed surprise at the rumors circulating in Argentina regarding his efforts, and told an anecdote: When he and Grinspun were in Washington together last week at an official dinner and they embraced, one of the Argentine journalists present approached him and asked him in surprise how it was possible for him to embrace the minister so warmly, when they were supposed to have had a falling out. "That was the first indication I had of what was being said in Buenos Aires," said Prebisch.

It was agreed that the interview would take place that same Monday at 1500 hours, Eastern time. A short trip and a contrast between the torrential rains of New York and sunny Washington. Prebisch was waiting punctually in his office at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 12th floor at 1801 K St. He answered all the questions cooperatively and patiently, interrupted often by the telephone. He is obviously a very active man at 83 years of age. By way of explaining all the hubbub, he commented: "Deep down, I am a man who enjoys idleness. But in spite of myself, my activities keep me on the go all the time."

[Question] Are you aware of the uproar your press conference caused in Buenos Aires?

[Answer] I don't understand it at all. There was never any conflict with either Minister Grinspun or Dr Alfonsin. From what you say, I can tell that there is a lot of confusion in Buenos Aires. All the points contained in the document signed by Dr De Larosiére and me were gone over with the minister of economics ahead of time. With regard to wage policy, before that document came about, the minister as well as Central Bank President Garcia Vazquez had



reached the same conclusion as I, that the form of retroactive adjustments accelerated inflation. Thus, we needed to find other solutions.

[Question] Are you aware of the tempest that was unleashed in the Radical Party, especially after some deputies walked out on the meeting in Congress?

[Answer] No, I am not aware of any tempest. I don't know about anyone walking out while I was talking. Everything I said had already been said by Alfonsin before in two documents, first in the presentation on television in mid-December, and then in the document "Basic Features of an Immediate Program of Action."

[Question] In Buenos Aires, nonetheless, it is said that you are the new de facto, though not de jure, minister of economics, or at least a parallel minister, given the importance of the announcements you made on 10 April. Why did you announce the new economic measures and not Minister Grinspun or President Alfonsin himself?

[Answer] I didn't announce any new measure. I simply said that it was unacceptable to continue with the inflationary spiral or to erode real wages, and that a new solution was urgently needed and that was precisely what was being studied. I announced nothing.

[Question] Do you deny that you proposed a new economic policy?

[Answer] Absolutely. I have a very clear idea of my role as adviser to the president: I do not make national policy. I am contributing to the formulation of that policy, and so far I have made no statement to Dr Alfonsin without consulting with Grinspun and Garcia Vazquez. To do otherwise would be to introduce an element of disruption in government life.

[Question] In your view, retroactive adjustments accelerate inflation. But it is argued that if these adjustments do not take place, real wages will decline . . .

[Answer] You are right. We must talk about this with absolute clarity and frankness. There are those who believe that these inflationary adjustments are the way to maintain or raise real wages. A disastrous illusion (he exclaims). Nominal wages go up, costs go up, and prices go up, so the improvement disappears. I am deeply concerned about this insistence on something that experience has already taught us. The inflationary spiral does not only not achieve social improvement, but actually hinders the growth of the country, as has already happened. And the effort to stop the spiral by monetary means is simply counterproductive.

[Question] Some insist that not making wage adjustments is recessive. Is that true?

[Answer] That is another serious mistake. Raising nominal wages can bring about a higher demand, which stimulates production, but only temporarily; immediately afterwards prices go up, and the effect is cancelled out. The country must understand that this policy would lead us down the fatal path of

hyperinflation. We must strive vigorously to prevent that, because the economy would not be able to recover under such circumstances. The reactivation of the economy, along with the progressive curbing of inflation, is a fundamental objective of the policy pursued since Dr Alfonsin took office.

[Question] How would you define that policy?

[Answer] Ever since his television appearance in mid-December, Dr Alfonsin has stated categorically that he is determined to reactivate the prostrate economy of the nation. This can be achieved only to the extent that inflation is cut. This is just the opposite of what was said in other times, that an effort should be made to curb the creation of money caused by the fiscal deficit, by reducing monetary expansion to private activity through a monetarist policy. It is quite paradoxical that the inflationary increase of wages, as is often advocated, has recessive consequences.

[Question] Could you explain that?

[Answer] That inflationary increase enlarges the deficit, and therefore the creation of inflationary money by the Central Bank; and the attempt to prevent the serious consequences that ensue leads to that absurd monetarist policy, which is clearly recessive.

[Question] But perhaps it cannot be denied that not making retroactive adjustments cuts into real wages.

[Answer] There is no way I could deny that. The inflationary spiral and the regression of real wages are both unacceptable.

[Question] So what would the solution be?

[Answer] I think we urgently need to find a non-inflationary solution, but I don't want to exceed in any way my role as a consultant to President Alfonsin. I have my ideas on the subject, but I will not express them until a decision is made, precisely so that no one can say I am acting as if I set economic policy in the country. Do you see my reasoning? I hope to discuss this matter, above all, with Drs Grinspun and Garcia Vazquez, as I always do.

[Question] Don't you feel that these measures bear a high political cost? Is the Alfonsin government strong enough to execute this policy?

[Answer] I think it is a fundamental problem of explaining to the party and to the public opposition that the adjustments that have been proposed so far, far from improving the national economy, are harming it. Why is the country in this state of prostration? Because of the serious errors committed in this and other aspects. If the country is to embark on the path to recovery, it needs to take these measures, and it needs to clarify this position. It is said that the wage adjustment is recessive, and I contend that it is recessive to adjust wages in an inflationary manner. In the long run, the political cost will be higher. I have a lot of faith in Dr Alfonsin and in his ability



to lead and govern, and I believe that he will know how to explain this problem to the people so that they understand.

[Question] You asserted a short time ago that the country has no clear idea or understanding of the serious plight it faces now. Isn't there a need, then, for a public diagnosis of the situation, and shouldn't it have been done the first day the administration took office?

[Answer] Yes, I think the country has no clear idea or understanding of the magnitude of its plight, but it seems to me very unfair to expect that the government can diagnose what is happening in 100 days. From the first day, the government has had to familiarize itself with a situation it was unaware of. It has been testing the waters, and in a short time it has been able to chart out a clear path. That is normal for a government of people who are new to power. Even in the United States there are contradictions.

[Question] Some people claim that this agreement with the International Monetary Fund would have recessive consequences because it will be impossible to emerge from this deteriorated situation without new adjustments. How will the government's role be cut back, private investment stimulated, exports increased and imports replaced?

[Answer] The objectives of Argentine economic policy have already been set forth by Alfonsín, as I said, in December as well as in his outline of an emergency policy. The International Monetary Fund did not impose any conditions, and I think the Fund well understood our country's problems. Argentina is determined to follow an economic policy of reactivation. With or without the Fund, it would have had to take these measures. Moreover, the Alfonsín government would never have accepted any conditions imposed by the Fund, and I think it is a good idea not to accept any.

[Question] You say that wage controls is just one of the measures necessary to curb inflation, and that the fiscal situation urgently needs help. How would you do that?

[Answer] By cutting spending, collecting more taxes and establishing new taxes. That would allow us to bring down the deficit gradually, which would attract more investment and lead to a genuine increase in real wages. The government's goal is economic reactivation. The country has a great deal of idle capital. As this idle capacity is reactivated, confidence will be restored and new investment will be attracted. It is just a matter of time.

[Question] Is your current economic policy perhaps closer to that which you advocated in the 30s, or in the 70s, when you were a constant critic of the imitation of those models that had been successful in centrally planned countries?

[Answer] In the 30s the economic and social reality was different from what it is today. In addition, saying just what one said 50 years ago is evidence of intellectual ossification. I have changed and modified my positions. One characteristic of my thought is that there is no economic theory of development. If a theory tries to be just economic, it is wrong. An economic theory must encompass technological, sociological, economic and political elements. There should not be too much compartmentalizing, and that is what I have been saying about Latin America for several years.

CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR RAPS UNION WAGE DEMANDS

Bridgetown BARBADOS ADVOCATE in English 3 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Avonda Scott]

[Text] Central Bank Governor, Dr Courtney Blackman, has criticised the trade union practice of demanding wage increases for managerial staff that were much less than those being proposed for rank and file people.

He said the practice had severely eroded the differentials between rank and file and managerial staff and had seriously affected the ability of Government to recruit high class managerial talent.

Dr Blackman was addressing the opening of a two-day management training seminar for senior staff of primary and secondary schools in the north at St Lucy Secondary School.

Dr Blackman alluded to the Barbados Union of Teachers' proposals for a 37 percent increase at the bottom and 17 percent at the top.

He said the effect of this kind of wage demands on the quality of the public service "has begun to tell."

Dr Blackman felt the situation was worse in schools where heads and senior staff enjoyed very slim differentials over the staff that they supervised and had very unfavourable differentials with people who held much less responsibility in other sections of our society.

"It is time that trade unions address themselves seriously to this situation," the Central Bank Governor urged.

Dr Blackman noted that in Barbados considerations of management had tended to be confined to business enterprise. He said even today it was hardly deemed relevant to put great emphasis on the management factor in Government enterprise and this had proven detrimental to the performance of most public enterprise.

He pointed to "two good reasons" why management was critical in education.

He said that in recent decades an increasing proportion of our resources had been spent on education. He added that education had a critical role to play in our economic development and the production of knowledge must be efficiently managed.

According to Dr Blackman, since 1957, Government expenditure on education, both current and capital, had increased at the rate of 14.1 percent.

"It has moved from \$3.4 million in 1957 to \$129 million in the fiscal year just ended," he said.

Dr Blackman said Government spent on average \$14 200 on each student per year at the University of the West Indies; \$4 338 per student per year at Erdiston Teachers' Training College; \$3 000 per student per year at the Barbados Community College; \$1 851 per student per year at the Samuel Jackman Prescod Polytechnic; \$1 500 per student per year at secondary schools; and \$1 000 per student per year at primary schools.

It was his view that even a slight improvement in the management skills at our schools would bring about significant savings.

Dr Blackman made a plea for greater operational autonomy in secondary schools. He argued that no one was better equipped to run a school than those who had run them so successfully for many years.

"Besides," he said, "the intellectual pool available to some individual schools is not inferior to that available to most ministries of Government."

He said secondary schools in Barbados were among the best managed in the Third World and were even better managed than some in the developed world.

He told the head teachers and senior teachers that dedication and trial and error would no longer suffice in the future. He added that schools were a microcosm of an increasingly complex society which was buffeted by increasingly powerful influences from "an unstable and perplexing international environment."

CSO: 3298/731

## BRIEFS

THREAT TO WORKERS' RIGHTS--The Barbados Workers' Union (BWU) is seeking accreditation as the representative of the workers employed by Montrose Poultry Farm Limited. However, the BWU reported yesterday that following its request to the company for accreditation some 13 members of the union have been dismissed over the past week, including the president and four committee members. At the same time, the company had advertised for workers in the local media and had been taking on new employees. The union said that such methods represented a serious threat to the constitutional right of the workers to join trade unions and it would use all legal means at its disposal to protect workers whose job security is threatened because of their trade union membership. The union said that it was calling for a meeting under the chairmanship of the Chief Labour Officer or his representative to discuss the dismissals. [Text] [Bridgetown THE NATION in English 5 Apr 84 p 28]

MORTGAGE INTEREST RISE--The Barbados Government, through the Central Bank, has raised interest rates on all residential mortgage loans from ten to 11 percent with effect from Sunday, April 1. This was announced yesterday evening by Governor of the Central Bank, Dr Courtney Blackman, who said that while it would mean that persons receiving mortgages would have to pay more interest, it would also mean that the lending institutions should be more willing to lend, because the profit margin would be wider. He explained that for some time commercial banks and mortgage lending institutions had been complaining that the differential between deposit rates and mortgage rates was not wide enough to encourage lending. "We expect that this one percent increase should ease the problem," Dr Blackman stated. [Excerpt] [Bridgetown THE NATION in English 3 Apr 84 p 1]

CSO: 3298/731

## ITAMARATY TO PROMOTE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS

Brasilia CORREIO BRAZILIENSE in Portuguese 15 Apr 84 p 11

[Article by Liana Sabo]

[Text] Although the funds previously allocated to promote foreign trade have been cut in half this year, Itamaraty intends to maintain Brazil's high profile at international trade fairs, through increased financial participation by Brazilian exhibitors, based on an estimated average return of \$70.00 for every dollar invested in foreign expositions.

According to the DFT (Division of Trade Fairs and Tourism) of the Foreign Trade Ministry, the strategy is to concentrate the agency's capacity for effective action on events that could open new markets in countries where it has been difficult to place Brazilian products, without detriment to the nation's traditional participation in promotional fairs in Latin America, Brazil's natural market.

When President Joao Figueiredo visits Beijing in May, he will inaugurate the first Brazilian industrial exposition in the People's Republic of China. Brazil would like to bring bilateral trade with China up to \$1 billion this year. Diplomats responsible for organizing the fair in Beijing do not hide their satisfaction with the "good will" demonstrated by the Chinese Government, whose decision on the Brazilian exposition "came very quickly." This is unusual for Oriental countries, which sometimes take as long as a year to respond.

Some 90 companies are interested in participating in the exposition in China. The major items to be offered will be capital goods, engineering services, durable consumer goods and processed foods, such as guarana-based soft drinks. According to Itamaraty, the great impetus was the recent governmental mission led by Minister Ernane Galveas and including 30 Brazilian businessmen, who met with the Chinese authorities to discuss the possibility of expanding trade. Bilateral trade now stands at \$720 million, from the exchange of petroleum, coal and chemical products for Brazilian iron ore and steel products.

## Tehran

In view of the upheaval in Iran, the DFT feels it will be more difficult to persuade the nation's businessmen to exhibit at the Tehran international fair in September. This year Brazil will officially participate in the fair for the first time since the regime of the ayatollahs was installed in Iran.

Some 5 years after the Islamic revolution, Iran has emerged as a potential market for Brazilian products, exceeding the trade levels existing at the time of the shah. In exchange for its petroleum, Iran has been acquiring Brazilian machinery, tools, trucks and steel plate, as well as sugar and soybeans.

Some firms in Brazil, such as Pirelli and Romi, are maintaining the same production levels as last year, thanks to Iranian orders for telephone wire, cable and lathes.

Last year Brazil expanded its exports to Iran by 70 percent, but this performance and the possibility of furthering expanding bilateral trade do not allay Brazilian exporters' fears about investing large sums in shipping their products and equipment to Tehran, which is at the center of an area of upheaval because of the war with Iraq.

The funds to promote foreign trade have been cut back 60 percent from 1983, forcing Itamaraty to limit its action basically to organizing trade fairs and renting the space for the Brazilian exhibitors.

6362

CS0: 3342/97



## IBC GRANTS NEW INCENTIVES TO STIMULATE COFFEE EXPORTS

Rio de Janeiro GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 21 Mar 84 p 15

[Article by Suely Caldas]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro--With two more incentives provided for importers yesterday, the Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) believes that the cycle of measures which it has been adopting since last week with a view to stepping up foreign sales of coffee is complete. These sales had developed at an extremely slow rate throughout this year, with a deterioration since the end of February. The new incentives became effective yesterday but will only remain in effect until next 30 June. The first incentive varies with the foreign quotation for this product, which was \$.05 cents yesterday, while the second is applicable only to buyers who exceed their purchase commitments in this half-year, with the figure being \$11 per sack yesterday.

The market reaction has not yet matched hopes. Yesterday, sales of only 75,000 sacks of green coffee were reported, and there is still a balance of 720,000 sacks to be reported and shipped between today and next 31 March.

Yesterday exporters were still digesting the meaning of the two incentives, and they said they were not in a position to say whether they are really capable of reactivating sales. The first incentive, valid for all sales made since yesterday, involves a compulsory requirement of a difference of at least 10 cents per pound-peso between the quotations for Robusta and the main coffees in the Brazilian price calculation formula, which gives our product greater competitive capacity. According to the market quotation yesterday, this incentive would be the equivalent of a discount of half a dollar per sack. The other incentive, moreover, is broader and bolder. It only applies to the purchases in addition to the volume for which the buyer contracted, representing a discount of \$11 per sack yesterday, according to IBC calculations.

While the interpretations by the exporters were confused, among other things because the IBC informed only its contractors abroad of the new measures, the leaders of that self-governing body said they did not expect any reaction in sales for yesterday, but were confident there would be acceleration beginning today. And they explained that not all of the importers learned of the content of the IBC instructions in time to complete transactions, since the offices need time to translate the additions to the contract and transmit them to the buyers via Telex, a task which had not yet been entirely completed yesterday.



In any case, even with the weak volume of 75,000 sacks, the level of export reports yesterday was the second highest this month, showing a certain readiness to react. But as all marketing has been delayed because of the slow pace of sales, it will be difficult for exporters to report and ship 720,000 sacks by the 31st of this month. A total of 110,000 sacks of this total represents a balance on the February quota, transferred to March, while the IBC had set a final deadline of yesterday for enterprises to ship, on pain of losing the volume lacking from their individual quotas. Just yesterday it revoked this decision and extended the deadline to 31 March, since the self-governing body itself judged the claims of difficulties in placing Brazilian coffee well-founded.

An IBC official explained to this newspaper yesterday that the two incentives, valid only for sales in this first half of the year, were designed first of all to make the supplementation of the quarterly commitments of the importers as specified in the contracts more viable. The second and more generous incentive applies only to sales exceeding the volume contracted for during the quarters ending 31 March and 30 June. In order to be entitled to this incentive, which on the basis of the quotation yesterday would be the equivalent of \$11 per sack, the buyer must totally fulfill his commitment for the two quarters. Thus the IBC hopes to end the first half of this year having disposed of Brazil's international quota, and to begin the second half with calmer marketing free of the haste and the lags characterizing this year's beginning.

5157

CSO: 3342/92

## COCOA CROP FOR 1985-86 EXPECTED TO MAKE COUNTRY LEADING PRODUCER

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 4 Apr 84 p 14

[Text] Mexico City--Brazil will become the leading world producer of cacao beans with the 1985-1986 harvest, when it will harvest 430,000 tons, more than the Ivory Coast, which has led production since 1977. This information is contained in an International Cacao Organization document "for limited distribution."

Brazilian production today is about 330,000 tons, as compared to the Ivory Coast's 330,000, but by the end of this present harvest the two countries will be on a par, with 350,000 tons each. After that, Brazil will gradually increase its capacity to the point of having a 25,000-ton advantage over that African country by the end of this decade.

Brazilian Cacao Bean Production Plan Commission Director Paulo de Tarso Alvim said yesterday that Latin American producers, with the exception of Mexico, suffered damage to their harvests to the extent of 20 percent from "black rot" (phytophthora). He is participating in the preparatory session for the 42nd annual meeting of the Cocoa Bean Organization, which is scheduled to be held between 9 and 13 of this month in the Mexican capital.

Who Produces Most  
(Estimated cacao bean production up to the end  
of the 1980s in thousands of tons)

(1)	PAIS	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90
(2)	Rep. dos Camarões	112	116	119	122	127	132
(3)	C. do Marfim	398	428	454	475	492	503
(4)	Gana	155	159	15	159	161	163
	Nigéria	150	151	152	153	154	155
(5)	Outros/Africa	58	58	58	59	59	60
(6)	Brasil	398	430	458	484	506	528
(7)	Equador	69	86	87	89	91	91
(8)	Outros/América	171	173	173	174	175	175
(9)	Malásia	92	112	134	152	166	178
(10)	Outros/Asia	52	52	53	53	54	55

(11) Fonte: Organização Internacional do Cacao

## Key:

- |                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| 1. Country                 | 7. Ecuador                                   |
| 2. Cameroon                | 8. Other American countries                  |
| 3. Ivory Coast             | 9. Malaysia                                  |
| 4. Ghana                   | 10. Other Asian countries                    |
| 5. Other African countries | 11. Source: International Cacao Organization |
| 6. Brazil                  |  |

## MARCH TRADE SURPLUS ATTRIBUTED TO MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS' SALE

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 5 Apr 84 p 23

[Text] Brasilia--The director of the Foreign Trade Department (CACEX) of the Bank of Brazil, Carlos Viacava, yesterday attributed the record surplus of \$1.2 billion in the trade balance last month, when exports totaled \$2.63 billion and imports \$1.61 billion, to the "exceptional performance" of industrialized products.

Viacava said that foreign sales of industrialized products in the first quarter of this year also showed record growth, up 41.1 percent as compared to the same period in 1983.

Sales of manufactured products, according to the CACEX director, exceeded all expectations, with a 40.7 percent increase for the quarter. "Domestic exports," Viacava said, "were up 22.5 percent in the first 3 months of this year, when the accumulated surplus reached \$2,439,000,000."

#### 1. Maxidevaluation--An Export Tool

According to Carlos Viacava, the best lever for exports continues to be the exchange policy, i.e., the maxidevaluation of the cruzeiro effected in February of last year, "the results of which are emerging in the medium and long range," along with the maintenance of minidevaluations on the inflationary level.

In the first 3 months of this year, the director of the CACEX said, the government expected an increase in imports because of the completion of centralization of Central Bank exchange operations, and a slight increase foreseen in oil imports, which showed a drop of 12.3 percent up until March as compared to the January-March period in 1983.

In this first quarter, Viacava added, industrialized products accounted for 168 [sic] percent of the export total and basic products 32 percent. In the coming months, primary products should play a greater role in the total.

#### 2. Credit To Be Updated

The government will update all of the lags in the release of credit for exports before the end of this month, the CACEX director, Carlos Viacava, gave assurance yesterday. He said that there is a repressed demand for about

50 billion cruzeiros in credit for foreign sales, apart from the normal financing needs totaling about 100 billion cruzeiros, through the Financing and Export Fund (FINEX).

The CACEX director said that about 44 billion cruzeiros were released last month for the financing of exports through the FINEX. This was the first month in which the resources released through this program came close to the expected sum--40 billion cruzeiros--since in the first 2 months of the year, the ceilings for this program were generously exceeded.

According to Viacava, the FINEX released about 230 billion cruzeiros for exports during the first quarter.

### 3. Imports To Be Expanded

Carlos Viacava announced that by the beginning of next week, the government will release a long list of raw materials for imports. Prominent on the list are chemical products, fertilizers and copper. He predicted that in all, these imports should total a maximum of \$100 million.

According to Viacava, the most difficult decision involved copper imports, because this will inevitably affect Caraiba Metals, the state enterprise which has a monopoly on sales of copper on the domestic market. Currently, copper imports are conditional on the purchase of about 50 percent of the products of Caraiba Metals, and what the government will do is to reduce this quota. The Caraiba prices, because they are higher than foreign market prices, exert inflationary pressure, the director of the CACEX said. With imports of the products on a larger scale, Caraiba will have to reduce its production or increase its stock.

5157

CSO: 3342/92

## CVRD TITANIUM PRODUCTION ON INDUSTRIAL SCALE DISCUSSED

## Industrial Production

Brasilia CORRPIO BRAZILIENSE in Portuguese 16 Apr 84 p 4

[Text] The Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) has been operating a pilot plant in Tapire, near Araxa, Minas Gerais, for the conversion of anatase into titanium concentrate. After 6 months of experimental activity, the project has been demonstrated to be economically feasible and the CVRD is planning to install a plant for production on an industrial scale by March 1985. The new plant will not be ready to go into production until the end of 1986, however.

The pilot plant has an annual production rate of only 15,000 tons of titanium dioxide ( $\text{TiO}_2$ ), which is the most concentrated form; in an initial phase, the industrial plant will manufacture about 150,000 tons a year. To reach the current level of technology, the CVRD has invested \$20 million over the last 7 years in research and development of the pilot plant, better known as "Project Titanium."

According to Gustavo Vasconcelos, the project coordinator, the new plant will cost about \$100 million (at current prices). He argues, however, that the investment will pay for itself rapidly, in only 2 years. The domestic market consumes only about 600,000 tons [sic] of  $\text{TiO}_2$  annually, which means that almost everything produced can be exported, guaranteeing foreign exchange receipts.

He stressed that this return is highly important, particularly taking into account that the CVRD investments will be made in cruzieros and the exports will bring in dollars.

Before it was feasible to extract titanium dioxide from anatase, the only mineral ores of any commercial significance were rutile and ilmenite with a high  $\text{TiO}_2$  content, aside from titanium-bearing magnetite, with only a 34-percent titanium content. Brazilian reserves of these ores are small, and it should also be noted that world reserves of rutile are very limited and are expected to be exhausted in the next 15 years, Vasconcelos commented.

In the process using ilmenite, the degree of impurity is quite high, hence the search for new raw materials to use in its stead. The search by CVRD teams was crowned with success, based on experiments with a product (anatase) of which they had had only a theoretical knowledge before them.

The new process, created entirely by technicians in the Belo Horizonte laboratory, has already been patented in several countries, including Australia, the United States and Canada, which look to the Brazilian process for a substantial increase in the world production of titanium, currently considered the "metal of the future." The best thing about all of this, from the national standpoint, is that Brazil has the world's largest deposits of anatase: about 1 billion tons, concentrated in the south of Minas Gerais and of Goias.

Titanium has a wide range of uses; it is an ingredient in paints and is used in its metallic form in the aerospace industry, with advantages over steel and aluminum. Until the CVRD extracted titanium from anatase, almost all the titanium used domestically was imported; only a small fraction was obtained from TIBRAS [Brazilian Titanium] mining operations in Bahia.

In its concentrated form, titanium is the best known white pigment, and 90 percent of all the titanium produced is consumed by the paint industry. The rest is used in the plastics industry, as a porcelain enamel, in the production of rubber inner tubes and textiles and, on a smaller scale, as a flux for electric soldering, as a dielectric for capacitors and in the manufacture of titanium carbonate, which is used in the manufacture of cutlery.

The growing consumption of metallic titanium and its alloys is owing to its lightness (with a specific weight between that of iron and aluminum) and its corrosion-resistance. It need only be noted that the strategic use of titanium alloys in the aerospace industry represents 80 percent of the total consumption in the United States; in Japan, it is used primarily (about 90 percent) in the chemical industry.

#### Exclusive Club

Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 16 Apr 84 p 15

[Text] The product which CVRD will begin to market in 1986 will also enable the country to develop production of metallic titanium, which is currently entirely imported. The CTA (Aerospace Technical Center) in Sao Jose dos Campos has already developed the technology, which will enable Brazilian industry to join the world's exclusive club of metallic titanium producers, which is currently limited to the United States, Japan and England.

The investments are estimated at about \$100 million, and it is thought that the installation of an industrial plant for the production of titanium concentrate on a commercial scale will open new horizons for the industrial sector in southern Minas Gerais.

6362

CSO: 3342/97

## MILITARY ENDORSE TALKS BETWEEN PLANALTO PALACE, OPPOSITION

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 22 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Helio Contreiras]

[Text] The military ministers will support the Planalto Palace understandings with the opposition to pursue solutions to the current crisis in Brazil. The government will thus have the backing of the military to take the initiative with the opposition leaders to achieve this end.

According to a high-level military source, the Armed Forces would not like to see the crisis intensify, and view the emergency measures as therapeutic, that is, adopted for the purpose of preserving the government's political program and preventing the crisis from getting out of control and jeopardizing the project.

Brig Gen Delio Jardim de Matos is in favor of an understanding. The aeronautics minister is not alone in this; he has the support of the military in the other branches, the navy and the army, and even of officers who are currently in a dissident position and have already criticized the government on other occasions.

General Delio's statement that there must be "good sense on both sides" was endorsed by Navy Minister Adm Alfredo Faran during a telephone interview with the Rio office of O ESTADO E JORNAL DE TARDE on Good Friday--the first exclusive interview granted since the admiral assumed command of the Navy.

"The important thing is to avoid radicalism, and as to the possibility of a national understanding, it is well to remember that the president of the republic has been appealing for conciliation since the beginning of his administration," Admiral Faran added.

The minister said that every effort should be made to bring about the goal, which must be common "and not just the president's goal," to bring the country to full democracy. The admiral was not only critical of radicalism, which always appears at times of national crises, but also of the "malcontents who make an uproar."

The minister feels that conciliation requires a willingness to reach a "national understanding," an expression which he prefers to the word "negotiation," because this "could be confused with business, when the goal is loftier."



According to high military sources, the fact that the Armed Forces have taken a discreet position during the development of the presidential succession process could further characterize them as apartisan. Some active and reserve officers have even publicly admitted their disagreements with the government, its policies and actions with regard to the economic crisis, but they feel there must be no risk of a major regression.

"The apartisan position of the Brazilian army" was stressed this week in Rio de Janeiro by a spokesman for the institution, Gen Glenio Pinheiro, and other officers who spoke of the responsibilities of the Armed Forces in the present situation, which they acknowledged to be difficult and from which the country cannot escape without sacrifice on both sides in the search for conciliation.

Gen Jose Maria de Toledo Camargo, Planalto Palace spokesman in the Geisel administration, who criticized the "way the emergency measures were carried out" in October, also defended the agreement as the only way out of the crisis.

After admitting that he supports the presidential candidacy of Aureliano Chaves, he noted that the vice president has constantly appealed for political negotiation and has even said he would sacrifice his own candidacy to bring about an agreement to overcome the crisis.

Aureliano's candidacy is already viewed pessimistically by other military officers who had come to defend it, in the certainty that he would be victorious, because they feel that an agreement between the government and the opposition will involve a reexamination of the process by which Figueiredo's successor is chosen.

Candidates Mario Andreazza and Paulo Maluf will also have much less of a chance than they did a week ago, since their candidacies were jolted by the emergency measures, according to a reserve general who maintains ties with government circles.

The same source assures that his own choice of candidate has already been overtaken by events, which will require a revision of the succession process, and he agreed with General Camargo that the crisis will demand understanding and patriotism, to arrive at an agreement.

There have already been political crises in Brazil in which the highest-ranking military officers supported a hard line, even for an indefinite period. The most radical example of this position was AI-5 [Institutional Act No 5], which lasted for 10 years, a period in which the rights of citizens and institutions were suspended and the judiciary was on a very short rein. In the present crisis, the military themselves are concerned that there be no more serious and lasting developments.

It would make no sense to extend the crisis indefinitely, according to high military sources, because the country has gone through other stages in the process of political liberalization, just as sensitive as the present one, or more sensitive, without trauma. A harder line is not in the interest of the Armed Forces either, because this could mean further erosion for them, inasmuch as it would lead them into a new involvement with repression.

## BRIEFS

EXPORTS TO PRC, IRAN--Sao Paulo--Within 12 months, exports to China and Iran will reach \$1 billion, predicts Jaques Eluf, president of the trading company IAT, who returned yesterday from a trip to China and other Eastern countries. He added that sales to China alone will amount to \$500 million in iron ore, steel products, textiles and lumber. "Just for lumber, a \$54 million deal was closed with a consortium of state companies. Exports of steel products will reach \$200 million. The \$500 million in sales to China represents orders that will be filled before April 1985," noted Eluf, who went to China with the official Finance Ministry mission. Eluf is also one of those responsible for reopening the Iranian market, which had been cut off since the fall of the Shah Rezi Pahlevi and the takeover by the Ayatollah Khomeyni. "In 1981 we did not export anything to Iran. In 1982, some deals were made and Brazilian exports reached \$80 million. In 1983, sales to Iran reached \$250 million, and the goal for this year is \$500 million." [Text] [Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 16 Apr 84 p 16] 6362

CS0: 3342/97

## BISHOPS CALL FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ARCHBISHOP FRESNO

## Text of Bishops' Declaration

Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 12 Apr 84 p A-10

[Text] Following is the declaration of the Bishops' Standing Committee:

1. The Standing Committee, meeting in its regular session on Tuesday, 10 April, carefully analyzed the situation of the nation, in an attempt to advance the process of reconciliation of the Chilean family, in these days before Holy Week and the celebration of Our Lord's Resurrection.
2. We adopt as our own the urgent appeal made by Monsignor Juan Francisco Fresno on 25 March, speaking from the Cathedral of Santiago. With him, we await "a great gesture: a gesture of thorough understanding; a gesture which"--in my humble opinion, he added--"is first of all the duty of the nation's authorities."
3. This appeal by the Archbishop of Santiago has been echoed by many people. And if the latest protest was characterized by a lesser degree of violence than had been feared, that may be attributed to the desire to respond "by deeds" to his appeal.
4. Despite this, we must express our regret about unacceptable deeds of terrorist violence, which occurred both before and after the protest, which led to the death of a police officer, and demonstrations of unjustifiable repressive violence, which cost the lives of a number of Chilean people. As for the application of administrative measures--press censorship, banishment, and exile--we would have preferred that the government renounce the use of these procedures, leaving all punitive measures in the hands of the judicial authorities.

5. A number of political and labor union organizations have indicated that they welcome the appeal of the Archbishop of Santiago and that they are prepared to seek ways leading to a consensus and to a peaceful transition toward full democracy. We express our appreciation of their position and we urge them to continue to work steadfastly in this direction.

6. We await the government's response to this appeal, which is now also the appeal of the Bishops' Standing Committee. This is an appeal for a clear expression of a sincere and determined desire to bring about the transition to democracy, with the participation of the citizens, government or opposition members, or their authentic representatives, emphasizing what unites us and respecting what divides us, and within a period of time consonant with Chile's situation.

7. We want to suggest some actions which seem to us conducive to the objective sought. These suggestions are directed to different groups of people within our national community.

8. To the government authorities and political leaders, and also to journalists and commentators: we request that they do not give offense with their words, and that they refrain from threats or provocations. That, whatever their political opinions may be, they express these opinions in respectful and truthful language.

9. To the opposition leaders: we ask that they absolutely eliminate violence in their demonstrations of discontent or protest. And to the armed forces and police who have the duty to maintain public order: we request that they also renounce the use of all unnecessary repressive violence, remembering that we are all Chileans, brothers and sisters united in our race, culture, and faith.

10. We urge an end to all terrorism, no matter what its origin. We urge that no one feel he is authorized to strike, wound, or kill anyone he considers his opponent. We ask that appropriate means be used to clear up political crimes that have caused serious injury or the death of people such as Tucapel Jimenez, General Carol Urzua, or Jorge Lavandero, and of other people who are not so well known, but whose life and physical integrity have the same value before God and before the Chilean nation.

11. To the women of Chile, who have shown that they have a decisive and healthy influence in our civic life: we ask that

they make use of their full capacity for affection and persuasion, within their homes, in their meeting places and workplaces, and in public life, acting for the cause of peace--peace with dignity, peace with justice, peace with love--and against violence, hatred, lies, and any irresponsible course of action.

12. To young people in Chile: we ask that they be the voice of hope, that they adopt creative attitudes, and that they prepare themselves to build our future. And to do this, we invite them to get to know Jesus Christ and to study the Bible, with all its constructive dynamism.

13. To those who are without work, to those who are trapped by poverty: we ask them to have strength and hope so that, by avoiding rash actions that might cause even greater evils, they may manage to overcome their present difficulties by acting with solidarity.

14. To those who have resources with which to live: we urge them to give up any unnecessary spending, to live with sobriety in order that they may be able to give fraternal help to so many of their brothers and sisters who are living in desperate economic conditions.

15. In conclusion, we call upon everyone--especially the Catholics whom we serve as pastors, but all others as well, whether believers or nonbelievers--to make use of their spiritual and moral reserves, to awaken or revive their inner conscience, to think of God who created us, who loves us, forgives us, and is going to judge us, and we urge that they ask Him to help us in this difficult hour of our history.

16. We Christians are preparing to celebrate Holy Week and the Resurrection. We Catholics are going to mark the end of this Holy Year of Reconciliation to which we were called by our Holy Father. With our hearts cleansed by Penance, fortified by the Eucharist, meditating with love and sorrow on the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ on the Cross, and participating with joy and hope in the celebration of Our Lord's Resurrection, we will call upon God and He will stimulate our efforts for peace and reconciliation among the Chilean people.

Signing this document were: Monsignor Bernardino Pinera; Msgr Tomas Gonzalez, bishop of Punta Arenas; Msgr Jose Manuel Santos, archbishop of Concepcion; Msgr Manuel Camilo Vial, bishop of San Felipe, replacing Msgr Juan Francisco Fresno, who is now in Rome; and Msgr Sergio Contreras.

## Bishops Reject CNT Demands

Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 12 Apr 84 pp A-1, A-10

[Text] The Bishops' Standing Committee yesterday issued a public statement endorsing the "urgent appeal made by Monsignor Juan Francisco Fresno on 25 March," and the committee is now awaiting the government's response.

The bishops feel that this response should contain "the clear expression of a sincere and determined desire to bring about the transition to democracy, with the participation of the citizens, government or opposition leaders, or their authentic representatives, emphasizing what unites us and respecting what divides us, and within a period of time consonant with Chile's situation."

They also appealed to different national sectors to adopt attitudes that will be helpful in achieving the objective of peace and reconciliation of the Chilean people. Of the opposition leaders, "we ask that they absolutely eliminate violence in their demonstrations of discontent or protest."

The Bishops' Conference of Chile also responded to the proposal advocated by the CNT [National Workers Command], declining to assume the task of convening a Patriotic Commission on National Reconciliation," in order "not to become involved in political decisions." The bishops did, however, express their desire to cooperate with such an initiative, announcing that they will explore "other ways to achieve what we are seeking."

Both the letter to the CNT and the declaration of the Bishops' Conference were issued yesterday afternoon at a press conference held by the president of the ecclesiastical organization and bishop of La Serena, Msgr Bernardino Pinera, and the secretary general and bishop of Temuco, Msgr Sergio Contreras.

In their communication to the CNT, they spoke about the Patriotic Commission on National Reconciliation, which would bring together personalities from the political, judicial, intellectual, scientific, academic, and religious worlds, as well as from the armed forces. As the CNT said on 30 March, this group would attempt to gather in the shortest possible time "proposals for the redemocratization of the different sectors and to express these proposals in one or more formulas to be presented to the people, in order to resolve these issues, by means of mechanisms which this commission would support. The bishops said: "It



seemed to us that it was not appropriate for us to do this, in order not to become involved in political decisions."

"May you continue," the letter added, "to seek the best resolution by peaceful means, by facing with flexibility the various positions with the aim of trying to reach a consensus. We, as pastors, will try to serve as a symbol of unity; we will work with you toward these goals, without prejudice to the possibility of our trying other ways to achieve what we are seeking."

#### Dialogue with the Press

After both letters were read, Msgr Bernardino Pinera answered a number of questions from reporters. About the statements made by the chief executive while in Antarctica, that the bishops' proposals should be subjected to a very thorough study, Msgr Pinera said that "the president of Chile, in speaking of the bishops' proposals, is referring to the appeal made by Msgr Fresno speaking in the cathedral. Today we have adopted this appeal as our own, and we are pleased that he is studying it."

"As for his impression--that the bishops may be taking sides against the government--we do not believe we have acted in such a manner, and I personally regret that he should have such an impression."

[Question] In its declaration, the Standing Committee repeated what Msgr Fresno said about waiting for the authorities to take the first step. Since that appeal was issued, 10 days have elapsed. In your opinion, does it seem that the authorities have taken any step in favor of national reconciliation?

[Answer] In point (6) of the declaration we said that we are awaiting the government's response to this appeal. Now there is a suggestion that a response will be forthcoming, contained in the comment which the president of Chile made while in Antarctica.

[Question] What steps would you consider appropriate on behalf of the government and the opposition?

[Answer] I wouldn't want to go beyond what was agreed by the Standing Committee, for which I am the spokesman. The steps the government and the opposition may want to take are their business, and we will support any initiative we are asked to support that is directed along the lines we have proposed, that is, designed to seek a peaceful solution to the present problem.



[Question] Today (yesterday), the CNT said that one of the most important points to be settled in the assembly to be held next Saturday is the idea and date for a national strike. What do you think of the fact that, on one hand, they are responding to the dialogue requested by Msgr Fresno, and on the other, they are calling for a strike?

[Answer] They should answer that question. The CNT told us that it is one thing to mobilize the masses through a means that excludes violence, and it is something else to seek a dialogue, and that both things may move ahead along parallel lines with no detriment to either activity. But that is their business, and not ours.

[Question] About the dialogue held in Concepcion, is there any possibility of broadening that to a national level?

[Answer] I understand that the dialogue to which you are referring, held in Concepcion, in which Msgr Santos was involved, came about in response to local circumstances. You may also remember that some time ago Msgr Fresno took a similar initiative here in Santiago. He also advocated a dialogue between people from different sectors. I believe that in both cases this was in response to a particular set of circumstances.

[Question] Do you believe that, as Msgr Fresno said in the cathedral, we are standing at the threshold of a spiral of violence?

[Answer] I believe that all of Chile fears that the situation we are now living in could take on violent characteristics.

In response to another question, he said that "in our declaration we did not mention a dialogue; there may be a dialogue or there may be some other way chosen, but I believe that there truly is urgency in dealing with the problem."

On the graffiti scrawled on walls of churches and offices of the archbishopric, Msgr Pinera said that "we did not address that issue in our latest committee meeting. Of course, we do regret the fact that people are defacing our churches, but that isn't Chile's most serious problem in these times."

7679

CSO: 3348/398

## ANDRES ZALDIVAR ON DC LEADERSHIP, DIALOGUE WITH GOVERNMENT

Santiago QUE PASA in Spanish 5 Apr 84 pp 16-18

[Interview with Christian Democratic International head Andres Zaldivar, by Gloria Stanley; date and location not specified]

[Text] For nearly a year, he has been constantly entering and leaving Chile; but now his departures are voluntary, and required by his job, not by an order from the authorities which made him a political exile for many months. This very position as head of the Christian Democratic International has enabled Andres Zaldivar to remain aloof from the potential political struggle, but to retain an important status in his own party, the Christian Democratic Party (no member could be indifferent to the opinion of one who guides the destiny of the directing entity, on the worldwide level).

With respect to the current crisis, however, he becomes the leader again; a leader who is willing to go to the assembly seeking support for his pacification plan. The latter may be summarized as: seating the government and the opposition at a table, and having them exchange their respective propositions, and then submitting the decision to the very ones concerned, the Chilean people.

Without waiting for questions, and as if he were giving a speech, he says: "The country cannot continue in this dangerous deadlock, with an immobilized government offering only the alternative of '89, with a few slight changes along the way."

He claims that in the international forum Chile's situation is a cause for concern and is gradually becoming the focus of attention. "The Europeans fear that the seriousness of the economic and social situation will turn Chile into a propitious area in which the Socialist bloc could attempt to establish a process of violence that would have enormous repercussions on East-West relations." And he adds: "The Americans believe the same thing, and I can claim this seriously, because of talks that I have held with politicians from their country. Evidence of this is the fact that the 'silent diplomacy,' consisting of not making statements, that the Reagan administration had maintained, has changed in recent years. We cannot forget that Minister Schweitzer himself, when leaving his position, admitted to having received more than 15 complaints against the regime from the United States."

[Question] There is unquestionably consensus among the Chilean population that means for understanding must be sought. The problem is that the Alliance has opted for social mobilization, a method that does not exactly produce pacification.

[Answer] Rather than mobilization, it is a way of expressing the dissatisfaction in peaceful terms. I sincerely believe that, if we abandon that proposition and the heads of the Alliance decide to talk with Pinochet, and accept the deadline of '89, at that moment we will be overcome by the more extremist sectors, which would assume the direction of the process using violent means.

[Question] That argument has been put forth since the first protests; but the actual fact is that the left is heading the social mobilization at the present time.

[Answer] No, an explanation must be made here. In the National Workers Command, out of 25 leaders, 14 are Christian Democrats, and of the remaining 11, many are not Marxists. In other words, those who are calling for protests are not from the extreme left nor the Marxist left. And what the Alliance has done is join in this.

#### Political Change

[Question] Some see the Alliance joining MDP. The protest (so the leaders of that conglomerate claim) was the first joint action with the Alliance.

[Answer] The problem here, over and above the Alliance and MDP, is that an irresponsible, populist, charismatic leader could suddenly appear, who would cause 50,000 young people to rise up and bring about an explosion in Santiago.

[Question] The social mobilization is giving those extremist leaders chances and opportunities.

[Answer] No, quite the contrary; it is placating them. I have recently visited many towns, and at all our meetings with town leaders, we have been showing the people the need for avoiding violence, destruction and physical damage. The problem, and I repeat it again, is that the opposition has no alternative other than continuing with the social mobilization, because General Pinochet does not want changes. As he told the regimental commanders the other day, he is offering the political laws, and no one knows that they are going to be like, so that Chileans may be "trained" a little. Then, he says, there will be an election for Congress. But, what Congress? The one of the Constitution of 1980? I would not attend that Congress, because that Congress has no authority, as the present Constitution stipulates. What is obvious is that there is, in essence, a desire to deceive the opposition: first, by offering the political laws, to get through 1984; and then, by announcing congressional elections for 1987, which would finally enable him to reach 1989. I think that General Pinochet is absolutely mistaken in this diagnosis. It does not suffice to offer political laws. Here, unless the problem of poverty and the severe economic crisis is dealt with, there is no chance of having a peaceful transition toward democracy; and the only way of dealing with poverty is by a political change.

## The Intransigence

[Question] To date, that political change has meant to the opposition the replacement or departure of President Pinochet. And the Alliance was hemmed in with that strategy last year, because the Armed Forces stated that they would not accept it. Don't you think that it would be dangerous to continue persisting in the same mistake?

[Answer] There may be people who describe that position as erroneous, but I don't think that the opposition could stop proposing it if it believes that this is what is needed. I, personally, think that transition is impossible, and that a process toward democracy is impossible, with Pinochet as a leader. And I think that if we were to ask Minister Jarpa that question privately, he would give me the same answer, and with much more reason. After 10 years of military government and personalist dictatorship, the country has reached the conclusion that this is a failed government. And when a government fails in a democratic system, it is replaced. Our tragedy is that, in Chile at present, there are no such mechanisms for replacement or penalty for a government that has failed.

[Question] Then we continue being intransigent.

[Answer] But if we want democracy! The fact is that we observe General Pinochet, on the other hand, not liking that democracy. In the recent interview granted to NEWSWEEK, in which he speaks sincerely, he appears with the typical position of the personalist dictatorships. He is a messianic, predestined figure, for whom there are no deadlines. The deadline is determined by the possibility of surviving, or of being penalized by the population.

[Question] We are returning to the same thing. Here is the opposition thinking that with President Pinochet it would be impossible to move toward democracy. There is the government, giving its type of solution, which is not what the opposition wants. How can the circle be broken? How can the understanding that Monsignor Fresno is requesting, be created?

[Answer] The solution has always existed in a method which is the simplest and wisest, in which we must trust. It is giving the country, and the Chilean people, the power to solve the problem. How can this be done? By seating the government and the opposition at the same table, having each put forth its proposition; and since no agreement is forthcoming, we put the two methods to a plebiscite, so that it will be the country which decides.

[Question] But you don't like plebiscites, because the authorities won't give you a guarantee.

[Answer] The plebiscite would have to be headed by individuals who would give guarantees, an associated group or one person. To give some names: Francisco Bulnes, Raul Saez, or the president of the Supreme Court; or all of them, along with a former commander in chief of the Army, or a former controller. That supreme electoral council would establish the terms for the plebiscite, and give access to the news media, on the basis of egalitarian justice.

## Two Propositions and a Judge

[Question] The method seems easy, at first glance, but in fact it is not. How would seating the two sides at the same table be accomplished? How could agreement be sought without experiencing the same thing that occurred at the last dialog?

[Answer] Things have to be done intelligently. One can never sit down at a negotiating table without previous contact having been made by second or third parties from both sides. If those feelers make it possible to conclude that there are chances of an agreement, then the sides could sit down to talk. At the present time, I would be opposed to sitting down at such a table, to undertake the signing of a declaration of war. That would not lead to anything. But if there is a spirit for reaching agreement, then we must be willing to talk, not just two or three times, but for all the time that is necessary: 10 or 15 days, during which all ideas would be exchanged and solutions proposed.

[Question] Apparently, from what Minister Jarpa has said, those contacts between second and third parties are already taking place.

[Answer] Minister Jarpa is not telling the truth. He is using meetings that have no significance to claim that contact has been made with the opposition. After I heard the minister say that he had met with Garbiel Valdes, I called Gabriel to ask him whether or not the claim was acutally true, and he told me that he had not held any meeting with him, but had only encountered him by chance. I, too, met him at an embassy, but we merely greeted each other. Politics must be engaged in seriously. Jarpa cannot claim to have had personal contacts with the opposition when he has not had them.

[Question] And with whom would you sit down to talk? With Jarpa?

[Answer] I am proposing a talk between the government and the opposition. With whom in the government? With one who really has power. I, personally, think that Jarpa has lost credibility in the country's eyes. What Chileans want are individuals, leaders who have the capacity for being magnanimous toward the country, and who are willing to make the maximum sacrifices to provide a solution to the present crisis.

[Question] Many people doubt that such magnanimity exists among political leaders.

[Answer] It must be fostered. Insofar as I am concerned, if the price for the country's advancement toward a real democratic solution were my political exile, I would impose exile on myself. But I would ask General Pinochet to be willing to resign as well, if the country were to decide that he was the obstacle to reaching a solution. I repeat again something that I said just after I arrived. Here, there cannot be any deadlines that are unchangeable, nor individuals who are irreplaceable.

[Question] There are some who think that the current leaders in the Alliance are too exhausted to continue the process that is coming.

[Answer] I think not. Furthermore, that is a problem which each party has to solve internally.

#### Internal Democratization

[Question] And do you believe that the leaders now representing the opposition really have representative status?

[Answer] To a large extent, yes; although, in principle, every leadership which has come into existence under the conditions that currently prevail here, should be reconfirmed in the democracy. Here, there is nothing to gain from having someone say "I am a leader." The important thing is for the country to say, in the future, "these are my leaders."

[Question] The Christian Democratic Party had announced that it would undertake that process of reconfirming the leadership. Now, a postponement of the elections has been announced.

[Answer] I am an advocate, and I have always said so, of the idea that, just as we request democracy of the country, we in the parties cannot fail to democratize ourselves, starting with the rank and file itself. We must form a party in which the leaders reflect what the members think. Before a board of directors is elected, we must democratize the party. To accomplish this, we must start by electing the boards of directors among the neighborhood rank and file, continuing with the communal boards and thereafter with the zonal ones, ending with the national board of directors. That process has already been started.

[Question] But it could last for a year.

[Answer] No, no; but I maintain that there is no need to hurry. The important thing is for the people to participate, so that the next board of directors can really represent a process of maturity.

[Question] And are you a candidate for that forthcoming board?

[Answer] No, no; I am not a candidate.

[Question] And what if it were asked of you by that rank and file which you have mentioned?

[Answer] During this phase, I don't believe that a confrontation of this kind is feasible. What the party needs is to seek the best people so as to achieve the best political leadership. This is not the time for determining leaders; they will be elected when the conditions are present.

[Question] In other words, you are keeping yourself as an essential candidate.



[Answer] I am definite about this. If, at any time, the situation should require it, and they not only confront me with a knife, but also with a line of machine guns, of course at such a time I would be dutybound to assume responsibilities. But I don't think that this is the time to do it. What is important now is to strengthen the political and social organizations, so that they will be able to meet the responsibilities that will be incumbent on them when the process of democratic openness occurs. If we expose ourselves now to a petty fight about "I yes, you no," the country will laugh at us. And I don't like people laughing at me.

[Question] Let's return to the types of solution for the political crisis. How could the stalemate between the government and the opposition, over compliance with institutionality, be surmounted?

[Answer] The problem of whether or not to comply with the institutionality that is in effect is an outward problem. The important thing is to reach solutions. To say: let's change this Constitution so that it will acquire legitimacy, and so that it will establish democratic institutions, is not the same thing as saying: let's make a new Constitution, and subject it to a plebiscite. For this reason, I return to the notion of consulting the country. Let the latter speak out, as to whether it wants the Pinochet government until '89, with all the conditions that it proposes, or whether it prefers our proposition, which might even be a rapprochement with the proposition of former Senator Bulnes. Let a Congress be elected, with the same powers that it had with the Constitution of '25; and let that Congress be the one to decide and determine whether to shorten or keep the deadlines in effect in the Constitution of 1980.

[Question] The other problem that such potential talks between the government and the opposition will face is that of the participants at the table. It would be difficult for the government to sit down with MDP.

[Answer] People know that I am absolutely opposed to the Communist Party, that I would never make concessions to it. But I am definite about one thing: The entire country must be involved in this; that is the only way of succeeding. Moreover, if I exclude now anyone who thinks differently, in the future a majority opposed to my ideas may be formed, and, quite logically, they could exclude me.

[Question] Do you really believe that an agreement will be reached?

[Answer] I am pessimistic, mainly because I believe that General Pinochet wants no solution other than the one he has proposed; that is what is most serious.

[Question] In the event that those agreements do not reach fruition, what do you think that the situation will demand?

[Answer] The opposition will grow, and hence the repression will heighten. And in this confrontation, the country will seek its solutions. I expect that, if that happens, there will occur what occurred in Argentina or Peru: the country



will topple the walls and climb over them, taking the path that is fitting. I shall never accept violence, because I regard it as parricidal, and because it never leads to democratic solutions. When the Armed Forces are defeated by the paramilitary groups, we end up with governments that are more dictatorial than the previous ones. That is what has happened in Cuba, and in Nicaragua as well.

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## U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY BLAMED FOR LOW SUGAR PRICES

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 25 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Luis M. Arce: "GATT, Sugar, Nicaragua and U.S. Arrogance"]

[Text] Once again the arrogance of U.S. rulers has come to the fore in international relations and once again trade among nations has become an instrument of aggression and blackmail in U.S. hands. Last year the Reagan administration implemented the illegal and arbitrary measure of drastically reducing the Nicaraguan sugar quota in order to distribute it among El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica.

A special committee of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) developed from the protests of the Nicaraguan government at the time to investigate and study the case. Its decision, which was announced March 14, was favorable to Nicaragua. GATT is officially demanding that the U.S. government restore as soon as possible (the period expires in May) the 52,000 tons wrested from the Sandinista government.

The White House official reaction has been to defy the GATT resolution and threaten not to change its attitude.

This is not the first time that the United States has used such methods. One of the first U.S. government measures against the Cuban Revolution was precisely to confiscate the sugar quota.

With greater or lesser subtlety, sometimes overt but mostly covert, trade blackmail has been a long-standing practice in U.S. international relations. This practice has not escaped industrialized countries with their sophisticated technologies or Third World countries which are the basic suppliers of raw materials and semifinished products for the U.S. market.

Mexican steel, Bolivian tin and Caribbean bauxite, to mention a few well-known cases, have frequently been victims of the U.S. boycott.

All this reflects the pragmatic criterion which was very clearly expressed in the United Nations, without anger or embarrassment, by Jeane Kirkpatrick who said that the economic relations of the United States should be conditioned by the political attitude of the counterpart.

David Demarest, spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Commerce, in announcing that his government would oppose the GATT decision, confirmed the point of view expressed by Kirkpatrick in the UN when he stated that the boycott on Nicaraguan sugar responded to political differences with the Sandinista government.

These were the same reactionary, unjust and illegal arguments brandished last year by Warren Lavorel, the U.S. GATT representative, when he said that the action against Nicaragua was strictly within the framework of trade relations since the reasons to cut off their quota were much broader.

In the UN, in the FAO and now in GATT, the prepotent U.S. attitude has been fought against because of the enormous dangers it involves and because it is not possible to allow trade blackmail and boycotts to be used as instruments of a country's foreign policy.

In the case of sugar this action against Nicaragua should serve as a warning to all the producers who conduct trade with the United States. Last year, the United States cut off 40 percent of its imports, reducing more than five million tons of quotas to only 3.1 million tons in order to benefit corn producers.

This has caused serious internal complications with sugarcane producers and in particular with refiners who are demanding that the previous import quotas be restored. And it has also caused negative consequences for consumers who must confront the artificial increase of the price of sugar to three times greater than the average international price. Basically, U.S. consumers are those who are subsidizing the affected producers.

If the current prices of sugar on the international market are now at untenable levels for the majority of the producers of the Third World, this is largely due to U.S. economic policy which relegates trade interests to political interests, thus poisoning international relations.

Therefore, the battle in GATT is not an isolated, solitary battle on the part of Nicaragua for the revindication of its rights. It is everyone's battle against injustice, in favor of legality, reason and good sense. It is a battle to make relations among nations healthy and marked by cooperation and mutual benefit.

CSO: 3200/21

## PAPER ATTACKS U.S., WESTERN INFORMATION MONOPOLY

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 1 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Roberto Alvarez Quinones: "Freedom of the Press Washington-Style"]

[Text] The U.S. government has announced that its withdrawal from UNESCO is based, among other things, on the institution's violation of freedom of the press and its attempts to obstruct the free flow of news in order to support a new international information order.

What is behind these claims? What does violation of freedom of the press mean to the Reagan administration?

Washington has clearly not forgiven UNESCO for its decision to expose colonialism in the field of information and culture which the industrialized West and the United States in particular impose on the underdeveloped world.

For the last eight years UNESCO has been providing information and irrefutable evidence on the tremendous imbalance in the field of information and culture between the industrialized capitalist nations and the so-called Third World. The McBride Commission, which was set up at the request of the 161 members of UNESCO and especially those of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, demonstrated after a detailed study that four Western news agencies--AP, UPI, AFP and Reuters--control 80 percent of the news that circulates in the world. AP and UPI, the two largest, are U.S.-owned and the others are French and British, respectively.

These four agencies transmit millions of words daily, while the 84 news agencies of the Press Agencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries transmit a total of 40,000 words. That is, for every word distributed by a Third World agency, the above-mentioned four distribute 1,000. AP sends 90,000 words from New York to Asia, while it only sends 19,000 words of news on Asia to other parts of the world.

To sum it up, the international information which reaches the underdeveloped world is largely what the information transnationals select and transmit according to their interests. This in no way reflects the historic, socio-economic, political and cultural realities of the underdeveloped nations.

When the average Latin American opens his morning newspaper, eight of every ten news items come from the above-mentioned news agencies, and in most cases they have nothing to do with the problems of Latin America. The same ratio also holds for TV news programs.

The situation is the same in Africa and Asia. Inhabitants in Burundi and Pakistan read more about the rape of an elderly woman on the New York subway than the problems of a neighboring country or the success of a national liberation struggle.

Last September in Igls, Austria, UNESCO made public a document which shows how the enormous "imbalance in the field of news exchange and messages between the developing and industrialized nations has become much worse since 1978." The document served as the basis for a meeting of UNESCO and UN experts on the urgent need to establish "a new international information order."

At this meeting, it was explained that the United States owns the 12 operational Intelsat satellites and that ten of the top 15 international companies in the field of data processing are U.S.-owned, along with the world's largest data banks. Eighty percent of the 18 million bibliographical references in the world come from the United States.

Other UNESCO studies have shown that a few transnationals, most of them U.S.-owned, control nearly 80 percent of the daily press published in both the industrialized and underdeveloped capitalist countries, 90 percent of the radio stations with an international audience, and 95 percent of TV broadcasts.

The United States has achieved such technological and political hegemony of information and communications that right now the information industry holds second place in terms of total export value of this, the richest country in the Western world.

This decisive control the United States has over the mass media which could well be called strategic, strengthening as it does the political, economic and cultural world hegemony desired by the Reagan administration, is what Washington calls freedom of the press and free flow of information.

The overwhelming dominance of the United States and other capitalist powers in this key sector is precisely what is being challenged and denounced. It is what UNESCO is trying to change in response to the wishes of dozens of nations subjected to colonialism in the field of information and culture.

CSO: 3200/20

## GUANTANAMO BASE AGREEMENTS TERMED VOID

Havana CUBA, ESTADOS UNIDOS Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORANEO in Spanish 1983 pp 141-171

[Unnumbered chapter in "Cuba, the U.S. and Contemporary International Law," by Miguel A. D'Estefano Pisani, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales]

[Text] Miguel A. D'Estefano Pisani graduated in law at the University of Havana in 1941. Since 1962, he has been professor of international public law in the Law Department of that university and at the Higher Institute of International Relations. In 1980 he was awarded the scientific degree of doctor of legal sciences.

Since 1960 he has filled different posts in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, among others: director of the Legal Affairs Directorate, director of the Training Division, professor of international public law and Cuban foreign policy at the Higher Institute of International Relations. He has held responsible positions like that of president of the Cuban UN Association since 1965, member of the National Directorate and vice chairman of the Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos (1964-1978), member of the University of Havana Scientific Degree Commission since 1979, member of the AALAPSC Advisory Council and president of the National Union of Cuban Lawyers' Cuban Society for International Law.

Many of his works have been published in national and foreign reviews. Works of his that have been published are: "Delinquency Among Indians in Cuba," "Social Defense and Dangerousness," "International Public Law," "Underdevelopment and International Public Law," "Puerto Rico: Analysis of a Plebiscite," "Law in Treaties," "International Public Law Schemes" (2 volumes), "Papers on International Public Law" (2 volumes) and "Cases in International Public Law," etc.

He has participated in many international events, among them: the conferences and tribunals on U.S. war crimes in Indochina (Stockholm, 1969 and 1970; Oslo, 1971; Copenhagen, 1972; Paris, 1973), plenary sessions of the World Federation of UN Associations (WFUNA) in Geneva (1973 and 1977) and conferences called by the United Nations, as well as events held in Cuba: the Tricontinental Conference, the Third Conference of American Jurists, the International Anti-Apartheid Conference, conferences of solidarity with Puerto Rico and seminars on South Africa, the Middle East, Indochina, the military-industrial complex and others.

## Illegal and Void Agreements on the Guantanamo Naval Base

### 1. History

The guiding purpose\* of this work is summarization and the most rigorous kind of objectivity. Its expansion would produce a very large volume, one which, moreover, the nature of the matter to be discussed deserves.

From the days of Jefferson in the first decade of the 19th century and then with Adams, as a long-term strategy with respect to the destiny of Cuba, the United States maintained that Cuba must fall into the hands of the latter country and that, for as long as this should not happen, it must remain in the hands of Spain, the declining mother country. We were to belong to the United States through purchase, annexation or occupation, but not to others and, of course, were never to be independent. In 1822 President Monroe said that Cuba and Puerto Rico "are natural appendages of the United States" and 2 decades later the secretary of state of the Union was to say that it was not their fault "that Cuba was halfway between Boston and New Orleans...." The Monroe Doctrine, geographical determinism and manifest destiny held in reserve for us the sad state of affairs their conclusions entailed.

But Spain never agreed to sell Cuba. The purchase of Cuba (as a permanent U.S. policy) was to be without consulting the will of the Cubans. Official American attestations to that effect abound. Since Spain did not sell, annexation failed and after 30 years of fighting for their independence the Cubans were about to attain it by themselves, when the United States looked for pretexts to intervene in Cuba, take control of the island and impose its imperial will on it. The explosion on board the cruiser "Maine" in the port of Havana was a ready-made event for establishing such a pretext. The jingoes, partisans of an aggressive foreign policy, imposed their will.

We should point out that during our country's 30-year struggle for independence the United States never recognized our governments in arms, nor even the state of war we were in. It always denied us any aid for the deliberate purpose of preventing our independence. A few hours before entering the war against Spain, President McKinley said: "At the present time it is not wise for us to recognize the independence of the so-called Republic of Cuba (...) in the event of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of that government. We would be summoned by or have to submit to its leadership and enter into the relations of a friendly alliance." And exhibited by McKinley with neither circumlocutions nor evasions, that policy has had a historical continuity. Just as Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, Ignacio Agramonte, Antonio Maceo, Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez were disregarded and offended by the United States and the latter had supported Spain, now, since the revolutionary victory, the United States has broken off relations with Cuba and allied itself with the expatriates.

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\* The development of Chapter 13 of my work, "Treaty Law," second edition, People and Education Publishing House, Havana, 1977.



We must note that, while it did not recognize the Cuban Government under arms in 1898, it did request aid of Cuban patriots, our Mambis, and the American armies landed thanks to the support of the Liberating Army, a decisive factor in the victory over Spain. But one more crime was committed: Those brave fighters whom it had never recognized, not even the fact that they were at war, when they needed its aid, it neither took them into consideration when the armistice with Spain was concluded nor permitted them to enter the cities, nor took them into account in the peace treaty signed with Spain in Paris.

According to the Yankees, in not admitting that the Mambis were fighting a war, the latter were reduced to the status of rebels against the government of the crown and they found themselves in that position at the start and at the end of the war. Therefore, the Yankees said that the Joint Resolution "is neither an agreement concluded with anyone, nor is it a law, nor even a decree." McKinley hastened to say that he did not recognize Cuban authority or any revolutionary organization empowered to negotiate the disarming of the Liberating Army, which is why the Cerro Assembly agreed to dissolve itself on 4 April 1899 after the United States had failed to recognize the Santa Cruz Assembly, organized by the Mambis. Peace with Spain was decidedly not Cuban peace with the United States....

## 2. On the Joint Resolution at the Paris Treaty

The Joint Resolution of 18 April 1898 was worded in the following way: "First: That the people of Cuba are and by right must be free and independent.

"Second: That it is the duty of the United States to demand, as the government of the United States is herewith demanding, that the government of Spain immediately renounce its authority and power to govern on the island of Cuba and withdraw its military and naval forces from the territory of Cuba and its waters.

"Third: That the President of the United States is herewith ordered and authorized to use all of the military and naval forces of the United States and to call into active service the militias of the different states to the extent it may be necessary to carry out this resolution.

"Fourth: That the United States herewith declares that it has no intention nor any desire to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or dominion over Cuba, except to restore peace to the island, and affirms its determination, once this has been accomplished, /to leave the governing of Cuba to its own people/."

This Joint Resolution began with the following paragraph: "Whereas, for the reasons expressed by the President of the United States in his message to Congress, it is impossible to any longer tolerate the existence of the horrible state of affairs that has prevailed for over 3 years on the island of Cuba, so close to our shores, which has profoundly shocked the people of the United States' sense of morality and affronted Christian civilization, and which has culminated in the destruction of an American warship with 266 of its officers and crew while it was on a friendly visit in the port of Havana."

Note that not even at the moment it was preparing to go to war with Spain did the United States recognize the existence of a war for independence in Cuba and, of course, of a Cuban Government under arms and of fighting patriots, did it speak of "the existence of the horrible state of affairs that has for over 3 years prevailed on the island of Cuba...." Even in the days preceding the Joint Resolution all attempts to introduce a reference to the Republic of Cuba, its government and its citizens into the document failed.

For Spain there were two alternatives: 1) renounce its authority and power to govern and withdraw its forces from Cuba; 2) go to war and yield to Yankee occupation of Cuba. They opted for the latter. Defeated militarily in Cuba, the cease-fire agreement was produced on 12 August 1898, which provided that: 1) Spain renounce any claim to sovereignty and any rights over the island of Cuba; 2) Spain immediately evacuate Cuba and must appoint commissioners to arrange for and execute the details of the evacuation.

Finally, the peace treaty between Spain and the United States was signed in Paris on 10 December 1898; it provided that: "Article 1. Spain renounce any rights of sovereignty over and ownership of Cuba.

"In view of the fact that when it is evacuated by Spain said island will be occupied by the United States, during whose occupation it will take it upon itself to fulfill those obligations which for the right to occupy it international law imposes on it for the protection of life and property.

"Article 16. It is understood that any obligation accepted in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba is limited to the duration of the occupation of this island, but when said occupation is terminated it will advise the government that is established on the island to accept the same obligations."

In several articles the treaty defines the status of the territories whose sovereignty Spain was renouncing (this was the case with Cuba) and of others that were to be ceded to the United States (Puerto Rico and the other islands of the West Indies, the island of Guam and the Philippine Islands).

We were constituted an occupied territory sui generis. Through the Paris Treaty Cuba was occupied by the United States and the latter, "for the duration of its occupation, will take it upon itself to fulfill those obligations which because it is occupying it international law imposes on it for the protection of life and property." At that time we did not constitute a territory with the status of wartime occupation because it was not a matter of an occupied enemy territory after the signing of the Paris Treaty, nor did we constitute a territory in which the concept of conquest might be considered to be applicable, that is, the absorption of one nation's territory by another nation in its entirety since the United States had not absorbed an established nation as such nor had Spain been absorbed by the United States. Furthermore, the instruments through which laws were enacted in Cuba at that time, that is, military orders, and the top representative of the occupying power, a military governor, to a certain extent conferred on Cuba the character of a /militarily occupied/ territory. While the Joint Resolution implied a pledge to respect Cuba's independence, the Paris Treaty turned us into a territory sui generis.

### 3. Relations Between Cuba and the United States (1899-1902)

When on 1 January 1899 the last Spanish commander in chief, Jimenez Castellanos, said that, "in compliance with the provisions of the peace treaty, with what has been agreed on by the military evacuation commissions and with the orders of my king, from this moment, today, 1 January 1899, at 1200 hours, Spanish sovereignty over the island of Cuba ceases to exist and U.S. sovereignty begins,"

the military governor, General Brooke replied that, in compliance with the provisions of the peace treaty, "today, 1 January 1899, at 1200 hours, Spanish sovereignty over the island of Cuba" ceased to exist" and "U.S. sovereignty begins."

The political and military powers submitted to the occupation force and, although the Congress of the United States could not enact laws for Cuba since that country had not assumed sovereignty over the island, the military orders of the governor, appointed by the president of the neighboring country, were created to enact laws.

Pro-Cuban annexation and anti-Cuban independence factions furiously demonstrated during that period. Gen Leonard Wood, who in 1900 assumed the post of governor, was a fanatic annexationist and went so far as to inform Elihu Root that "pro-annexation feeling is growing everywhere and, unless the convention passes the amendment without further delay, the big agrarian and commercial interests will develop sufficient influence to promote it...." He had in mind a Cuba where, although it would have to be independent, there would be a military commander who represented the United States and would, if necessary, exercise the veto power and have American "collectors" in the Customs Bureau. These words of his reflect his line of thought: "Naturally, the Platt Amendment has left Cuba with little or no independence (...) and the only thing now indicated is to seek annexation. This, however, will take some time and during the period of time in which Cuba maintains its own government (...) with the control we exert over Cuba, control which will no doubt soon turn into possession...."

Cuba was nascent Yankee imperialism's first big market. In 1899 in the United States they were talking about the gigantic deals they would be engaging in in our country. The corporations, bankers, large estate owners, etc. followed the army of occupation as legitimate occupiers. The first "act of sovereignty" of the Yankee occupation, when it was still restricted to the province of Oriente, was decreed on 13 December 1898 and consisted of a tariff reduction on American products imported into Cuba, later transformed into the general tariffs of 1900. As early as 1899, Consul Lee said: "In Cuba the great mass of workers, yellow and black, want to be left alone. Like the Spaniards, educated and wealthy Cubans desire a protectorate...."

### 4. The Platt Amendment

On 5 December 1899, in his message to Congress, President McKinley said: "Cuba must of necessity be tied to the United States through special links; these links may be organic or conventional (...) only the future will tell how far the destiny of Cuba will have to be irrevocably united with the destiny of the

United States." The "organic links" constituted a euphemistic expression for annexation and the "conventional links" left the way open to the Platt Amendment.

On 25 July 1900 elections were called for delegates to the convention, which was to draft and adopt a constitution for the people of Cuba "and as part of it to provide for and reach agreement with the U.S. Government on the relations that were to exist between Cuba and that government...." On 6 November 1900, while inaugurating the convention sessions, General Wood said that they should formulate "what, /in your opinion/, relations between Cuba and the United States should be," and he added that "it will be completely separate from the drafting of the Cuban Constitution." And Wood went on to say: "When you have formulated the relations which, in your opinion, should exist between Cuba and the United States, the government of the United States will without a doubt adopt those measures that will, as far as it is concerned, lead to a final and authorized accord between the peoples of both countries in order to promote the development of their common interests...."

Through the Joint Resolution of 18 April 1898 we were to be free "as soon as the country was pacified." As General Wood said on 6 November 1900, the convention should formulate what, "in your opinion" (that of the Cuban convention deputies), relations between Cuba and the United States should be; but Wood himself immediately slipped into the usual Yankee hypocrisy: He invited the Cuban convention delegates to formulate those relations and added that, when those relations were formulated... the U.S. Government "will without a doubt adopt those measures that, as far as it is concerned, will lead to a final and authorized accord between the peoples of both countries..." The Platt Amendment was to be the Yankees' final word, "the measures" indicated by Wood.

In fact, on 2 March 1901 the Congress of the United States added an amendment to the military credit law that authorized the president of that country "to leave the governing of and dominion over the island of Cuba in the hands of the people of Cuba themselves as soon as a government has been established on said island in accordance with a constitution in which future U.S. relations with Cuba are defined, at times as part of it and at times as an attached statute." The amendment (known as the Platt Amendment because it was proposed by Sen Orville Platt, although drafted by Elihu Root) totally impaired Cuban independence not only by permitting Yankee intervention (Clause 3), but by trimming our national territory in leaving the Isla de Pinos situation "for a future treaty to determine its ownership" (Clause 6). Furthermore, it limited the right to contract or assume public debts (Clause 2), limited the conclusion of treaties with Cuba (Clause 1), established the nature of our health plans (Clause 5), validated all military occupation acts (Clause 4) and, finally, Clause 6 provided: "To place the United States in a position to maintain Cuba's independence and protect its people, as well as for its own defense, the Cuban Government will sell or lease to the United States those lands necessary for coaling stations or naval stations at certain specified locations that will be agreed on with the President of the United States."

The Yankee interpretation of this amendment may be deduced from the following statements: Senator Hoar: "...it is the indispensable accord for seeing to



it that the United States applies the Monroe Doctrine to Cuba, its closest neighbor after Mexico..."; Elihu Root: "The intervention described in Clause 3 of the Platt Amendment is not synonymous with meddling or interference in the affairs of the Cuban Government, rather the formal action of the United States based on just and substantive foundations for the preservation of Cuban independence..."; Senator Platt: "The amendment must be considered as a whole; and from the way it is worded it follows that its purpose is to assure the independence of Cuba." Commenting on the coaling stations, Mr Root permitted himself to say the following: "Notwithstanding the coaling stations, the United States will remain as separate from the Cuban Government as it would without those stations."

## 5. The Constituent Process (1900-1901)

The oath the Cuban convention delegates took in 1900 was the following: "We, the delegates elected to the National Constituent Convention by the people of Cuba, swear or promise to faithfully discharge the duties of our responsibility. We publicly and solemnly renounce any loyalty extended to or agreement contracted directly or indirectly with any state of nation, swearing to the sovereignty of the free and independent people of Cuba."

But Wood himself, who on 6 November 1900 had said to the Cuban convention delegates that he left "to your judgment" relations between Cuba and the United States, on 27 February 1901 warned them lest "they appear to be assigning little importance to or ignorant of what the United States had done for Cuba..." and went on to say "the political element (...) is an ungrateful group and only appreciates the strong hand of authority, and, if it becomes necessary, we will have to show it to them." Until then concealed under the cloak of hypocrisy we referred to earlier, /the Yankee in him/ had put in its appearance. Three days later, on 3 March, Wood raised the text of the Platt Amendment at the convention "for your consideration" and added: "The President is waiting for the action on it that the convention will take."

Since the convention was opposed to the Platt Amendment and only under tremendous Yankee pressure accepted some drafts of the document in question, such as those of 28 May and 7 June 1901, on 9 June General Wood hastened to say to the convention that he had received a message from the U.S. secretary of war in which he said: "As adopted by the Constituent Convention on 28 May 1901, the amendment to the Cuban Constitution is not a total acceptance of the provisions of the law referred to as the Platt Amendment, which authorizes the President to withdraw the Army from Cuba as provided in that amendment."

The threat could not have been more blatant and public. But there was to be more and that very day Wood himself said: "The time has come to determine with absolute clarity the government's position and it must be done in the form of an ultimatum so that the discussions will cease. Any other action would be a sign of weakness and indecision."

And in the neighboring country voices were raised, like that of Congressman Grosvenor: "Those individuals [the Cubans] whom we have permitted to assemble a constituent congress dare to amend nothing less than laws dictated by the

United States." Of course, it was not only this congressman who felt this way about it. For Yankee imperialists of any period the language has always been the same, then, in 1901, as it was later with regard to their resounding defeats in Vietnam, in revolutionary Cuba and anywhere else in the world where peoples have permitted themselves to amend American laws, nothing less than those laws dictated by the United States.

The commissions, the protests, the arguments, Cuban anger meant nothing. The Constitution had been drafted, but there would be no Republic unless the Platt Amendment was incorporated into it. It meant nothing that on 28 May the convention, with a vote of 15 for and 14 against, passed the amendment with certain clarifications. They were reminded that, since the Platt Amendment was "a law passed by the Legislative Branch of the United States, the President is obligated to execute it as is. He can neither change nor modify it, add to it or remove anything from it." In the end, on 12 June the Platt Amendment was submitted to a vote and 16 said yes while 11 said no. In the end, only 16 of the 31 convention delegates agreed to approve the amendment. And among those who voted for it, convention delegate Berriel said: "I have given in with my vote in favor of the amendment because otherwise the military occupation of our country by the United States of America would go on indefinitely without any likelihood, however remote, that dominion over their land would at some time be turned over to the people of Cuba and their government. The Platt Amendment is an imposition that Cuba cannot oppose." Cuban feelings may have been reflected in what convention delegate General Lancret said: "Cuba has three important dates: On 10 October 1868 we learned to die for our country. On 24 February 1895 we learned to kill for independence. Today, 28 May 1901, a day of mourning for me, we have enslaved ourselves forever with heavy chains."

It was not to be forever. Because on 1 January 1959 we broke those chains.

#### 6. The Permanent Treaty of 1903 and the Naval and Coaling Station Concessions

The Platt Amendment was turned into a Damoclean sword whose edge consisted of the naval and coaling station concessions. The strength of the ominous amendment lay specifically in the clause concerning the bases. The so-called Permanent Treaty signed by the United States and Cuba in 1903 was a verbatim copy of the Platt Amendment, which in turn figured as an amendment to the 1901 Constitution. Of course, Article 7 regarding the sale or lease to the United States of land necessary for coaling or naval stations was reproduced in it. Signed on 16 February 1903 by Estrada Palma for Cuba and on the 24th of that month by Teddy Roosevelt, the accord implemented Article 7; as for the Permanent Treaty referred to above, it was signed on 22 May of that same year.

The government was transferred to Cuba, a territory occupied by the United States, under the express condition that it assume the obligations contracted by the United States through the Paris Treaty of 1898 with Spain and after establishing that the United States could exercise the right to intervene, first noted in the so-called Platt Amendment, later incorporated as the 1901 amendment to the Constitution and in 1903, as the Permanent Treaty with the United States, it "had subrogated our former Spanish mother country."



Through the 16-23 February 1903 agreement (Article 1): "The Republic of Cuba herewith leases to the United States for such time as it may need them and for the purpose of establishing on them coaling or naval stations those expanses of land and water located on the island of Cuba that are subsequently described" (and specifies those of Guantanamo and Bahia Honda). On 2 July 1903 the regulations governing the leasing of the naval and coaling stations of 16-23 February of the same year were signed; Article 1 provides: "The United States of America agrees and stipulates that it will pay the Republic of Cuba the annual sum of 2,000 pesos in gold coin of the United States for the period of time it occupies and makes use of said lands by virtue of the agreement referred to above.

"All privately-owned lands and other real estate included in said areas will be acquired without delay by the Republic of Cuba. The United States agrees to furnish the Republic of Cuba with the sums necessary for the purchase of said lands and private real estate, and the Republic of Cuba will accept said sums as advance payment to be credited to the rent due by virtue of said agreement."

On 10 December 1903, at 1200 hours, possession of the land and water areas leased for the establishment of a naval station at Guantanamo was turned over to the United States.

We need not go into a consideration of how the United States has always viewed our country's attitude toward it. It would suffice to cite a declaration made by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 24 November 1933, precisely during the period of the 100-day nationalist government in Cuba, which that country refused to recognize: "Due to the exceptional and close relations that have existed between our two peoples since the founding of the Republic of Cuba and in particular because of the treaty relations that exist between our two nations, U.S. recognition of a Cuban government implies, more than an ordinary fact, material and moral support for that government." And they did not recognize it. That government was replaced by one of submission to the powerful neighbor, of course, immediately recognized by Washington. The years went by and a quarter of a century later they tried to apply the same formula to the Cuban Revolution. And they went so far as to break off relations with revolutionary Cuba and engage in all sorts of international effrontery, crimes, blockades and acts of the simplest kind of common delinquency against Cuba. But they have failed. Cuba has demonstrated to them and to the world that it does not need the "material and moral support" of the United States. Even more, fortunately and definitively, it has liberated itself from it.

## 7. Position of the Cuban Revolution

The Cuban Revolution has maintained and strengthened the principle that has aroused our Mambis and patriots for over three-quarters of a century now: It has to do with a piece of Cuban territory occupied by a foreign country. Our revolution, which involved the liquidation of the Monroe Doctrine, of manifest destiny and of geographic determinism, as well as of the crude conception of pan-Americanism and its pseudolegal regional bungling, practices the policy of the exercise of the principle of rightful, de facto sovereignty in accordance with what our commander in chief, Comrade Fidel, has stated.

The issue of a foreign base on our soil has been and is a painful thorn in the side of our sovereignty. Comrade Fidel's words, pronounced before the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1960, reflect a brilliant summary of what this means: "In the entire history of the bases today situated throughout the world the most tragic case is that of Cuba: a forcibly imposed base on our unmistakable territory that is at a considerable distance from the shores of the United States, against Cuba and against the people, imposed by force and as a threat and a cause of concern for our people. The revolutionary government is very seriously considering, within the precepts of international law, requesting the withdrawal of the naval and military forces of the government of the United States from this part of our national territory."

At the First Conference of Chiefs of State or Government of the Nonaligned Countries, held in Belgrade in 1961, then president, Comrade Osvaldo Dorticos, said that that base "has only served to damage our national honor, harbor counterrevolutionary forces, introduce arms into the country with which [others] combat the liberating revolution and concentrate troops in each instance in which liberation movements in the countries of the Caribbean have threatened imperialist domination." And on 28 October 1962, in formulating the five points for regulating the situation between Cuba and the United States, Comrade Fidel established as the fifth point: "withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and return of the territory occupied by the United States."

The 24 February 1976 Constitution of the Republic of Cuba provides in Article 8 a) that the socialist state "maintain and defend the integrity and sovereignty of the nation," in Article 12 b) it "condemns direct or indirect imperialist intervention and any other form of economic coercion and interference or threat to the integrity of the states" and in the last paragraph of Article 10 leaves its position on the naval base at Guantanamo perfectly clear in providing: "The Republic of Cuba repudiates and considers illegal and void treaties, pacts or concessions concluded or granted under circumstances that are inequitable or which disregard or diminish its sovereignty over any portion of its national territory."

The considerations noted above are more than sufficient to enable us to repudiate the process that led to the conclusion of illegal and void treaties regarding the naval base at Guantanamo. Let us go ahead and consider the legal formulation of this repudiation in the light of contemporary international law.

## 8. Legal Analysis of the Agreements

### 1) The Platt Amendment as a Violation of the Joint Resolution

We have briefly noted the sequence of U.S. decisions regarding Cuba and we now discuss in greater detail the sequence corresponding to a historical period as extremely brief as the one covered between April 1898 and June 1901, that is, a period of 3 years.

According to the Joint Resolution of 18 April 1898, which opened the door to the neighboring country's direct interference in the destiny of Cuba, it is made clear that "the people of Cuba are and by natural right must be free and

independent" and it goes on to state that the United States "has no intention of exercising nor any desire to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or dominion in Cuba except to restore peace to the island and it affirms its determination to leave the government of and dominion [over the country] to its own people once this has been accomplished." From that moment until the month of December of that same year, Yankee military intervention in Cuba, the defeat of Spain, the cessation of hostilities, the whole premeditated attitude of the United States toward our patriots, etc. followed one another.

Through the Paris Treaty of 10 December 1898, the United States agreed with Spain that, "for the duration of its occupation, it will assume and fulfill those obligations which, due to the fact that it is occupying [Cuba], international law imposes on it for the protection of life and property," and Article 16 provides: "It is understood that any obligation assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba is limited to the duration of its occupation of this island, but that at the conclusion of said occupation it will advise the government to be established on the island that it must assume the same obligations."

This was followed by the convocation of the Constituent Convention of 25 June 1900, which was directed "to carry out the Joint Resolution," draft the Constitution "and as part of it to provide for and agree with the government of the United States with regard to the relations that are to exist" between Cuba and the United States. During his inauguration of the convention sessions on 6 November of that year, General Wood reiterated that it was the duty of the convention to draft and adopt a constitution and "formulate the kind of relations that, in your opinion, ought to exist between Cuba and the United States."

Now, once the text of the Constitution was drafted, on 2 March 1901 the Platt Amendment was surreptitiously introduced into a U.S. Army credit bill, an amendment that considerably curtailed Cuban sovereignty and in Article 7 provided that, "in order to place the United States in a position to maintain Cuba's independence and protect the people of that country, as well as for its own defense, the Cuban Government will sell or lease to the United States those lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified locations to be agreed on with the President of the United States."

The United States had not only concocted a crude plot of successive curtailment of our sovereignty and independence to lock us into the colonial dominion of Washington, but in so doing — and it could not have turned out otherwise in terms of its scheme to achieve control — it entered into flagrant contradictions and illegalities that rocked the whole pseudolegal foundation on which it was trying to build its dominion. It could neither purchase nor annex Cuba, but through the final pretext of our independence it imposed on us a semiprotectorate and, not in accordance with it, snatched from us a piece of our territory. In the entire history of the world it is impossible to find more shamefaced, and at the same time crude, treachery, arbitrary exercise of power and coercion than U.S. actions with regard to Cuba, which as we have seen have a history that goes back centuries, represented in their most hypocritical form of expression in the period between the solemn proclamation in the Joint Resolution and what was imposed by the Platt Amendment.

Rejecting the ominous amendment, convention delegate Juan Gualberto Lopez said that the words, "for the duration of the occupation," could not express it better inasmuch as "the day the occupation ceases, the obligation will have ceased"; and another convention delegate, Dr. Mendez Capote, argued thusly: If the United States had openly proclaimed to the world its right to meddle in Cuba's affairs with exclusive authority, "why didn't it request it, elucidating it in the resolution of 19 April 1898?" adding that the Platt Amendment "from the preamble to the signatures contradicts the whole Joint Resolution. Among the judgments that were heard in the United States let us cite Representative Sulzar's: "As ingenuous as he may be, what man can speak of the Platt Amendment on Cuba asserting that it is in harmony with the highest principles of the Joint Resolution?" As Comrade Osvaldo Dorticos said in a letter addressed to Chilean students in 1962: "The Platt Amendment imposed on the Constituent Convention in 1901 betrayed the spirit and the letter of the Joint Resolution and was a humiliating impairment of Cuba's sovereignty."

## 2) 1901 Convention Delegates' Lack of Legal Competence with Respect to the Relations and Concessions Demanded by the United States

The first thing we must note is that, as regards the delegates to the 1900-1901 convention, we are confronted with representatives of a people who were not endowed with competence in legal matters and who were mandated to negotiate about something that went beyond their abilities. The Platt Amendment, and with it the right the Yankees claimed to have bases in Cuba, was passed in the United States in March 1901; that is, it happened when the convention was deliberating, many months after it had been convoked and had its powers conferred on it. The convention delegates' reaction was immediate and resounding. Manuel Sanguily proposed the expediency of calling for other elections to elect a new convention that would be fully authorized to deal with relations with the United States. Enrique Villuendas said that "the amendment requires that the convention delegates accept terms and, in conferring on them through the ballot boxes the mandate expressed by the convocation, the people of Cuba required of them only ordinary 'standards and manners'." Salvador Cisneros Betancourt advised them to return their dispatches and papers to the governor and Gen. Amilio Nunez maintained that the Platt Amendment involved "the reform not of several, but of all the constitutional precepts."

In law it is a fundamental concept for an accord to be invalid when the person who concludes it exceeds his powers, and the constitutional amendment that introduced the Platt Amendment is for this reason alone quite unconstitutional and with it the entire nullity of origin that follows from that unconstitutionality.

## 3) Coercion, Fraud and Corruption

There was an endless number of attested demonstrations of coercion, fraud and corruption on the part of the United States throughout the whole process that led to the concession of the bases and the one that followed it. As we asserted in the analysis we made of the Treaty Law Agreement, signed in Vienna in 1969, when there is neither corruption nor coercion nor violence in ownership, the neocolonial structure devises a power or coercion mechanism that persuades the



country that has been subjected to it to submit and lends a semblance of validity to its contractual obligations. Thus we invite the reader to relate the /Guantanamo case/ to the fraudulent behavior of the United States contained in Article 49 and which permits us to allege fraud as a flaw of consent by obligating oneself through the treaty to engage in the kind of corruption that appears in Article 50 and the coercion Article 51 defines and specifies.

One who is threatened with an imminent and serious misfortune is intimidated, and the alternative the Cuban convention delegates had to deal with at the start of the century was an imminent and serious one. All the events and all the evidence, of any kind, that have been accumulated are more than enough to give shape to the illegal nature of those agreements. They resorted to everything from "persuasion" to "ultimatum," from the most despicable American interpretation to the most shamefaced public threat. Not only did they violate their own pledges and formulations, but they disarmed patriots, abused and intimidated Cubans, and they did this from Presidents McKinley and Teddy Roosevelt and the military governors to the soldiers who struck it rich and with their American way of life attracted the newly-established companies. But, in addition to all this, they attempted to lend a semblance of legality to an originally unconstitutional law thus imposed on the convention delegates and, one more item, as if that were not enough for them, they had no qualms at all about resorting to coercion, fraud and corruption in all forms. This would seem to be more than enough, but there is still much more, as we shall see.

#### 4) Flaws of Consent

In international law it has been fully established that the principle of consent is the basis for any international legal obligation; and we know that consent can be nullified by flaws of consent. Treaties presuppose the consent of the parties involved so that a legal bond is formed. And the whole /Guantanamo case/ is based on the crudest forms of a "consent" that neither legally nor morally existed.

To this are added the object of and the reason for the agreement. If the conclusion of a treaty implies a chronological succession of steps in that direction, there was no more transparent opportunity to observe the actions that preceded, accompanied and followed than in this case. We have to refer to the object and the reason, the former as a subsequent realization of the consent and the latter as the intrinsic reason for the existence of the legal act. As Alvarez Tabio notes: "The reason for leasing the base at Caimanera is expressed unilaterally in Article 7 of the amendment: /to place the United States in a position to maintain Cuba's independence and protect its people, as well as for its own defense,/" and he adds: "It makes no difference that Cuba did not agree to consent to this type of protection of its independence, based on ceding part of its territory. Later the reason for the agreement was substantially changed in the 1934 treaty. In the preamble to that one, which annulled the previous one of 1903, they state that it was inspired /by the desire to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries and to that end to modify the relations established between them by the treaty governing relations signed in Havana on 22 May 1903..../" And in his work, "The Naval Base of Guantanamo and International Law," Alvarez Tabio adds: "Thus not only was the reason for

the agreement altered, but in a veiled manner it was admitted that the previous one had generated relations that should have been /modified/. In the 1903 treaty we were offered Chicago gangster-style "protection": 'Either you pay me for protection or I destroy you.' In the 1934 treaty we are offered 'good neighbor status' in the style of those neighbors who spend the whole day in our house, want to govern us and sit down at our table without anyone's having invited them to do so."

With the revolutionary victory we are very far from supposing that the base at Guantanamo is a means for "maintaining Cuba's independence and protecting its people" or "strengthening the ties of friendship between the two countries ....," which the Yankee documents of 1903 and 1934 refer to. On the contrary, that base has become a permanent threat to our people and an element of deep-seated animosity. In this brief work it is impossible to present a chronology of all the criminal actions the United States has committed in and from that location. We mention only the following:

4 January 1961. The State Department in Washington declares that the breaking off of relations with Cuba "does not affect the /status/ of our naval station at Guantanamo."

12 January 1961. Cuban worker Manuel Prieto Gomez is savagely tortured on the base for the "crime" of being a revolutionary.

13 March 1961. A gunboat shells the oil installations at Santiago de Cuba and takes refuge at the naval base of Guantanamo.

13 August 1961. Cuban authorities reveal plans for a spontaneous attack that were being worked out on the base, plans that contemplated as a first step an attack on Commander Raul Castro followed by a simulated artillery attack on the base together with an attack on a Cuban Army artillery emplacement.

15 October 1961. Cuban worker Ruben Sabariego is tortured and then murdered on the naval base at Guantanamo.

26 October 1961. Cuban territorial waters are violated by four cruisers, three submarines, five destroyers, two transports and a tugboat of the U.S. fleet proceeding from the base at Guantanamo.

November 1961. Cuban authorities report that between the months of June and October of this year the following violations committed from the base occurred: in June, 168 violations of Cuban air and maritime space by U.S. planes and vessels; in July, 148 times; in August, 161 times; in September, 25 times; and in October, 21.

20 July 1962. Cuban fisherman Rodolfo Rosell Salas is murdered on the base at Guantanamo.

10 June 1964. A note is issued by the revolutionary government regarding shots fired by marines of the naval base at Guantanamo at Cuban sentinels, as a result of which one of the bullets "seriously wounded Cuban soldier Jose Ramirez Reyes in the left leg...."



11 December 1964. In his speech before the UN General Assembly, Commander Ernesto "Che" Guevara noted that "our forces continue to be harassed from the naval base at Guantanamo. That base has been turned into a den of malefactors and a catapult for introducing them into our territory. We would overwhelm this assembly if we were to give a halfway detailed account of the multitude of provocations of this type. Suffice it to say that their number, including those of the first days of this month of December, amounted to 1,373 in 1964 alone. The list covers minor provocations, like violations of the boundary line, the throwing of objects from the territory controlled by the Americans, the commission of acts of sexual exhibitionism by Americans of both sexes, verbal insults, others of a more serious nature, like aiming weapons at our territory, and offenses against our national education system. The most serious provocations are crossing the boundary line, starting fires in installations on the Cuban side and rifle shots, acts repeated 76 times during the year with the sad result of the death of soldier Ramon Lopez Pena as a result of two shots fired by American posts situated 3.5 km from the coast on the northwest boundary."

10 June 1968. The minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces issues a note with regard to a provocation by the naval base at Guantanamo when the day before two U.S. Navy F-4 "Crusader" aircraft penetrated Cuban air space on the northern boundary of the naval base, reached the western edge of the town of Guimánera and continued in an easterly direction. The same day another plane of the same type entered our air space to a depth of 1 km.

Perhaps we should refer to a thorough analysis of the provisions of Article 60.1 of the Treaty Law, inasmuch as it provides that a serious violation of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties will empower the other to claim that the violation is cause for abrogating the treaty or totally or partially suspending application of it? Paragraph 3 of the same article specifies that for the purposes of the article a "serious violation" of a treaty is constituted by: 1) a rejection of the treaty not allowed by this agreement; 2) the violation of a provision essential to the attainment of the /object/ or /goal/ of the treaty.

#### 5) Fraudulent Lease

The United States "leased" the coaling or naval stations (as we noted, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Platt Amendment and later the 1903 accords, which the 1934 Reciprocity Treaty in turn reiterated). But a lease is a consensual, onerous and commutative contract through which a person binds himself to /temporarily/ grant the enjoyment of use of something or provide a given service to another person. A lease of a permanent nature with regard to the objects in question leads to ownership, control or possession of same and a permanent lease with regard to services leads to slavery.

Now, in the /Guantanamo case/ there is no indication whatsoever of temporariness in the lease; none of the agreements relating to the matter provide anything to that effect. By the terms of the Platt Amendment we had to sell or lease the necessary land to the United States, but nothing more was specified in it. The agreements of 16-17 February 1903, in Article 1 of which there is already

reference to "leasing," state: "...for as long as it [the United States] needs them and for the purpose of establishing coaling or naval stations....," and the presumed perpetuity of the leased base is maintained in the 1934 treaty. It is a legal absurdity for the owner of a leased object not to ever be able to regain possession and use of the ceded object, but that is how the Yankees have felt matters stand with respect to Guantanamo. The lease shall be valid "for the entire period of time the latter [the United States] occupies and uses said areas," according to Article 1 of the agreement of 2 July 1903.

#### 6) The 1934 Relations Treaty

Combined with the "good neighbor" policy dreamt up by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to change the big stick policy image of his predecessors, our people's rejection of the tyranny of the Platt Amendment, the development of revolutionary awareness starting with the 1920's and the anti-Machado process in conjunction with the revolutionary situation created in 1933 occasioned the signing of the so-called Relations Treaty of 29 May 1934 between the United States and Cuba, a treaty that replaced the Permanent Treaty of 1903 and, consequently, the Platt Amendment in providing: "Article 1. The Relations Treaty concluded between the two contracting parties on 22 May 1903 shall cease to be valid and be abrogated as of the date the present treaty goes into effect."

Now, Article 3 of the treaty provides: "Insofar as the two contracting parties do not reach agreement on the modification or abrogation of the provisions of the agreement, signed by the president of the Republic of Cuba on 16 February 1903 and by the President of the United States of America, regarding lands in Cuba for coaling or naval stations, the provisions of that agreement will continue to be in effect as far as the naval station at Guantanamo is concerned. With respect to the naval station, the supplementary agreement with reference to naval or coaling stations concluded between the two governments on 2 July 1903 will also continue to be in effect under the same forms and conditions. So long as said naval station at Guantanamo is not abandoned by the United States or so long as the two governments do not agree on a modification of its present boundaries, it will continue to retain the expanse of land it now occupies with the boundaries it had on the date of the signing of the present treaty."

With regard to this 1934 treaty and in view of the fact that the new boundaries of the base, much more extensive than the original ones of 1903, were confirmed in it, we should point out that it operated on the basis of the 1911 agreements, through which the United States gave up the Bahia Honda coaling station in exchange for more land at Guantanamo; this 1911 agreement was not ratified by the United States, but it was implemented.

When the 1934 treaty went into effect, Senator Pitman said that "relations between Cuba and the United States now cease to be governed by the Platt Amendment and will in future be governed by international law," but he was mistaken in saying that those relations would in future be governed by international law and in the process he admitted that the Platt Amendment was contrary to international law.

If it were necessary to produce an attestation as to the significance of this new document, it would suffice to remember the words of Manuel Marquez Sterling, then Cuban ambassador to Washington, who actively participated in the negotiations on that treaty. These are his words, which appeared in his message of 18 April 1934 — that is, 40 days before the signing of the document — to the Cuban secretary of state: "If the United States incorporates into this agreement we are negotiating as an express condition of our relations with it the perpetual obligation to tolerate its coaling or naval stations on our territory, we will never be able to boast that we have delivered our nation from the humiliating tyranny of the Platt Amendment. We must not agree to let the establishment of coaling stations continue to mean a condition imposed on our country in its good neighbor relations with this powerful empire." And Marquez Sterling added: "If the entire article, which was first the Platt Amendment and then the amendment to the Constitution, to later become the Permanent Treaty, ceases to have any validity and Clause 7 is excepted, it is obvious that Cuba's obligation, which has stemmed from that clause, will cease to exist and cannot later be impugned. It is not fitting to consent to there being an obligation of this nature on Cuba's part, one foreign to Clause 7, from the provision of which it arose, if that provision is to disappear."

On that occasion another American senator, Mr Borah, said with respect to the Platt Amendment and the new treaty of 1934: "We must either comply with it [the Platt Amendment] or abandon it, and we haven't done either the one or the other." Of course, the 1934 treaty is a treaty that was never instituted, since it retained one of the clauses of the 1903 treaty; it is a document invalidated from the start, void from the start, ab initio.

So those who are trying to keep those documents, invalidated for so many reasons in effect cannot claim that they have in part been confirmed; if they were null and void ab initio, there cannot be an a posteriori confirmation; their essential flaws cannot be confirmed by any subsequent legal act.

#### 7) The Principle of Ius Cogens

Even if the process we have analyzed that led to the establishment of the naval base at Guantanamo were valid, even if for the sake of argument we were to admit that this is so and that everything that has so far been attested did not carry any legal weight in terms of rejecting all the pseudolegal shrewdness woven by the United States for so many years about the naval base at Guantanamo, there would be other elements that would lead to its legal invalidity. And the application of the principle of ius cogens is one of them.

The 1969 Treaty Law Convention draws on this international principle in two situations: 1) in declaring null and void any treaty which at the time it is concluded is in opposition "to an imperative rule of general international law" (Article 53) and 2) if a new imperative rule of general international law arises, according to Article 64, "any existing treaty that is in opposition to that rule will become null and void and be terminated."

This is how the Treaty Law defines "imperative rule": "For the purposes of this agreement an imperative rule of general international law is a rule that

is accepted and recognized by the international community of nations in their aggregate as a rule that does not admit an agreement contrary to it and that can only be modified by a subsequent rule of general international law that is of the same nature."

That is, an imperative rule (*ius cogens*) is a rule whereby any treaty that is in opposition to an imperative rule at the time it is concluded as well as one whereby any existing treaty that is in opposition to an imperative rule that arises a posteriori becomes null and void and is terminated. A logical consequence of the principle of *ius cogens* is for us to be confronted with a problem of nullity of treaty if the latter is in opposition to an imperative rule at the time it is concluded or subsequent thereto. The existence of that imperative rule deprives any act or situation incompatible with the rule of its legitimacy.

Analysis of the theoretical and practical value of *ius cogens* is a matter that requires extensive development in terms of its scientific or doctrinaire significance. It reflects mankind's political and social changes and legal achievements. With the growth of international relations the development of imperative rules, to the evolution of which treaties, international jurisprudence and the practices of nations contribute, becomes necessary. It is a matter of a rule that puts nations on notice that they must agree with other nations on obligations in conformity with the fundamental principles of international law. Its function is expressed by penalizing with absolute nullity a treaty through which given nations agree to engage in acts that constitute violations of those principles and rules. And foreign military bases have been -- as we shall see -- condemned by the international community. What is at issue is the survival of an imperative rule that condemns them.

#### 8) The Rebus Sic Stantibus Clause

In the /Guantanamo case/ we stand before an opportunity to bring into play the doctrine of "fundamental change in circumstances," which consists of judging a treaty to be ineffective, inapplicable or null and void when the circumstances under which it was concluded have changed in such a way that it may be assumed that it would not have been concluded if the same circumstances had existed at the time the treaty was produced.

Article 62 of the Treaty Law provides: "1. A fundamental change that has occurred in the circumstances that existed at the time a treaty was concluded and which was not foreseen by the parties in question cannot be claimed as a reason for terminating the treaty or withdrawing from it unless:

/"a) the existence of those circumstances constitutes an essential basis for the parties to consent to their being bound by the treaty;/"

"b) the change has the effect of radically modifying the scope of the obligations that have still to be fulfilled by virtue of the treaty.

"2. A fundamental change in the circumstances may not be claimed as a reason for terminating a treaty or withdrawing from it:

"a) if the treaty establishes a border; or

"b) if the fundamental change is due to a violation on the part of the party who alleges that it has occurred of an obligation created by the treaty or of any other international obligation with respect to any other part of the treaty.

"3. When, pursuant to the provisions in the above paragraphs, one of the parties claims a fundamental change in circumstances as a reason for terminating a treaty or withdrawing from it, he may also claim that the change is reason for suspending application of the treaty."

Since this doctrine applies to treaties in process of being carried out or in effect in successive terms, whether this clause is tacit or not, it does not contradict the *pacta sunt servanda* clause because a treaty must always be agreed on in good faith; but, despite the change in circumstances, whether it continues to have obligatory force or not is an entirely different matter. Far from being contradictory, recognition of the *rebus sic stantibus* clause guarantees the rules of law.

Accordingly Alvarez Tabio maintains: "With regard to international law, this *pacta sunt servanda* rule obliges the nations in question to obey the rules created by the agreement between them. But obligation against one's will may not be alleged on the basis of the principle of obligation by agreement, without which a legal system is unimaginable. This principle does not have an absolute value internationally. On the contrary, opposing it arises with equal rank and order of precedence to the other principle to which we are referring: *rebus sic stantibus*, once concluded agreements may be modified or revoked in consideration of given circumstances."

There can be no question that invocation of this clause is one of the confirming elements of the illegal presence of the Yankees at Guantanamo. If the circumstances that existed when we Cubans invoked said clause had existed at the time of the signing of the treaty, the surrender of the base would certainly not have led to such an ominous surrender because, regardless of all the reasons for terminating the agreement and even though the agreement was for the sake of argument legal, there would still be the indisputable application of the *rebus sic stantibus* clause. What a difference between what McKinley said in 1898 to avoid recognizing a Cuba under arms and the revolutionary government's response in May 1959 to an insolent note from Washington!: "The revolutionary government arrogates to itself the right to decide what it deems to be more in keeping with the vital interests of the people of Cuba and does not permit, nor will it permit, any indication or proposal that tends in the least possible way impair our national sovereignty and dignity." We were no longer the yes or no republic. Circumstances have changed....

If the 1934 treaty, which decreed that it be signed "animated by the desire to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries and to that end to modify the relations established between them by the Relations Treaty signed in Havana on 22 March 1903," was at one time valid, it has ceased to be so inasmuch as Guantanamo is not a keepsake in response to "the ties of friendship between the two countries. Another item, the reference to the 1903 treaty,



a carbon copy of the Platt Amendment, conceived to "maintain Cuba's independence," detracts from it whatever value that might be cited, which cannot be cited.

Recognition of the rebus sic stantibus clause in law, doctrine and international jurisprudence is evident and is beyond the scope of this work.

#### 9) The International Community and Foreign Military Bases

Setting aside all the considerations and analysis that lead to confirmation of the illegality and nullity of the agreements on the naval base at Guantanamo, the fact is that the gradual development of international law is leading to the denunciation and condemnation of the permanence of military bases on foreign soil.

The United States makes use of hundreds of military, naval and air bases on all the continents, all of them for a markedly aggressive purpose, and it maintains troops stationed at them for the most varied of interventionist purposes. The Yankee bases in Guantanamo, Puerto Rico and Panama not only affect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the peoples of those areas, but also constitute a threat to all the peoples of the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America. At those installations not only are there the means of aggression against those peoples, but the bases are also training schools for forces of repression, centers for espionage, sabotage and terrorism, sites where counterrevolutionary, mercenary and fascist forces or elements contact one another and concentrate and centers where the possession, distribution and smuggling of all sorts of drugs, vices, prostitution and other manifestations of the American way of life proliferate.

It is not for us to discuss Puerto Rico and its complex of air, naval and land bases, including nuclear bases, but that sister island has been transformed into an immense Yankee military base; nor is it for us to bring up the well-known situation of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone. Much can be said about the presence of both issues in current international law and in the proceedings of international agencies. To be exact, the naval base at Guantanamo was the first established by the imperialists in the triangle of the Caribbean. Months after the 1903 agreements between the United States and Cuba the Canal Zone was created and later the bases in Puerto Rico emerged.

The concession, cession or leasing, or other form of surrender of part of one's national territory for the installation of foreign military bases, constitutes a surrender — whether disguised or not — of one's national sovereignty, one that threatens the peace and security of the country where it takes place and of other countries as well. And this has been confirmed as an international rule, one that during the past few years has acquired its own category.

The Nonaligned Countries conferences have been specific in their condemnation of foreign military bases and of the naval base at Guantanamo in particular. They have repeatedly condemned imperialist military base installations throughout the world, considering them to constitute a predetermined attempt to intimidate nations and an unjustifiable continuation of neocolonial and imperialist policy.



With respect to the naval base at Guantanamo, the Nonaligned Countries have formulated positions that have been reiterated from time to time. Thus at the Belgrade summit conference (1961): "11. The participating countries are of the opinion that the establishment of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries against the will of those concerned constitutes a violation of their national sovereignty. They also denounce those colonial problems that force countries aspiring to independence to pay the price of having foreign military bases in their territories in exchange for their liberty. They declare their full support for those countries that wish to deliver themselves from foreign military bases and appeal to the countries that maintain such bases to take steps to eliminate them as a contribution to world peace.

"12. They also recognize that the American military base of Guantanamo, in Cuba, against whose permanence the government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, has impaired the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country."

After considering the current presence or establishment of foreign military bases to be a flagrant violation of countries' sovereignty and a threat to freedom and international peace, the Cairo summit conference (1964) alluded to Guantanamo in the following terms: "The conference feels that the maintenance by the United States of America of a military base at Guantanamo (Cuba) in defiance of the will of the government and people of Cuba and also in defiance of the provisions contained in the Belgrade conference declaration constitutes a violation of Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

"Whereas the government of Cuba declares itself prepared to resolve its dispute with the government of the United States of America regarding the base at Guantanamo on terms of equality, the conference earnestly solicits the government of the above-mentioned nation to initiate negotiations with the Cuban Government to evacuate the base."

At the Algiers conference (1973) they directed: "The conference demands that the military bases established on Cuban, Panamanian and Puerto Rican territory be restored to the countries to which they legitimately belong."

At the Colombo conference (1976) they declared "that the sovereignty of Guantanamo, the Panama Canal Zone and the Malvinas [Falklands] be restored to Cuba, Panama and Argentina respectively, which are the legitimate owners of those territories."

At the Coordination Bureau meeting held in Havana in May 1978 they said: "The bureau has once again expressed its solidarity with the demand that that part of its territory which the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo currently occupies against Cuba's will be restored to Cuba."

At the Conference of Foreign Relations Ministers held in Belgrade in July 1978 they stated: "The conference reaffirms its solidarity with Cuba's just demand with regard to the unconditional return of the naval base the United States at present occupies in Guantanamo."

Furthermore, the UN General Assembly has adopted a considerable number of resolutions in the same vein. Among them we may cite Resolution 2105 (20) of 20 December 1965, which requests colonial powers to dismantle military bases installed in colonial territories and abstain from establishing new ones, and Resolution 2344 (22) of 19 December 1967, which requests the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference to resume its study of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in conformity with the above-mentioned Resolution 2105 (20).

11,466

CSO: 8048/1149

## FLUCTUATION IN WORKFORCE, WORKER DISCONTENT ANALYZED

Havana TRABAJADORES in Spanish 22 Mar 84 p 4

[Article by Renato Recio: "Do you Feel Comfortable in Your Workplace?"]

[Text] We often find among enterprises justified concern regarding an excessive fluctuation in the workforce. At a time when the goal of increasing profitability has assumed primary importance, such concern is completely natural.

Fluctuation of the workforce, which manifests itself principally in the constant movement of workers from one enterprise to another, seriously affects costs of production.

In the first place, the costs of worker training increase more and more, without a compensating benefit to the enterprise or to society in competent and stable production by the worker.

On the other hand the insufficient productive capacity of the high number of new workers has adverse effects on the quantity and quality of production.

Why are certain enterprises and lines of work characterized by a permanent instability of the workforce?

This question cannot be answered with simplifications, but there is a general reply which fits the case: Workers move because they feel dissatisfied.

We have observed the tendency of late, no less worrisome for being small, to simplify the causes of dissatisfaction to the point where some can only think of the salary incentive, as if it were some sort of "miraculous" remedy, capable of solving all problems.

The importance of wages at the present stage of our society cannot be denied, but this incentive is not the only or the most important one for evoking that desired feeling of satisfaction in one's work, that concern and that inclination by which the worker uses his talents and skills to the utmost for the benefit of his work output.

Those who think only of salary as a means of motivating the worker, are not thinking of socialist man as an individual possessed of physical and spiritual

motivations. They are not mindful of the proven truth that the years we have spent in transforming society at the same time have been converting work more and more into a humanized activity, recompensing the worker simultaneously from the material and moral point of view.

A correct analysis of the causes of dissatisfaction which lead to instability in the workforce should include many elements, important in themselves, an interrelated system which also includes salary.

Often, when one speaks of moral incentives, one thinks only of certificates and ribbons, but social recognition and moral stimulation are much more than that.

A worker tends to feel satisfied and willing to make the best use of his talents when he feels that relations between his comrades and himself, between workers and management, are always based on fairness and impartiality. That is to say, that the same merit receives the same reward for everyone. In this sense experience shows that the value of a salary system is not based on the amount of income which it provides, but on the extent to which it accurately evaluates the work involved. In other words, a good system of salaries and job gradation is also a source of moral satisfaction.

In enterprises and establishments one cannot overlook the incentive value of opportunities which workers may have for promotion and advancement through unquestionably fair procedures.

On the level of moral satisfaction, one should not forget for an instant that confidence which identification with management produces in the employee. The worker should not only expect decent treatment from his superiors, but he should also look to them for intelligent solutions to his problems, based on undeniable capacity, experience and knowledge of the work which they supervise.

Those qualities of the supervisor, together with his talent and sensitiveness in allowing the workers to share in decisions, in being familiar with the merits and values of each man, in setting an example in dealing with the work and the problems surrounding him, give the worker strength of mind and confidence in what he is doing, and add an important ingredient to labor stability and the worker's willingness to remain with his employer.

We are not going to allot space, because the solutions are obvious, to the problem of material conditions in the work area (noise, temperature, toxic conditions, lighting, etc.). We shall only point out that there are many such factors which militate against the stability of the workforce, and too often feasible solutions are not sought, but there is the tendency to chant the word "salary!", as if it were a real "Open, Sesame!"

## CARIBBEAN LEFTIST PARTIES' COMMUNIQUE NOTED

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 25 Mar 84 p 11

[Text] On the initiative of the People's Progressive Party of Guyana, parties and organizations from all over the Caribbean met in Georgetown, March 2-4, to exchange views on the current situation in the area after the U.S. invasion of Grenada. A delegation from the Communist Party of Cuba participated in those talks at which the following joint communique was issued:

1. A consultative meeting of communist and revolutionary parties and organizations was held in Georgetown from 2-4 March, 1984.
2. The meeting was attended by representatives from the Movement for National Liberation (MONALI) of Barbados; the Communist Party of Cuba; Action Committee for a Socialist Movement (ACSAM) of Curacao; the Dominican Liberation Movement Alliance; the People's Progressive Party of Guyana; the Communist Party of Guadeloupe; the Worker's Party of Jamaica; the Martinique Communist Party; the United People's Movement of St. Vincent and the Grenadines; the Worker's Revolutionary Movement of St. Lucia; the February 18th Movement and the People's Popular Movement of Trinidad and Tobago.
3. Meeting for the first time since the illegal and unjustified U.S. led invasion of Grenada which was condemned internationally and by the UN, the delegations made a profound assessment of developments in Central America and the Caribbean and concluded that the Grenada tragedy introduced a renewed emphasis on the use of force by U.S. imperialism as a solution to the Region's problems.
4. Participants unanimously agreed that the deteriorating economic situation and the declining living standards of the Caribbean peoples are endangering peace and security in the Region. Delegates emphasised that the Reagan-sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is basically an instrument aimed at creating a military/political bloc linked to imperialism and against the interests of the peoples of the Region.
5. Speakers emphasised the need to counter the U.S. imperialist military offensive in the Region. Attention was paid to the increasing dangers facing the Nicaraguan Revolution as well as to the heroic struggles being

waged by the revolutionary forces of El Salvador. In this connection, all participants re-iterated their whole-hearted support and solidarity with the people and government of Nicaragua and with the revolutionary forces of El Salvador, led by the FOLM/FDR. Firm support and solidarity was also re-affirmed with the people and Government of Cuba in their endeavour to build a socialist society. Emphasis was made on the necessity to step up the fight for world peace and to make the Caribbean a Zone of Peace.

6. All delegates expressed their firm repudiation of U.S. military bases in the Region, against all aggressive military manoeuvres, Washington's increased militarization of the Region and in particular the proposed Washington sponsored and controlled Eastern Caribbean Sub-Regional Interventionist Army, being established against the dignity, sovereignty and wish of the Caribbean peoples for the peaceful and independent development of their respective countries.

7. Participants in the meeting highly appreciated the positive stand taken by the Governments of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas and Belize for the dignified and sovereign stand in their rejection of the criminal invasion of Grenada by U.S. imperialism.

8. Delegates expressed deep regret at the death of Maurice Bishop and his colleagues and agreed to take appropriate actions in their respective countries to sustain the memory of the Grenada Revolution. Delegates also recognised the heroic resistance put up by patriotic Grenadians and Cuban internationalist workers to the U.S. aggression against tiny Grenada; lamented the loss of civilian life; and agreed to protest vigorously against the illegal occupation of Grenada and insist on the recognition of the Human Rights of all Grenadian citizens.

9. Representatives exchanged information and experiences pertaining to the work of the parties and organisations in their respective countries.

10. Participants agreed that meetings of this kind are very useful to the fight for peace, the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Caribbean countries--and the well-being of the Caribbean peoples.

11. There was a coincidence of views among delegates that the parties and organisations should continue working in a spirit of equality and cooperation in the interests of peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism.

12. The discussions took place in a frank, constructive and comradely atmosphere.

Georgetown, 4 March, 1986

CSO: 1100/11



## GUATEMALAN ROLE IN CENTRAL AMERICA ANALYZED

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 25 Mar 84 p 11

[Article by Luis M. Arce: "Focus on Guatemala's Dissent With Washington"]

[Text] General Oscar Mejia Victores, head of the Guatemalan regime, said in an interview for EFE news agency that he does not agree with many of Washington's views on Central America and that he does not agree with the United States' area policy. The general does not believe that a military invasion of Nicaragua would solve the area's problems. He feels that the U.S. policy of violence would achieve nothing. He refuses to have his country participate in regional military maneuvers. He questions the reactivation of the Central American Defense Council. And he has doubts as to the short- and medium-term results of Reagan's so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative, which implies U.S. military aid to Guatemala to the tune of 10.3 million dollars by 1985.

In the context of the Central America situation, a study of the Guatemalan case must take into account a series of peculiar aspects, although the source of its social problems--as in the case of the other countries in the area--are known to be rooted in inequality, exploitation, plunder of natural resources and poverty among the dispossessed masses.

It is true, however, that Guatemala has been seriously affected by the war in El Salvador and the war hysteria in Honduras. Outranking its two neighbors in agricultural production, Guatemala had, up until now, been their traditional supplier. The war has put an end to this market. Guatemalan produce is rotting on trucks unable to cross the border and producers are incurring untenable losses.

General Mejias' ascent to power has given the oligarchy added confidence, as well as greater interest in commercial operations, a field in which it has always played a major role in the area. Therefore, a policy of violence such as that being implemented by the United States is contrary to the economic plans of the Guatemalan oligarchy.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative--whose economic program consists of subsidies to U.S. companies with branches in beneficiary countries--may also turn out to be an obstacle to the Guatemalan oligarchy's expansionist plans, and this is the basis on which General Mejias questions the advantages of the Reagan initiative.

From a military standpoint, Guatemala also has its reserves in regard to U.S. designs in the area. In spite of the large expenditures resulting from its policy of repression, Guatemala has received much less military aid from the United States than have either El Salvador or Honduras. As a result, the armies of those two countries are infinitely superior in every respect to that of Guatemala.

This accounts for the general's reluctance to join El Salvador and Honduras in military maneuvers. It also explains his opportunistic stand, designed to obtain greater concessions from Washington.

There are other reasons. The members of the Guatemalan General Staff, for example, look upon the armies of the two neighboring countries as extremely inept, and they balk at the idea of being ordered about by officers who they feel could be their subordinates. There's also a practical aspect, which is that joint military maneuvers would reveal Guatemala's inferiority and weak spots not only to the Salvadoran and Honduran armies but also to the insurgent forces.

These are but a few of the reasons why General Mejias views the reactivation of the Central American Defense Council with a jaundiced eye.

From Guatemala's point of view, for the Council to function the way the United States would want, it would have to be governed by General Staffs of Honduran officers. Given the old feuds between Salvadorans and Hondurans, it is evident that it would be impossible to structure these General Staffs along those lines.

The animosity between Salvadorans and Hondurans was made evident at the training camp in Puerto Castillo and has led to the separation of Salvadoran and Honduran contingents training there, to prevent further brawling, rioting and gunfighting. And the Salvadorans, like the Guatemalans, would never agree to take orders from Hondurans.

Furthermore, even though Honduras would be the Council's main base of operations, considering the poor quality of the Honduran army the United States would be far from pleased to have such an army as its strongest pillar. We should recall that the most recent Big Pine exercises had to be suspended because of a series of costly operational mistakes that at a certain moment placed whole U.S. units on the verge of death. Without going into actual combat, human error caused the Honduran army to suffer numerous casualties--whose exact number, of course, will never be revealed. The situation might, of course, change. If Guatemala succeeds in convincing Washington to grant concessions for its economic plans, there's no doubt that it will join the Council. Whether it leads the parade or brings up the rear remains to be seen.

So far, Guatemala is still at loggerheads with the United States and what counts is not the difference of opinion but what's really behind it.

For example, whereas there are a series of factors common to the area that account for many of its problems, each of these social problems has its own particular features.

These characteristics explain why the Sandinista Revolution came into being, went on to develop and become victorious and why the Salvadoran revolution follows its course independently of the existence of the new Nicaragua.

Guatemala's dissent with the United States reveals that the East-West confrontation has its own place in time, its own way of expression and has absolutely nothing to do with the Central American conflict, which is *sui generis*.

The reactionary logic and pragmatism of the Guatemalans have led them to consider their situation to be different from that of the other countries in the area, reasoning that peace rather than a regional conflict would help achieve their economic goals.

Guatemala's stand is clearly opportunistic. A U.S. invasion of Nicaragua could possibly lead to a generalization of a war that might extend to Guatemala's territory and create big problems for the military. The war, the existence of an organized revolutionary movement and a series of border disputes pending settlement could easily grow into a problem of such a magnitude as to make it impossible for the army to handle.

Independently of its opportunistic stand and its attempts to make it appear as if its situation is different from that of other countries in the area, is it not that Guatemala is tacitly admitting that revolutions are not exportable?

This is, in our opinion, the most important conclusion to be drawn from Guatemala's dissent with the United States.

CSO: 3200/21

## COMRADESHIP CONSIDERED FUNDAMENTAL TO SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Havana TRABAJADORES in Spanish 26 Mar 84 p 4

[Article by Libia Sariol Cespedes: "The Rules of Living Together in Socialist Society"]

[Text] Life in the socialist society is grounded in collective relationships of brotherhood, study, play, and work.

Indeed, one of the fundamentals laid down by socialist morality is training in ways of handling social coexistence and human relationships, which should characterize the young communist, the real revolutionary of our time.

Comradeship, cooperation, mutual assistance constitute the premises for the success of such relationships, because they conform the most solid foundation of love and respect to the collective well-being.

In the student framework of secondary education, those terms are used frequently, and one freely speaks of "the existence of comradeship in the classroom community"; however, we need to discuss those aspects in order to clear away certain erroneous concepts which still exist among workers -- basically regarding what comradeship really is.

An example taken from experience provides the most accurate illustration in such cases:

"I recall some time ago the revolution built a school in a community on the outskirts of this city. One of the walls of this building was of glass, and affected one of the classrooms in a certain way when the sun fell on it. To deal with this situation the school council, the parents, and residents from surrounding areas decided to replace the glass panes of the classroom window with 'Miami'- type [wooden] windows, and did so. When the work was finished the students were quite happy.

"One day, during class, one of the boys saw a little classmate trying to break one of the new windows. The boy immediately reprimanded his friend, and was about to tell the teacher what was going on, when a third boy approached him and said: 'Come on, that is not being a comrade.'

That expression, which we have all heard at one time or another in similar circumstances, is an example of that false perception which holds that true comradeship requires one to overlook small, or even serious faults, "in order not to get out in front," as they say. This mistaken standard leads to leniency toward friends' weaknesses, which contributes nothing at all to the development of individual integrity.

Comradeship is a manifestation of human feelings expressed in behavior consistent with the socialist morality of our society. It involves affective relationships in all of their aspects. It is the product of moral training acquired in the home from the child's earliest years, and continues strengthening itself throughout the student and worker stages of life.

Because of its close linkage to the standards of social intercourse of the new morality, real comradeship decrees, within those same affective relationships, opposition and intolerance to what is not well done, criticism and self-criticism. This is considered to be the true stance of the comrade. This requirement is not at variance with fair treatment, nor with the consideration which we all owe each other; every revolutionary should recognize this.

Comradeship includes familiarity with and understanding of the problems of others, the causes of their difficulties. This approach offers the pleasure of being able to serve, to help, to cooperate, to become a member of the great socialist family. In all of that there is love, there is a song to life, and when man is able to subordinate his individual interests to those of society, for the sake of the collective well-being, then, in all of that there is more love: There is a song to the future.

12383

CSO: 3248/545

## SOLIDARITY OF CHRISTIAN CONFERENCE NOTED

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 1 Apr 84 p 5

[Text] Christians from more than 30 African, Latin American, Asian, North American and European countries met in Barcelona last January to exchange experiences and analyze the options of the liberation struggles and the practices of social change.

"The world economic crisis reflects a growing contradiction," according to the congress conclusions, "between the social relations of production and mankind's scientific and technological evolution, a contradiction inherent to the market economy."

The congress participants also held that the world economic crisis shows the basic ability of the whole social system and of its technological options to resolve the problems of survival and development.

"Today, advanced technology is used as a new arm of capitalism and the inherent logic of this system excludes millions of workers from the process of production, reduces social benefits and strengthens the economic mechanisms of imperialism with regard to the Third World," they stated.

The congress devoted particular attention to pressing problems stemming from the arms race, charging that it has been considerably accelerated over the last ten years, with yearly weapons expenditures climbing from around 300,000 million dollars to more than 600,000 million dollars.

They indicated that these figures reflect a technological improvement of the weapons used for mass destruction from a twofold perspective: a strengthening of imperialism's economic power and the forcing of other countries to contradict their own material, social and cultural development in favor of increasingly burdensome military expenditures, causing them to enter a spiral in which the adversary controls the principal mechanisms.

The congress agreed that armed aggressions are increasingly directed against the peoples of the Third World who are trying to free themselves from capitalism, as in the case of some Central American and southern African countries.



Participants analyzed the struggles in the industrialized capitalist world, calling attention to two situations: the appearance of new forms of struggle such as the peace and ecological movements and the fact that certain left parties and workers' organizations became promoters of the crises. This is often parallel to the workers' struggles and today greater sectors of the population, such as the youth, are being won over.

"Their capacity to mobilize is important to the creation of new dynamics. But these movements will gain nothing more than partial and fragile results if they do not develop a broader perspective of struggle: that of the working class and that of the oppressed peoples of the Third World."

The Christians gathered in Barcelona reaffirmed their commitment to promote the need for the socialist path of development, "which today can respond to the hopes of millions of human beings to live another way, not in an unspecified future but rather in the present."

The last part of the final document of the Christians for socialism takes up the problems of the Church:

"After so many centuries of Western Christianity--during which the Christian Churches identified with the colonial powers and the gospel was perverted by conservative ideologies and dogmatic and sectarian theological currents--a reform spirit shook Churches the world over, especially after the 2nd Vatican Council."

It goes on to say that "the Church which had lost awareness of itself as the organ of God's people became a universal Church as a result of local churches and new ecumenical currents emerging in the Third World.

"This reform current has increased the conscious participation of Christians in the people's liberation struggles, a fact which is particularly significant in Central America, southern Africa, the Philippines and in other places."

The congress document refers to "the transformation of Exodus, in which the majority of mankind's poor seeks to pass from death to life; they deeply distrust Western Christianity, which has been manipulated for centuries by the colonialism and imperialism of death. The cry of the oppressed, in the light of faith, changes into the call of the God of the poor for a new organization of humanity in which everyone has work, food, health, education, democracy and freedom."

In relation to Latin America, the congress declared its solidarity with all those Christians who shed their blood "as the seed of future independence and justice for their peoples."

"We suffer with the crucifixion of the peaceful people of Grenada, criminally attacked by U.S. imperialism. We fraternally support the Nicaraguan Christians who are resisting neo-conservatism which attempts to use faith

and the Church as ideological supports of counter-revolution and U.S. imperialism.

"We view the Nicaraguan Revolution and the grass-roots ecclesiastical communities of Latin America as bearers of a historic and evangelical liberation of our Churches, which have not always been sources of life, life in its fullness."

CSO: 3200/20

## WRITER COMMENTS ON EUROPEAN TOUR, NATION'S IMAGE

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 1 Apr 84 p 7

[Interview with author Reynaldo Gonzalez by Rolando Perez Betancourt in Cuba; date not given]

[Text]

● A TRIP is always enlightening, and writer and critic Reynaldo González is back in Cuba after a visit of a month and more to the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Spain. What would the author of *La fiesta de los tiburones* (Feast for Sharks), *Siempre la muerte, su paso breve* (Always the Stealth of Death) and *Contradanza y latigazos* (Contradanza and Whiplash) like to comment on first?

"There is a keen interest in Cuban literature and culture at universities, research centers and other institutions in those countries. I traveled with literary critic José Prats Soriol and we were able to see for ourselves that in the eight German universities where we lectured there was more than just a passing interest in our culture; there was constant study and specialization. They wanted to know all they could about Cuba, our literature, painting, drama and music."

And literature in particular?

"Among the wide range of interest, the work of poet and writer José Lezama Lima, the testimonial novel as a cosmovision and analysis of Cuban nationhood, poetry and narrative in general and — to go a little beyond the framework of your question, strictly speaking — new Cuban theater forms to communicate new conflicts and the construction of socialism without falling into old forms of expression or aesthetic clichés. Quite a few of those who attended the lectures wanted specific information on topics they were researching or on which they had already written a thesis or prepared a seminar."

What surprises were there in store for you?

"As an author, the pleasant surprise that they had read my books in Cuban, Spanish, French and even Polish editions and had been received with interest by students and specialists alike. They were familiar with them and asked about formal aspects and questions of past and recent Cuban history. *Feast for Sharks* and Miguel

Barnet's *The Biography of a Runaway Slave* were for them texts to explore a reality long-passed by cross-relating source information."

What image of Cuban cultural life do people who attended your lectures have?

"In spite of the tremendous interest of German students, professors and intellectuals in Cuban cultural development, they are the victims of the painstakingly rigorous attempt on the part of transnationals engaged in spreading lies to adulterate the image of life in Cuba. They are unaware of many of our cultural activities. Along with the information blockade there is also our own inability to reach them with our own means. They knew very little about the Theater Festival which was being held in Havana, our forums of intellectuals from Cuba and other countries, the various culture festivals, the films shown in our cinemas and many other aspects testifying to the wealth of cultural life and universal cultural policy. Their interest in learning the truth and only the truth — not the lies engendered by a fierce enemy disinformation campaign — meant that lectures dealing with specific subjects invariably ended in debates on the political and social life of our country."

What did you do in France?

"Meetings with publishers of my books. I had planned to interview Julio Cortázar but sadly only arrived in time to attend his funeral. That sunny but very cold Paris morning, we saw the burial of one who to the end maintained a position of solidarity with Cuba and peoples fighting for their liberation."

And in Spain?

"Meetings with publishers and the staff of magazines. Alfaguara Publishers have put out a lovely edition of *Feast for Sharks*, which some

critics have called 'a feast for popular language.'"

What book are you working on now?

"A book for José Martí Publishers, which is a historical and cultural study on the Cuban cigar."

And then?

"Llorar es un placer (Tears of Pleasure), an essay on radio soap opera in Cuba and Latin America."

And after?

"Another book which, like every author, I hope people will like."

CSO: 3200/20

## UD PROPOSES ALTERNATIVES TO AGREEMENT WITH IMF

Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO in Spanish 27 Mar 84 p 4 C

[Text] The Party for Democratic Unity presented yesterday a number of points regarding the country's economic situation, among them a scientific agrarian reform, as an alternative to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

Dr Antonio Abreu, general secretary, delivered to the press a document outlining the party's position regarding the country's economic situation.

He sums up the principal factors of the crisis as being the economic recession of the developing countries, the lack of parity in commercial exchanges, the protectionism of industrialized countries, outdated tariff policies, the high dependence of domestic industries on imported equipment and raw materials, an inconsistent exchange policy, large and burdensome loans, government deficits and a decrease in production.

Abreu mentioned a number of points that should be considered as an alternative to an agreement with the IMF. These points, as he explained, are the following:

- a. Modification of the Tax on the Transfer of Processed Goods (ITBI).
- b. Revitalization of the National Registry of Taxpayers (RNC).
- c. Adoption of the Tax Code.
- d. Modification and reform of import duties.
- e. Traditional as well as nontraditional exchange incentives for exporters.
- f. Application of the protection rate to the manufacturing industrial sector, and reforms to Law 299 for industrial incentives and protection.
- g. Additional support for tourism in order to turn it into a dynamic source of foreign exchange.
- h. Facilitate the opening of dollar accounts in the country.
- i. Apply drastic measures to freeze the prices of basic commodities.

- j. Drastically limit credit and establish priorities and selective criteria for certain production sectors.
- k. Join other countries in strengthening standards for international negotiations.
- l. Limit the foreign indebtedness, reserving it for programs and projects of great national importance.
- m. Strengthen the national industries and support the construction sector in order to absorb a large percentage of the unemployed workers.
- n. Energetically fight speculation in the handling of foreign exchange and with the prices for basic commodities.
- ñ. Reduce running expenses, avoiding unnecessary expenditures in order to increase savings in bank accounts and reduce deficits in all public sectors.
- o. Apply measures that would increase agricultural and industrial production in a relatively short period of time.
- p. Help the industrial manufacturing process to grow from within by encouraging the industries to commit themselves to a massive use of native raw materials.
- q. Carry out a scientific agrarian reform that would do away with the archaic land tenure system, encourage agricultural production based on intensive techniques, income producing products, and substitutes for imports, through the organization of collective enterprises, production associations, co-operatives, agroindustries and others that would ensure a larger production of food and generate jobs in the rural sector. This would increase the country's income from exports and improve the balance of trade.

9907

CSO: 3248/537



## UCN CAMPAIGNS AMONG INDIANS IN TOTONICAPAN

## Confederation Formed

Guatemala City EL GRAFICO in Spanish 1 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Ricardo Gatica Trejo]

[Text] Totonican, 31 March--Breaking the patterns of a divided society at noon today, Saturday, the indigenous peoples of the country united in a single block to create the National Indigenous Confederation of the Union of the Center (CINUC). This was one of the most significant steps taken toward integration into the political life of the country.

The step taken in the city of Procer, the cradle of the legendary hero Atanasio Tzul, will make it possible from now on for the members of the various indigenous peoples of the country to participate truly and authentically in the political process of the country, and to cease to be just another subject of our folklore.

The supreme leader of the Union of the National Center, UCN, Jorge Carpio Nicolle, presided over the ceremonies together with representatives of the various indigenous races of our country.

Delegates from the ethnic groups Mam, Pocoman, Quekchi, Quiche, Kakchikel, Tzutuile, Jalapa and Jutiapa traveled from remote areas of the country to participate in the signing of the proclamation that creates the National Indigenous Confederation of the Union of the Center. From now on, that confederation will fight for the genuine incorporation of the indigenous peoples into the political, social and economic life of all representatives of the national ethnic groups.

Hundreds of people gathered in the atrium of the Totonican church for the ceremonies, which were characterized by the frank, simple words of each of the indigenous representatives. The speakers expressed their solidarity with Carpio Nicolle.

Men and women from the different indigenous regions of the country spoke about the important opportunity they have now been given, clearly and without demagogy, to enter through the front door and to discuss, under no pressure of any kind, the problems their races are facing and the mechanisms for their solution.

## Text of Declaration

Guatemala City EL GRAFICO in Spanish 1 Apr 84 p 4

[Text] On the basis of the Declaration of Human Rights, representatives of the indigenous ethnic groups of Guatemala drew up the proclamation that unites them in a single confederation under the Union of the National Center (UCN).

In this proclamation other indigenous groups are urged to join the confederation and further strengthen the indigenous union. The proclamation, which was read before hundreds of people, is presented below.

"In the city of Procer of Totonicapan, land of the illustrious patriot Atanasio Tzul, at 12 o'clock on 31 March 1984, in the gathering of the ethnic groups Mam, Jalapa, Jutiapa, Pocomam, Qultche, Kakchiquel, Tzutull and Quiche, who represent one of the major segments of our Guatemalan identity; and considering one of the declarations of human rights approved by the United Nations on 10 December 1948, stating that all people have the right to participate in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives; and that all people have the right of access, under conditions of equality, to the public offices of their country; and because the will of the people is the foundation of the authority of the government, and is expressed through authentic elections that should be held periodically with universal suffrage through a freely cast vote:

We Proclaim:

1. That we represent one of the major, vital forces of Guatemala, and that, invoking the aforementioned declaration of human rights, we have decided to unite in the National Indigenous Confederation of the Union of the Center (CINUC), with the purpose of expressing our will freely and participating in the upcoming elections in order to assist in the realization of the aspiration to the real economic, political and social advancement of our beloved homeland, Guatemala.
2. That as members of Guatemalan society, we represent various departments such as Jalapa, San Marcos, Quezaltenango, El Quiche, Alta Verapaz, Solola, Totonicapan, Jutiapa and Jalapa and Chimaltenango, and we urge those who wish to do so to join us because only in this way will we be able to make a future government implement urgent measures so that we will cease to be a marginal class taken advantage of strictly for electoral purposes by the politicians of the past.
3. That, having analyzed the various political factions of the country, we have unanimously agreed to join, as the National Indigenous Confederation, the Union of the National Center Party (UCN), because we see in the confederation the best alternative for achieving this purpose and because we know that one of the most important measures that will be taken by the party's supreme leader, Jorge Carpio Nicolle, the future president of Guatemala, will be to incorporate, as a priority, the national indigenous class into the sources of work in the province, so that we will have bread with peace and freedom.
4. That, upon establishing this day our National Indigenous Confederation of the Union of the Center, we urge our brothers, on next 14 April of this year

in general assembly in Guatemala City, to name the first provisional governing body of our organization, in view of our awareness that all people have the right to work, to the free choice of work, to equitable and satisfactory conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to the fulfillment of their economic, social and cultural rights, which are indispensable to their dignity and the free development of their individuality.

5. That, together with the leaders of the Union of the National Center Party (UCN) and its supreme leader, Jorge Carpio Nicolle, we sign this proclamation in the city of Totonicapan on 31 March 1984 to commit ourselves to our mutual duty to contribute to a better Guatemala, as the foundation of our national identity."

12351

CSO: 3248/542

## PSUM MEMBERS OFFER THOUGHTS ON WITHHELD STIPENDS

Mexico City ASI ES in Spanish No 96, 5 Mar 84 p 9

[Text] In order to learn the feelings in the party concerning retention of the stipends of five PSUM [Unified Socialist Party of Mexico] deputies, we conducted this survey in which party members from different parts of the country gave their opinions on this problem. Without further ado, we present the results of these interviews.

Nestor Montes (Oaxaca): I think that, given the characteristics of the party, the principles and objectives that support it and its basic differences from other parties, the stipends of the deputies must be used to pay for the needs of the deputy, balancing this with a larger percentage for the party. There must also be a principle of balance and proportionality in the money received by the party professionals. These deputies are not following party principles and there is no way we can approve. This can cause internal problems in the party. I think that the statutes should be strictly applied in this case.

Francisco Javier Ramirez (Tabasco): I propose expulsion. I think this is not a problem of just one or two members. This has generated confusion among the members, especially in Tabasco. Handling party resources is a very delicate question. Here we are discussing retention of the stipends for five deputies. Daniel Angel Sanchez Perez' arguments are very negative for the development of the party as a revolutionary organization. It is an opportunistic attitude, using collective work for personal benefit. However, I think the problems of the comrades must be solved. This must not be done, though, through personal stipends. If these comrades do not respect the general guidelines of the party immediately, they should be expelled.

Horacio Garcia (Jalisco): This was discussed in the Third Plenum and aroused great interest for debating it in depth in order to precisely regulate the responsibility that all the popular representatives have to the party based on party statutes. I don't believe it is right for each one to personally decide whether to turn over the stipend or not. There is a clear statute we all have to respect. However, it seems to me that in the specific matter of the deputies who have not turned over the stipends, it is necessary to reflect whether the wages given to our popular representatives are adequate. If not, it is necessary to change them. Second, everyone must not be considered on the same basis. There are particular cases, especially deputies of other states who

cannot take care of their minimum needs and the requirements of political work with that wage.

Alejandro Encinas (Mexico State): This is a problem that has to do with the type of party and the type of party deputies we want. Therefore, I believe the retention of the stipends is a problem of principles that will not be resolved with sanctions alone but with an in-depth political and ideological discussion in our ranks. I think retaining the stipend as political blackmail or pressure to change the internal life or balance of power within the party is unacceptable under any argument. The methods used by the government party-- opportunism, climbing to popularly elected positions for personal benefit-- cannot be reproduced in our party.

In Mexico State, after a long process in which the party base was involved, we considered it necessary to expel the local deputy for retention of the stipend, among other things. In the case of federal deputies, I feel that either the statutes and resolutions of the Central Committee must be changed or the statutes applied as they are.

Rosa Maria Cabrera (Veracruz): The Executive Committee of the State Committee discussed and unanimously disapproved of that conduct before the Third Plenum of the Central Committee. The stipends belong to the party and it is not right to retain that money. It is part of political education. You do not run alone for the position: if the position is the party's, so is the stipend. I think what a professional is and what type of professional this party needs must be discussed. In this situation of deputies, I think each case is different. We must proceed according to the statutes with Daniel Angel Sanchez. The alternate must be called for Pedro Bonilla who is sick. The case of Florentino Jaimes is also worrisome. If it is not resolved politically, the statutes must be applied. Although I feel there should be an increase for professionals in general, I think that what happened to us is an example of the alternatives that can be taken. Benito Perez, our alderman in Coatzacoalcos, embezzled funds and we called him up for it. He did not come so we applied the statutes.

7717

CSO: 3248/573

## PSUM DOCUMENT DEVOTES SPACE TO FINANCE-RELATED ISSUES

Mexico City ASI ES in Spanish No 99, 26 Mar 84 pp 17-18

["Central Committee Guidelines and General Aims for 1984" issued by the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico; Mexico, D.F., January 1984]

[Text] This document contains the general work lines that the CC [Central Committee] proposes to develop this year. Since the CC is structured by areas and national committees to achieve its objectives of leadership, that order has been followed in the presentation of this document. However, there are tasks included here that spill over from one area and are actually part of the general scope of tasks of the CC as the national leadership organ of the PSUM [Unified Socialist Party of Mexico].

The document presents the tasks that can be developed this year in the opinion of the CC. It omits many others that are being done now and that obviously will continue in 1984. Since it is an initial statement, the tasks contained here will be subject to the necessary modifications that the course itself of party work and the evolution of the country determine. Therefore, the CC resolves to make two evaluations in 1984 of the progress in the fulfillment of the tasks and objectives contained here.

In the more general area of work organization as the top leadership organ of the PSUM between congresses, the CC resolves to encourage the regular functioning of its areas and committees. It also resolves to design a cadre training policy to strengthen the work of the areas and committees. The CC authorizes the Political Committee and the Secretariat to adopt organizational measures that contribute to the fulfillment of the present objective.

## Organization

a) In fulfillment of the Second National Congress of the PSUM, the CC resolves to hold the National Organization Conference in August. First the discussion material that will serve as the basis for the conference must be drawn up. Therefore, the CC assigns the Political Committee to present a draft discussion document on the organizational tasks of the PSUM to the Fourth Plenum. According to Article 22 of our statutes, the PSUM National Organization Conference will include the members of the CC, the secretaries general of the state



committees, the organization officials of the state committees, the secretaries general of the municipal, zone and branch committees and the guests invited by the CC. The agenda and the scope of the conference will be determined by the CC itself.

b) The CC resolves to support the regular functioning of the state committees, encouraging the appointment of the necessary committees for that objective. It also resolves to help form leadership cells in those states where the state committee faces serious problems in formation and operation. In 1984 the CC will promote opening permanent PSUM offices in at least all the state capitals.

c) The CC assigns the Area of Organic Construction to draw up an informational document on the present situation of the PSUM organization with special emphasis on the municipal committees and base organisms. It will have to obtain information on the number of members and formation of leadership organs.

d) The CC resolves to draw up a national plan for construction of the PSUM in the main cities of the country. Therefore, it authorizes the Area of Organic Construction to work with the state committees to present a draft for discussion and approval by the CC.

e) The state, municipal, zone and branch committees, with the support of the CC, will systematize already existing base organisms, appoint members to base organisms and create new organisms, especially by work center, in factories, shops, public and private offices and businesses.

f) In May 1984, a conference will be held to establish the National University Branch. The Political Committee will do all the necessary preparatory work.

g) The CC resolves to begin preparations for holding the Third National Conference of the Education Workers Branch this year.

h) The CC resolves to increase the number of professional cadres assigned to organic construction tasks. Therefore, it authorizes the Secretariat to carry out the necessary operational measures for fulfillment of this resolution.

#### Financing the PSUM

a) The CC assigns the Secretariat to formulate a National Financing Plan for the PSUM. It must contain at least the following aspects: dues, enterprises and fund-raising events and the guidelines for a policy to allocate resources that helps achieve the objectives presented in this document.

b) The CC, through the Area of Finances and with the participation of all its members, will draw up and carry out a National Dues Campaign for the members of the PSUM. Therefore, the Area of Finances must work with the state committees to establish the mechanisms to insure regular payment and statutory distribution of the shares. The Area of Finances will keep the CC informed about the results of this campaign.

c) The Area of Finances will support the state committees in forming their own financing systems and carrying out regulatory controls of their revenue and

expenditures. In 1984 an overall account of all the revenue and expenses of the different levels under the CC must be drawn up through the CC comptroller. Therefore, there must be progress in the integration of the state committees to that account.

d) As to the functioning of the enterprises, the basic objectives for 1984 are:

To resume production of new titles in our publishing house and make these profitable;

To increase the production and sales of the record enterprise, increasing its level of profitability; and

To begin operations of the integral graphic arts enterprise, guaranteeing its profitability and capitalization.

e) A new enterprise for foreign trade activities must be created in 1984.

f) There must be progress in making pamphlets self-supporting with the establishment of the respective mechanisms in the state committees.

g) The profitability of the Festival PSUM, 84, and other fund-raising events that will be held this year **must** be guaranteed.

h) The CC resolves to incorporate new cadres to the Area of Finances. All the members of the CC itself must support the financial activities since they constitute a fundamental basis for realization of all PSUM activities.

#### Propaganda

a) The CC resolves to draw up, through its Area of Information and Propaganda, a policy document on the communications media to serve as the basis for the deployment of more intense and better organized activity in this area.

b) The CC will encourage the struggle demanding a license for the PSUM to have a radio station.

c) The Area of Information and Propaganda must adopt measures to improve the quality of radio and television programs. Therefore, it will promote the participation of other areas of the CC in these tasks.

d) The CC assigns the Area of Information and Propaganda and the Electoral Area to draw up a propaganda support plan for the election campaigns that will be held in 1984. It will guarantee the timely production and distribution of propaganda material.

e) In 1984 the basic documents and resolutions of the Second Congress and the CC plenums will be published in the Serie Ediciones of the CC. Their distribution to all party members will be insured.

f) In coordination with the Electoral Area, the Area of Information and Propaganda will draw up a general propaganda proposal for the 1985 federal election campaign.

- g) The Area of Information and Propaganda will maintain regular contact with the PSUM members who write for different periodicals.
- h) The CC resolves to strengthen its Press Committee in order to insure publication of the agreements, initiatives and proposals of the PSUM in the different information organs to which we have access.
- i) With respect to the main organ of the CC, the newspaper ASI ES, it assigns to its leadership the plan to implement a system to recover sales in order to substantially increase the percentage of its self-support which is now about 20 percent.
- j) ASI ES must improve the quality of its information and its analyses and promote the participation of PSUM leaders and members, especially the members of the CC, the state and municipal committees. In 1984 the network of correspondents throughout the country and the distribution network that guarantees that our newspaper reach all PSUM members must be improved.
- k) The CC resolves to create a weekly analysis section in the newspaper ASI ES. It will be written by the newspaper leadership and the Area of Analysis and Education. This section will contain articles, discussions and documents that contribute to publicizing and developing the PSUM political line and theory, mainly among the party members.
- l) The CC resolves that the Political Committee immediately appoints the Editorial Council of the newspaper.

#### Electoral

- a) The CC resolves to give priority attention to the seven state election campaigns that will be held in 1984. Therefore, it will support the state committees with cadres from the CC itself to design and carry out the election campaigns.
- b) In coordination with the Area of Analysis and Education, the Electoral Area will support the state committees in drawing up election platforms and government programs at the state and municipal levels.
- c) The CC assigns the Electoral Area to formulate the general plan for the 1985 federal election campaign.
- d) The Electoral Area will formulate electoral statistics and will promptly report the PSUM results in each campaign to the CC.
- e) The CC authorizes the Electoral Area to coordinate the activity of the PSUM representatives in all the federal and state electoral organs. It will register them throughout the country.
- f) The CC authorizes the Electoral Area to work with the state committees to coordinate the policy of electoral alliances so that this policy follows the provisions issued by the National Congress and the CC resolutions.

g) The Electoral Area, in coordination with the state committees, will design a system of electoral coverage that guarantees the presence of PSUM representatives at as many voting booths as possible.

h) The CC resolves to incorporate new cadres to electoral work.

#### Analysis and Education

a) Starting in February 1984, the Center for Studies on the National Economy will distribute its weekly economic report to all the members of the CC and the state committees. Also publication of the quarterly bulletin ALTERNATIVA ECONOMICA will begin in 1984.

b) CEMOS [Center for Studies on the Labor and Socialist Movement] will organize **different** activities in 1984 to publicize and support the research it does. It will publish essays on the history of the PCM [Mexican Communist Party], a graphic history of the PCM, the collection of articles by Miguel A. Velasco, several editions with the ECP [expansion unknown] and four issues of the bulletin MEMORIA.

c) The CES [Center for Socialist Education] will hold 10-week courses for scholarship holders at its installations in Mexico City in 1984. It will collaborate with the state committees to organize and carry out political education courses for PSUM members in the states. It will publish the first political education course for the use of the base organisms and will organize different events for the analysis and discussion of the PSUM line. With the support of the committees and centers in the area, the CES will write political education material for the PSUM members.

d) In 1984 the work of the Committee for International Studies and the Committee for National Studies will be encouraged. The first will contribute to the tasks of the International Area, supplying it analysis materials, publicizing the international positions of the PSUM and publishing documents of other parties abroad through the publication of the bulletin CARPETA INTERNACIONAL. The main objective for 1984 of the second committee is to achieve its formation and formulation of an immediate plan of activities.

e) The Area of Analysis and Education will collaborate with the party publishing house to design an editorial policy and select titles to be published this year.

f) The CC resolves to strengthen support for the activity of the centers and committees in the Area of Analysis and Education, promoting publicity about their activities throughout the party.

#### International

a) The CC, through the International Area, will promote the development, diversification and consolidation of relations between the PSUM and other parties and movements within the framework of our basic documents and the political resolution of the Second National Congress.

b) The CC will promote throughout the country acts of solidarity with the peoples who fight for their liberation and for the construction of socialism. Special attention must be given to solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Central America and the Caribbean: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Cuba.

c) The International Area will send the parties in other countries the basic statements and concrete positions of the PSUM concerning international problems. It will seek agreements for joint action in matters of collective interest.

#### Coordination of Work with the Masses

a) The CC resolves to hold the national conferences decided on by the Second National Congress with the following schedule:

National Union Conference, June 1984

National Agrarian Conference, pending

Youth Conference, pending

Women's Conference, pending

Urban-Popular Conference, pending

The CC will decide who will attend each conference and the agenda for each one based on Article 22 of the statutes.

b) In fulfillment of the Second National Congress, the CC will give special attention to the union work of the PSUM, strengthening the National Union Committee with new cadres and encouraging construction of state union committees.

c) The CC authorizes the Political Committee and the Secretariat to contribute to the formation and regular functioning of the Agrarian, Youth, Women's, Urban-Popular and Ethnic Groups committees and will promote a plan of activities for each one and the assignment of cadres to their tasks.

#### Federal Parliamentary Group

a) The Parliamentary Group, in coordination with the state committees, will organize public information events concerning the activity and results of the second session of the Chamber of Deputies.

b) At the plenum before the beginning of the 1984 sessions, the Parliamentary Group will present the CC its work program for the third session. The areas and committees will offer their support to formulate the program and carry it out.

c) The Parliamentary Group will contribute, with the areas and committees of the CC, to the development of the activities of the PSUM, particularly electoral tasks and support to local deputies from our party.

## Alternative Program

The CC authorizes the Political Committee to discuss and present for the discussion of all the party the draft Alternative Government Program that will serve as the basis for the election platform in the 1985 federal election campaign.

The Political Committee and the Secretariat of the CC will immediately work on the formation and formulation of a plan of activities for a new committee responsible for technical and political support for the popularly elected representatives from the PSUM in the states. The activities of this new committee must be coordinated with the state and municipal committees on which the popularly elected officials of the PSUM depend.

Mexico, D.F., January 1984

Third Plenum of the CC of the PSUM

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CSO: 3248/569



## STUNAM FACTIONAL DIFFERENCES APPEAR DURING GENERAL CONGRESS

## Charges by Democratic Renovation

Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish 4 Apr 84 p 4

[Text] Problems between political factions in STUNAM [Trade Union of Workers of the National Autonomous University of Mexico] reappeared yesterday during the General Council of Representatives of that organization. The RD [Democratic Renovation] accused the new executive committee of wanting to ignore the resolutions passed by the Electoral College stating that the members of the Bloc of Democratic Forces who will be on the new committee will hold intermediate positions.

RD indicated that the secretary general elect, Evaristo Perez Arreola, did not legally summon the existing executive committee whose duties end next 29 April. Instead, he asked permission for all the workers to attend because he wanted his proposal approved. The proposal was that the Bloc of Democratic Forces would hold the last positions from 13 to 17, total number on the committee.

During the council meeting that was especially well attended for that reason, the bloc came out in favor of the proposal of the Electoral College but this was ignored by the vote.

RD reported to this newspaper that union law is being violated by that vote since the Electoral College has the authority to determine the placement of positions. It and other tendencies on the new committee "predict a dangerous line toward the right" that must be fought.

## Executive Committee Membership Named

Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish 5 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by Teresa Gil]

[Text] There have been no violations to the statutory law of STUNAM, according to the new executive committee of that organization yesterday. It stated that the Electoral College does not determine the distribution of the positions on the committee but the superior organ, the General College of Representatives. That organ voted 179 to 30 that 13 members of the Union Unity slate remain in

the first positions and four of the Bloc of Democratic Forces in the subsequent ones.

In a press conference Nicolas Olivos Cuellar, secretary of academic organization, also explained that there are no problems between the factions. He repeated that the fights ended with the committee election and that this process will end tomorrow when the new union leaders take office.

Olivos Cuellar said that the political parties have always worked within the institution and there will be no exception in the new committee. He stated: "The union is respectful of the participation of the parties and its affiliates' membership in them."

He even repeated that the entire gamut of leftist organizations is represented in STUNAM, some in the Executive Committee itself.

He also explained that the union is not participating in this phase of university reform because it has its own project, structured on an in-depth reform of university programs. He added, concerning the election of rector: "We do not know what Rivero Serrano's intentions are." The union has not had any information on the appointment process. Whatever it may be, he stated, the union has other plans.

On the appointment of secretaries for the Executive Committee based on the principle of proportionality, he said that these were filled based on the votes the slates won: Union Unity (52.55 percent of the votes) and Bloc of Democratic Forces (32.25 percent).

The Executive Committee that will lead STUNAM as of tomorrow is as follows: secretary general, Evaristo Perez Arreola; secretary of administrative organization, Leonardo Olivos Cuellar; secretary of academic organization, Nicolas Olivos Cuellar; secretary of administrative work, Pablo Pedro Gutierrez Bardales; secretary of administrative conflicts, Benito Cristobal Ortiz; secretary of work and conflicts, Felisa Zimbron; secretary of relations, Francisco Garcia de la Cadena; secretary of press and propaganda, Alberto Pulido Aranda; secretary of finances, Adrian Pedrozo Castillo; secretary of education and cultural promotion, Armando Solares Basaldua; secretary of sports, Agustin Rodriguez; secretary of university affairs, Elmer Diaz Diaz; secretary of social welfare, Francisco Garcia de la Cadena; secretary of housing development, Armando Quintero Martinez; secretary of work with women, Ivon Cisneros Lujan; secretary of analysis and studies, Felipe Espinoza Torres; and secretary of records, resolutions and archives, Luis Bravo Perez.

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## ANTILLEANS DEMAND MORE DUTCH FUNDS

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 16 Apr 84 p 4

[Text] Willemstad, 16 Apr--Holland will be asked to become the main contributor to a 'survival fund' for the Netherlands Antilles when Antilles Affairs Minister Jan de Koning arrives here today, a government minister said at the weekend.

Ralph Richardson, Constitutional Structure Minister in the Willemstad-based central government of the six Caribbean Islands, said agreement on the request was reached last Friday.

He said the central government and delegates to the island's recently-failed financial summit agreed that Holland should become chief contributor to a fund providing for the smaller, more economically dependent islands, after Aruba's planned secession in 1986.

Holland has proposed contributing 10 per cent to post-secession fund, with the larger islands of Curacao and Aruba providing the remainder at a ratio of 5 to 2.

## Guarantee Wanted

The island nation's summit collapsed earlier this month when the smaller islands (St Maarten, Bonaire, Saba and St Eustatius) demanded guarantees on the fund before discussing the group's future after Aruban secession.

Richardson said the government and representatives also hoped to reach agreement with De Koning on an increase in Holland's financial aid to the Antilles.

After Friday's meeting, Aruban leader Betico Croes expressed his satisfaction with the decision to call on Holland for greater contributions.

'Holland brought them together. Holland is therefore responsible for the proper management of the smaller islands when Aruba secedes. Holland colonised these islands,' Croes noted.

## INAA DIRECTOR EXPLAINS MANAGUA'S WATER SUPPLY PROBLEMS

Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 31 Mar 84 p 5

[Text] A poll conducted by BARRICADA in various sectors of the capital shows that although some people naturally are annoyed by the cuts of water service, it is generally understood that the cuts are necessary to avoid the total draining of Asososca Lake.

"The lake is drying up," said Ana Julia Reyes of the Riguero sector. Estela Acevedo Lopez was of the same opinion, adding that she didn't feel singled out.

Others from the Carlos Fonseca and Rene Cisneros districts seemed to be quite aware of the situation imposed by the water cuts, and said resolutely: "There is no other way out, brother, and I prefer the cuts to being left without running water."

The serious problem with Asososca was discussed by the minister-director of INAA [Nicaraguan Water and Sewage Institute], Otoniel Arguello, who recalled that a minimum daily consumption of 10 million gallons was required in 1960 when Managua had a population of 200,000.

Twenty years later, in 1980, the population was tripled by the progressive settlements to more than 800,000 and water demand was four times higher with a daily consumption of 44 million gallons. The water is obtained from various sources, which are the wells and Asososca Lake with a capacity of supplying 16 million gallons daily.

Arguello said the effect on the lake started in 1970 when approximately 3 million gallons of water were obtained from it daily, which was greater than its installed capacity and caused its level to drop 3.54 meters. Managua's water authority tried to satisfy this demand by installing new wells in the Los Robles sector, and by 1972 Asososca's level had dropped only 1 meter.

The situation became normal after the earthquake [in 1973], and reached its critical point in 1975 when 24 million gallons of water were pumped out daily, in other words, about 50 percent over its capacity. Eight wells were built in 1976 in the airport area. However, in 1979 the water in the lake was overexploited, and its level only needed to drop 22 centimeters more to uncover the pumps that drew the water.

## Response of the Revolution

At the time of the revolutionary victory, the lake's water had dropped 34 meters and for the first time an appeal was made to the people to conserve water. Excellent results were attained since 7 centimeters were recovered daily, and the critical summer season ended with the lake being 30 centimeters below its normal pumping level.

The water reserve attained in 1980 permitted the start of the following year without major problems. Meanwhile, stressed the official, INAA began its reconstruction plans, reactivating the wells in Los Barrios, Colonia Centroamerica, Nicarao, UNAN [National Autonomous University of Nicaragua] and other areas which supplied 1 million gallons daily. Five new wells were opened in the airport area, and exploitation plans were implemented for the fourth stage of the plan--more water for Managua.

However, Asososca dropped another 26 centimeters in 1983. Therefore, INAA mounted a campaign in parks and schools with the support of the youth organizations, JS 19 de Julio [19 July Sandinist Youth] and ANS [Association of Sandinist Children], but without favorable results.

### Another Problem: Acts of Aggression and Managua Lake

Arguello argued that lowering the pumps more to drain the water from the lake is not the solution, since that would mean extracting the moderate amount of water that filters from Lake Managua due to erosion of the subsoil. Moreover, he said the operation is too expensive and complex for the country which earmarks most of its resources to defense because of the constant acts of U.S. military aggression.

In this regard, he said the only company in this country capable of drilling wells suspended the INAA contract for the exploration of three additional wells because the company's services were required to raise the country's agricultural production. The city currently has 26 wells which complement water supply to the population by more than 27 million gallons per day, in addition to the 21 million supplied by Asososca. He further emphasized that five other wells are paralyzed for the lack of spare parts that come from abroad.

### Projects

The first phase of the fourth stage of plans to provide sufficient potable water to the city is on its final study phase. It consists of drilling 30 wells in the jurisdiction of TISMA, in Masaya Department. Another part of these plans is based on obtaining water from Cocibolca or Granada lakes, which would start during the subsequent stage within the next 10 years.

"Self-rationing is the best solution. That is why this campaign will be more aggressive, since we will disseminate it directly to all homes and production centers, with the help of the mass organizations," he concluded.

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## DAILY ANALYZES CHANGES IN CHILEAN ECONOMIC POLICY

Lima LA PRENSA in Spanish 9 Apr 84 p 10

[Editorial: "What Economic Policy Has Failed in Chile?"]

[Text] The recent replacement of the finance and economic ministers is interpreted as a sign of change in Chile's economic policy. It appears that the ministries everywhere dealing with these matters share the same lot. Every change is seen as a policy change. On the other hand, no one is interested in whether the agriculture minister leaves, nor is there speculation as to whether "agrarian policy" will change.

The Chilean case is mistakenly viewed as the failure of neoliberalism. It is argued that it is a theory which does not work "in our reality." We know that either the theory works, or it doesn't, period. Therefore, we should know beforehand if the theory is applicable or not, that is, whether what occurred in Chile was neoliberalism or whether we are being deceived. And that is what's happening. But this is not a matter of talking about theories; rather it concerns what happened to the Chilean economy.

Chile wanted to turn toward a market economy. But this was only a half-way attempt, because today there are still dozens of state enterprises in Chile. The generals, of whom an understanding of economics can hardly be expected, did not pay attention to that. For them, opening the market to imports meant everything.

They reduced the tariffs to 10 percent of the import value. In theory, the free market would restore the balance. The exports and imports of goods and services would restore the balance. But it wasn't like that, nor could it have been, because the theory required that the exchange rates also be free for this balance to be produced. The generals forgot this. Once again, they cannot be expected to have the know-how.

In April 1979, parity was fixed at 39 pesos per dollar. The rate was artificial. Imports became comparatively cheaper than Chilean products. These, when exported abroad, were comparatively quite expensive. The consequences were two-fold: a deficit in the trade balance and the bankruptcy of Chilean enterprises, because they were unable to compete with foreign products, inexplicably subsidized by the government with its fixed exchange rate.



Moreover, the government was fueling the foreign debt. With cheap dollars, it was cheap to become indebted in dollars. When in June 1982 the 18 percent devaluation occurred, the debt amounted to some \$18 billion. Nobody was able to pay.

In addition, the price of imports suddenly rose, triggering a new round of high inflation which, to be sure, has been effectively combatted.

Today Chile has regained control over inflation. But the recession has harmed the country for 2 successive years. There remain two avenues of approach: reinstate controls in an attempt to establish a "recovery," or return to the discipline which Chile should not have abandoned, correcting the errors which should not have been committed.

CSO: 3348/375

## BRIEFS

DOUBLE AGENTS, MERCENARIES CITED--Since the expulsion of 16 Surinamers 1 and ½ weeks ago there are still 71 persons in French Guiana preparing to invade Suriname. This is what Rob Wormer, chairman of the Union for People's Democracy, stated this past Wednesday. There are supposed to be mainly Netherlands and Surinamers among the 71 people and also a few American mercenaries had been recruited. Further, Wormer said that the Dutch and French intelligence services knew about the plan for an invasion to be carried out on 1 April. The intention was to take the border town of Albaina where a government in exile would be formed. A group of 50 Dutch commandos would join the invasion force. Further, Wormer confirmed that the Council for the Liberation of Suriname had invested ¼ of a million dollars in the operation. He learned this from infiltrators in the so-called Council. He called council member Nasrullah a "double agent" who passes information from the so-called Council to Suriname. Further, council member Marte who recently resigned, is also supposed to have passed on information from the so-called Liberation Council. Lastly, Wormer thinks that the Hague ought to forbid all activities of the Liberation Council. [Text] [Paramaribo DE WARE TIJD in Dutch 7 Apr 84 p 1] 12433

MOEDERBOND MEMBERS TO USSR--Henk Shields and John Nijman, members of the national council of "De Moederbond" [The Mother League], will be leaving for the United States for training about the end of this month. Sending them in cooperation with the American trade union movement fits in with the training activities of their trade union federation. Moederbond Chairman Frederik van Russel announced that there is a shortage of qualified union leaders. He said that "De Moederbond" decided to bind officials who are sent for training, to put their acquired knowledge and experience at the service of the trade union federation. If they do not do this, then the costs will be recovered from the person(s) in question. This measure was decided on because lately union officials did not live up to their obligations towards the federation after a trip abroad. Van Russel also announced that "De Moederbond" will delegate two persons to the 1 May celebration in Moscow on an invitation. These are Mr Leo Mook, national council member of "De Moederbond", and Mr Hendrik Sanrocham of the General Association of Banking Personnel. Upon return they will have to report to the Moederbond council which will investigate whether any part of the gained experience can be fitted in the Moederbond model. [Text] [Paramaribo DE WARE TIJD in Dutch 3 Apr 84 p 8] 12433

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